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American Ambassador James Watson Gerard’s embassy in the imperial German capital o f Berlin (19131917) directly reflected the remarkable paradigm shift in and professionalization o f American diplomacy
occurring around the turn o f the century. Prior to the 1890s, domestic matters absorbed the nation,
including post-Civil War reconstruction, settling the West, and building an immensely successful industrial
society. Those priorities considered foreign relations unessential, and the nation, therefore, largely
disregarded international affairs and neglected its diplomatic and consular services, allowing political
patronage to populate them with unskilled amateurs.
Beginning in the early 1890s, however, developments compelled the country to leave its isolation and '
increasingly involve itself in world affairs. Explosive expansion of the national economy, a global
revolution in communications and transportation technology, rise to world power status, alarm at perceived
threats to her shores and her overseas markets, a lengthy economic depression, and loss o f national
confidence helped prompt a shift in the nation’s foreign relations paradigm that would last into the early
1920s. The country’s increasingly purposeful involvement abroad required competent, reliable foreign
representatives to serve its widening interests, thus stimulating by the early 1900s initial, though uneven,
moves towards the professionalization o f the American foreign services. The First World War’s demands—
felt so keenly by the Gerard embassy—laid stark once and for all the inadequacies o f a non-professional
diplomatic service, and gave renewed urgency to reform, culminating with the Rogers Act’s establishment
of the United States Foreign Service in 1924.
Coming at the inflection point of these institutional and paradigmatic transitions, the Gerard embassy
reflected the transformation o f American diplomacy from nineteenth-century amateurism to twentiethcentury professionalism. The embassy’s personnel displayed both vestiges o f the old paradigm and the
rising careerism o f the new. Gerard’s trials in securing suitable housing for his embassy highlighted a
glaring deficiency, even as embassy use of the telegraph, telephone/automobile, cinema, and other new
technology accelerated modern diplomacy’s pace and changed its very character. And, finally, the sharp
increase in work quantity, and its quality abruptly expanding to include such novel issues as human rights,
public relations, intelligence gathering, and propaganda, demonstrated the new diplomacy’s growing
complexity.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: AMBASSADOR GERARD AND HIS
EMBASSY AT THE CROSSROADS,
1913-1917
There are at the present tim e two great nations in the world...I allude to the
Russians and the A m ericans-.T heir starting point is different and their courses
are not the same; yet each o f them seems marked out by the will o f heaven to
sway the destinies o f h alf the globe.1
—Alexis de Tocqueville (1835)

As we would not put a ship into the hands o f a commander ignorant o f navigation,
an arm y under the control o f a general without military training...so we should not
put the foreign affairs o f our government into the hands o f men w ithout knowledge
o f the various subjects which go to make up the diplomatic science.2
—H erbert H.D. Peirce (1897)

Congressman Peirce’s pronouncement the year before the seminal Spanish-American War, while
eminently reasonable, stood very far from being foregone. Despite the prophetic Frenchman Tocqueville’s
early divination, young America’s preoccupation with major'domestic concerns absented her from world
involvement for virtually the entire nineteenth-century. As the country maintained little real use for
foreign representation, her consular and diplomatic services slipped into serious neglect, and even so late as
Peirce’s day largely remained despised havens for political patronage and amateur m ediocrity/ Beginning
in the late nineteenth-century, however, a seachange occurred in American foreign relations and
diplomacy. In a state of chronic neglect into the 1890s, the importance o f foreign affairs to the United
States’ well-being began a steady resurrection in that decade in response to changing conditions and

1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Penguin Books, 1956), p. 142.
1 In the “Arena” periodical, May, 1897, as quoted in Kenneth W. Thompson, American Diplomacy and
Emergent Patterns (New York University Press, 1962), p. 77.
3 Before the Rogers Act of 1924 merged them, the “diplomatic service” and the “consular service”
remained two, separate, often divorced components o f America’s foreign representation. /This work
focuses on the professionalization of the diplomatic service, but does make occasional reference to the
consular.
1

2

perceptions. By Peirce’s time the initial stirrings of America’s coming dominance in world affairs had
produced noticeable ripples. A shift in perspective had begun asserting itself in which Americans
perceived a more deliberate and active role for their nation; a changing paradigm was setting the stage that
would soon prove Baron de Tocqueville a shrewd observer. Its progress saw an initial marked upturn of
American interest abroad starting in the early 1890s. An increased assertiveness in foreign involvement,
the evolution o f actual foreign “policy,” and the transformation from amateurism to professionalism o f the
American diplomatic and consular services followed. Caught in the midst o f this protracted
metamorphosis which would continue into the 1920s, the Berlin embassy o f Ambassador James Watson
Gerard (1913-1917) mirrored the transition and highlighted the unusual difficulties, challenges, and
successes o f American diplomacy’s twentieth-century debut.
After the War o f 1812, the United States retreated into isolation and became preoccupied with
internal development. A liaradigm grew up, that filtered perceptions of what was important and
unimportant in the minds of Americans. In this sense, “paradigm” refers to the predominant modes of
thought, perception, and interpretation current among people and decision-makers at a given time; it refers
to the prism through which they gauge their nation’s interests, desires, and dangers. For most o f the
nineteenth-century, but particularly during its heyday between 1865 and around 1890, the governing
paradigm’s defining characteristic rested in popular confidence that isolated America enjoyed unusual, and
virtually total, protection from outside threats. Exploring and settling the continent’s West, fighting a civil
war, and developing an industrial economy and mass urban society dominated a domestic agenda, as the
nation withdrew from material international involvement for most the century.
In direct consequence, the foreign relations mechanism of the United States suffered serious
neglect, The country had no need for foreign “policies” or for expensive, superfluous foreign
representation. Republican simplicity stigmatized the services, especially the diplomatic, as elitist and
unneeded. Consuls and diplomats were unnecessary, to a nation eminently capable o f self-sustenance and
free o f entanglements outside her borders. The services consequently stood chronically underfunded, illequipped, and rife with political spoilsmanship. Paucity of public funding ensured private wealth as a
prime criterion for a candidate’s selection and thereby contributed to “elitist” stigmas. A tendency to
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change diplomats with every new presidential administration helped wreck any institutional continuity.
And while seen as manifestly inconsequential, the prestige o f foreign posts nonetheless conferred politicalplum status and saw their ranks widely filled with amateurs, party hacks, and incompetents as a result, .For
its part', Washington exhibited a similar spirit of dereliction. In the broader scheme, the country’s “foreign
.relations” remained uncomplicated, undemanding, and unimaginative. Isolated and left with no direction
or policy, missionaries, ambitious military officers, bumbling consuls and diplomats often enough took
unenlightened charge to create situations, which prompted a reflexive, and rarely timely or adequate,
response from the sleepy capital. Far from any system of premeditated foreign policy, mere episodes
composed America’s relations abroad well into the latter-years of the nineteenth-century.
Beginning in the 1890s, however, the confluence of several internal and external developments
challenged the “old” paradigm of nineteenth-century insularism and obliged its gradual replacement with a
“new” paradigm of foreign engagement. These broad milestones combined to begin drastically changing
Americans’ perspective, altering their foreign relations paradigm, and, finally, provoking reform o f the
country’s foreign service and foreign relations mechanism. Leading the way to change were three abrupt
issues, in whose wake other contributing developments followed. The first, most intangible issue arose in
the late 1880s and persisted well into the 1890s, when Americans generally slipped into a melancholy
malaise and fearful foreboding over their nation’s purpose and future. As final settlement of the frontier
West symbolically closed a continent itself symbolic o f opportunity, America lost focus and gained
uncertainty soon to border on despair. For in close pursuit followed two crises to further plunge national
confidence. Decades o f post-Civil War reconstruction and industrialization brought phenomenal rises in
total output o f manufactured goods and stimulated equally breathtaking expansion o f the American
economy and foreign trade. In 1893, however, a sudden panic and severe economic depression turned
promise into ash. Subsiding only in 1897, the depression became emphatic with a second crisis in its
midst, as perceived threats to America’s current and future markets abroad boiled over. By 1895, foreign
trade buoyed high hopes for the nation’s temporarily cooled, but otherwise white-hot economy. Soon,
however, newly erected tariff walls in Europe and her colonies imperiled the country’s traditional markets;
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then China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1895) prompted a feeding frenzy amongst the victor and
prowling European imperialists, which seemed direly to menace potential American markets there.
Other factors weighed in as well to push a new foreign relations paradigm. Despite economic
difficulties and psychological uncertainty, Americans in the 1890s began understanding their nation’s
rising stature in the world community and increasingly looked to exercise her imminent status as a world
power. At the same time, starting in the 1880s, the swelling tide of a technological revolution began
making quantum gains. Modem steamships, airplanes, a global net of telegraphic and wireless links, and
other innovations in communications and transportation technology rapidly reduced the effective size of
the world and urged reevaluation of America’s coveted old paradigm centerpiece, her immunity to external
attack. Foreign trade prospects meanwhile married with technology to expand national interests abroad
and encourage keener regard for developments beyond America’s shores. Together, these several new
developments antiquated old paradigm premises, altered American perspective, and rapidly mounted
•’pressure for the development of more deliberate, security-minded, trade-protective foreign policy. The
nineteenth-century’s passing ushered in not only a new century, but also a developing “policy” approach to
America’s foreign relations and, eventually, a resolve to upgrade appropriately her foreign service through
reform.
Beginning in the early 1890s, a series o f episodes marked a new, rising trajectory o f American
involvement abroad. Relatively minor, but significant, assertions o f American influence in Samoa, Chile,
Hawaii, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, served as prelude to the conflict that established the United
States as a major world power. Accompanied by the mounting crisis over Chinese sovereignty after the
Sino-Japanese War and followed by bestial combat in the Philippines (1899-1902), the Spanish-American
War (1898) bequeathed an overseas empire as the spoils from Spain’s defeat and marked a watershed in the
waxing importance of international relations to America. Teddy Roosevelt rode up San Juan Hill and into
the White House, meanwhile, to symbolically and practically embody America’s new assertiveness.
America’s increasingly purposeful involvement in world affairs naturally required increasingly reliable and
competent executors of policy. Thus, it was Roosevelt who inaugurated the first, substantial moves
towards professionalizing the nation’s amateur diplomatic service.
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An initial stab at consular service reform by President Grover Cleveland (1892-96) marked the
first, real effort since the Civil War to improve the quality o f at least part of America’s foreign
representation. Cleveland’s attempt, however, fell on sterile ground, as his successor, William McKinley
(1896-1901), pulled up the still-noxious root and threw out its temporary advance. Roosevelt’s rise (19011908) after McKinley’s assassination, though, finally brought real change, which his hand-picked
successor, William Howard Taft (1908-12), helped make lasting. Important executive orders in 1904,
1905, and 1909 laid the initial, essential planks of reform, including removal o f the consular service from
spoils-based, political patronage and the establishment o f the diplomatic service on a Civil Service-style,
merit basis for the first time. Roosevelt and Taft thus midwifed American diplomacy’s birth as a career
service. Simultaneously, their Secretaries of State proceeded with thorough-going overhauls to reorganize
an out-dated State Department and better suit it for the demands of America’s heightened foreign
involvement. New, geographically-oriented divisions allowed focused expertise for increasingly
voluminous and involved policy issues. Communications technology like the telephone and, particularly,
the transoceanic telegraph, introduced new possibilities for improved formulation, coordination, execution,
and control of policy dictates. And executive-supported legislation, like the 1911 Lowden Act, sought to
begin long-over-due correction o f the sorry state o f permanent diplomatic housing abroad (namely that
there was none).
The advances o f the successive Republican administrations o f Theodore Roosevelt and William
Howard Taft (1901-1912), however, suffered a nearly fatal reverse with the Democrats’ return to the White
House. Locked out of the highest office since 1896, the Democrats’ victory in 1912 came only after years
of accrued political debt, and the new administration of Woodrow Wilson opted for a significant return to
the patronage system under his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan. By that year, most of
America’s diplomats, consuls, and State Department staffers had entered service with Republican
credentials. Men like soon-to-be-appointed Ambassador Gerard’s First Secretary Joseph Grew, Second
Secretaries Hugh Wilson, Willing Spencer, and Roland Harvey, as well as Gerard’s Taft-appointed
predecessor in Berlin, John Leishman, were all beneficiaries of Republican charity. They, along with their
not inconsiderable experience and expertise, now stood to fall to resurgent spoilsmanship. Bryan
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dispatched large numbers o f them wholesale, particularly chiefs o f mission in the field and department
officials back in Washington. Replacing the retired Leishmans were diplomatic amateurs like James
Gerard, whose financial and moral largesse had helped sustain the Democratic Party through its years of
exile. As the turnover gained momentum, however, mounting political opposition, falling institutional
morale, and pause at the growing loss o f corporate knowledge and experience caused Wilson to finally
harness his thoroughbred secretary—unfortunately, not before significant damage had taken toll.
In mid-1914, a disrupted American diplomatic service stumbled into the ultimate test of
amateurism versus professionalism. Assuming his post in October, 1913, James Gerard spent the large
majority of his ambassadorship representing a thorny American neutrality in the midst o f the First World
War. His Berlin embassy displayed a telling amalgam of old and new paradigm elements, as it stood
midway between the Roosevelt-Taft initiatives away from foreign service amateurism and the 1924 Rogers
Act’s formal establishment of a professional United States Foreign Service. In its staff, housing
arrangements, technology, quantity and quality of its wartime diplomatic work, and in the nature of its
relationship with Washington, Gerard’s embassy revealed a shifting diplomatic paradigm, and shifting
diplomacy in every important regard.
Especially in their backgrounds, methods o f entry into sendee, attitudes, and careers, the
ambassador and his professional staff collectively reflected the transition. As an amateur, political
appointee selected largely on account of his considerable wealth and abiding support o f the Democratic
cause, Gerard represented the spoils system o f Old Diplomacy patronage. The Wilson Administration that
elevated him, itself harkened to the earlier paradigm in its assignment o f the muddled William Jennings
Bryan to the dimly viewed position of Secretary of State. The Old Paradigm could be seen especially in
the Administration’s repoliticization of American diplomacy with Bryan’s return to party patronage. To
the President’s mind, the highest diplomatic post was the ideal place to tuck out o f harm ’s way a dubious
man who nonetheless required political accommodation; likewise, the department’s irrelevance allowed a
ready means to pay off political debts, as well, to men like Gerard. Wilson’s appointment o f Gerard
nevertheless highlighted the waning spoilsmanship o f a different era.
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His long ambition for a prestigious ambassadorship satisfied, Gerard returned to his private life of
leisure upon the break in relations with Germany in 1917. His professional staff, on the other hand,
represented products o f an increasingly professional, career-oriented diplomatic service. Despite the
Wilson/Bryan setback, hardly a decade’s worth of piecemeal reforms had initiated a distinct change in
attitude, as the State Department’s early, professionalizing efforts to adapt to the heightened demands o f
the New Paradigm took root. Political clout greased First Secretary Grew’s entry into service. But nearly
all the rest o f Gerard’s staff entered only after passing formal oral and written examinations instituted in
1904. Most of them arrived at their first post only after 30-days’ initial training in the department’s offices,
also a new requirement. After a 1909 executive order and 1915 legislation, promotions became effectively
merit-based and tenure increasingly protected. In consequence, the young Second and Third Secretaries in
Gerard’s embassy more and more considered the diplomatic service in terms of a career, rather than
-upholding the older secretaries’ initial view of diplomacy as an exciting, but temporary, diversion before
getting down to their life’s “real” work. This notion slowly faded, even among the older staff like Grew.
His early service extraordinary for its continuity in a time when political connections held sway, Grew’s
•tenuous tenure definitively assumed career status during Gerard’s embassy, eventually to span four decades
and every rank in a professional American diplomatic service. Most his fellow diplomats in Berlin
followed his vanguard, with three others also rising to ambassador-rank.
Reminiscent of the passing paradigm, however, Grew and his subordinate secretaries displayed
drum-like consistency in their common, elitist backgrounds. Privileged upbringing in high society; nearly
all Ivy League-educated and well-traveled; all largely secure in private fortunes—together they underscored
the undemocratic, nineteenth-century residue o f personal wealth, breeding, and connections as sine qua
nons for recruitment and advancement in the diplomatic service. Only with the 1924 Rogers Act and
subsequent legislation would true merit recruitment and promotions gradually replace wealth as arbiter and
open the door for real democratization o f America’s diplomatic ranks.
One important reason wealth played so prominently had much to do with the almost total lack of
suitable, permanent housing for American representatives abroad. Well into the twentieth-century, the
United States stood aloof from European appreciations o f housing as an essential tool for a diplomat’s
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work. With little offered in the way of official subsidies, diplomats and, particularly, chiefs o f mission had
to locate and pay out-of-pocket for whatever residential and embassy accommodations they could afford
and/or fmd. Gerard’s experience in Berlin demonstrated the heavy and distracting burden this posed for a
new, American envoy. Quickly condemning his less-well-off predecessor’s residence and offices as
inadequate, Gerard embarked on a consuming, four-month odyssey before finally establishing himself and
his embassy in satisfactory quarters. Options were scarce in a crowded capital, renovations expensive and
time-consuming, the physical move disruptive in every way, the entire ordeal unnecessarily absorbing for a
new ambassador feeling his way through the important, initial months o f his post. Congress had deigned to
lift a finger towards rectifying the situation with the meager housing provisions o f the Lowden Act of
1911. Unfortunately, initial funding for the appropriations finally trickled out only in 1914 on the eve of
the First World War. The war, of course, completely sidelined the lodging issue. A few, abortive, post
war attempts to revive the matter got nowhere until the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926 at last
seriously restarted the move to fix so fundamental a deficiency.
Not only did the Gerard embassy struggle with what it lacked, but it also grappled ironically with
what it possessed. For roughly between 1880 and 1918, a technological revolution initiated enormous
changes to industrial world existence, even as it spilled over to recast the diplomatic milieu for Gerard and
his embassy.' Electric lights, elevators, typewriters, steamships, automobiles, airplanes, the cinema,
telephones, telegraphs, wireless radio—these and other innovations strongly contributed to the changing
paradigm. With feverish onset, much swifter means of mechanical transportation allied with a new,
worldwide, virtually instantaneous communications web. Their remarkable synergism effectively shrank
the earth’s physical limits and radically compressed people’s—including diplomats’-notions of time.
Automobiles, steamships, and airplanes made the world vastly more accessible through faster, more
versatile means of locomotion. The constraints of railroad lines and sailships began falling to the auto’s
quick mobility and the steamship’s reliability and speed; airplanes literally overflew obstacles as they
penetrated areas formerly accessible only by days of ground travel. News and information could be heard
o f events almost anywhere and almost as they happened; no longer were days or weeks required, but hours
and minutes, for word to travel, decisions to be made. Developments might now be shared by people
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everywhere, as the world of simultaneity, for the first time ever in m an’s history, rapidly embraced the
globe.
The technology revolution’s implications were direct for America’s old diplomatic paradigm and
diplomatic service. Events abroad assumed increasingly sinister hue, as Americans began reassessing the
nation’s interests and security in new circumstances. National safety came into question again, as speedy,
transoceanic telegraph and wireless communications between foreign powers and their faster, steampowered warships renewed fears o f vulnerability to foreign attack. Pressures mounted in Washington for a
more concerted, security-oriented foreign policy. Meanwhile, the same technology offered important
potential for the capital’s growing policy approach to foreign affairs, since diplomatic strategies might now
be better informed, formulated, and coordinated in their execution by diplomats abroad. Also, the tighter
link-read micromanagement-now possible between the home office and the field began revoking the wide
latitude previously allowed formerly-secluded diplomats, although the State Department proved somewhat
slow to exploit the possibilities. As with turn-of-the-century life generally, the picked-up pace of
diplomacy compelled more hurried decision-making in response; under the pressure naturally arose a
higher potential for gaffes, misunderstandings, or serious errors. The rapid-fire sequence o f demands,
counteroffers, and ultimatums that oiled the July 1914 crisis’ slippery slope to world war demonstrated this
in woeful degree. Finally, communications technology like the cinema and mass dailies made possible an
unprecedented public treatment of world issues and developments, and thereby elevated public relations
and propaganda as powerful components to modem diplomatic calculus. Caught up in the thickening
environment of accelerating communications, complicated policy approaches, often difficult popular
opinion considerations, and Machine Age diplomacy in high-gear, the Gerard embassy weathered a
tempest made the more chaotic by old paradigm residues on the one hand and unparalleled diplomatic
hurdles on the other.
The First World War represented a major inflection point for American diplomacy as it moved
towards the new paradigm. “Occupying the pivotal diplomatic position,” according to the London
legation,4 the wartime experience o f Gerard’s embassy endured and reflected the nation’s baptism to the

4 Gerard Papers, Folder 18-16, A.E. Taylor to Gerard, 14 August 1916.
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complexities of diplomacy in a new century. Just as the demands following the August, 1914, eruption of
war strapped the State Department nearly to the breaking point, the conflict immediately inundated
embassies like Gerard’s and threw their staffs into chronic overtime. Thousands of trapped American
travelers, especially those in the German Empire, suddenly required previously unnecessary passports.
Access to emergency funds and arrangements for evacuation fell to the hard-pressed Berlin embassy, even
as it sought to clarify the wartime status of agreements with the German government. On top of all, neutral
America’s assumption of the interests o f belligerents like Great Britain, Serbia, Romania, San Marino, and
Japan, made similar arrangements necessary for their nationals as well.
These early, though not necessarily unusual claims quickly fell to background noise, however, as
novel issues highly unusual to American diplomacy forcefully advanced to engage the Gerard embassy.
Matters o f intelligence gathering, public relations, propaganda, and, most tellingly, human rights and
•humanitarianism initiated American diplomats in Berlin to the complexities of modern diplomacy. In
assuming belligerent interests for Great Britain, Gerard and his staff soon were consumed with inspections
o f a gulag of British prisoner of war (POW) and civilian intern camps scattered across the German empire.
j

They successfully protected the internees from maltreatment and neglect by ensuring basic needs were met
and minimum standards and rights upheld by their captors. Gerard’s diplomatic intervention opened the
door for neutral, non-governmental agencies like the Young Men’s Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) to
gain and retain access to the camps for further, important, humanitarian work. In service as an
intermediary, the embassy negotiated prisoner exchanges between governments and thereby secured
repatriation for hundreds o f men. On a scale orders o f magnitude higher, its work on behalf o f Herbert
Hoover’s Committee for Relief in Belgium directly helped stave off disastrous mass starvation for several
million captives in German-occupied Belgium and northern France. Energetic diplomacy failed against
similar conditions threatening millions more in Poland, but Gerard’s continued engagement in the west
forced the Germans to cease forced relocations of French civilians and halt deportations o f Belgian males
to Germany as slave labor. Such matters of human rights and humanitarianism deeply involved his
embassy and directly introduced American foreign affairs to the widening purview o f diplomacy in the
new century.
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Other extraordinary work expanded American diplomacy’s scope even further. Persisting into the
immediate pre-war years, a negligent deemphasis on information collection abroad reflected America’s
nineteenth-century insularism. The First World War’s outbreak left Washington almost completely devoid
of important intelligence regarding the main belligerents and the circumstances surrounding the conflict.
Attempting in a virtual vacuum to formulate and then pilot major, national policies o f neutrality
immediately proved an impossible task. Details of official mood, war effort, domestic conditions, war
aims, public sentiments, and countless other considerations became necessary grist for informing the
nation’s diplomatic initiatives and negotiating her neutrality. Information, then, took on vital importance.
Its timely collection for national-level decision-making assumed shrill priority for strategically placed
outposts like Berlin, and the Gerard embassy marshaled an impressive intelligence gathering effort in an
admirable attempt to keep Washington informed. The ambassador and his staff industriously nurtured
official and unofficial connections with German bureaucracy, newspapermen from both sides of the
Atlantic, travelers, businessmen, politicians, and contacts throughout the capital’s corps diplomatique..
Domestic news sources they continuously monitored for broader developments, while resorting to spies
and private investigators for more urgent or more specialized detail. General situation awareness and
occasional tip-offs derived from frequent official travel for camp inspections, military observation, or
courier duty. American consuls around the empire meanwhile remained keen to advise the embassy of
sensitive news and to usher to Berlin potentially useful contacts. In its exploitation o f information sources,
the Gerard embassy sought to develop an accurate picture of wartime Germany, even as it establ ished
intelligence gathering as indispensable to twentieth-century American diplomacy.
Two further, related factors emerged as serious considerations for American diplomats, namely
public relations and propaganda. Mass communications yielded by the technological revolution directly
sensitized public opinion, particularly in open democracies like industrial America. By the First World
War, popular mood had evolved to a formidable force in domestic politics and the conduct o f foreign
relations. Both the Allies and the Central Powers discerned very early on that their public image in
powerful, neutral America would be perhaps decisive in the conflict’s outcome. Their ensuing media
struggle colored much of the backdrop around the Gerard embassy’s diplomacy. The embassy’s
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humanitarian work particularly turned on international public opinion in large degree. Prospects of
condemnation over an avertable, famine disaster in German-occupied Belgium leveraged Gerard’s
representations in Berlin on the CRB’s behalf. Similar risk o f bad press for Germany likewise helped him
effectively negotiate other humanitarian issues as the Belgian deportations and the French relocations.
Responsibility for the well-being of tens o f thousands of British POWs and interned civilians compelled the
embassy to closely play its influence on domestic, British public opinion. Gerard and his staff understood'
well the substantial effect that publication of their periodic camp inspection reports could wield. Unduly
negative reports or ill-timed release might incite popular pressure on the British government for precipitate,
counterproductive action, which easily could drive German retaliation in turn. The corollary, too, could
brace Gerard’s negotiations, that repercussions from public offense over needless maltreatment o f English
prisoners could frustrate German designs. Finally, Gerard’s painful experience with a German governmentsupported, anti-Wilson, anti-Gerard front organization called the League o f Truth exposed American
diplomacy to propaganda’s poisonous potential. Opposing American neutrality and its developing Allied
bias, the Berlin-based League sought to defame the President and gain the ambassador’s recall through a
multi-pronged smear campaign. Gerard’s vigorous, but ultimately ineffectual, defense employed
newspaper editorials, counterespionage, legal action, a counter-League o f Friendship, and even sketches of
a proposed propaganda play.
Such were the new “subjects” coming to comprise modem “diplomatic science.” Grappling with
so many largely unprecedented demands on American diplomacy as propaganda, public relations,
intelligence gathering, and humanitarian diplomacy, the experience of Ambassador James Gerard’s Berlin
embassy validated Congressman Peirce’s earlier observation, as it helped chasten American diplomacy to
the complexities o f modem international affairs. That Gerard and his staff o f professional diplomats found
themselves at the twilight o f old diplomacy in America had everything to do with a host o f new pressures
besetting the nation by the late nineteenth-century. An. increasingly active and deliberate involvement in
world affairs led to the actualization of America’s enormous potential, as de Tocqueville predicted, and to
her assumption of world power status. The transformation at once was caused by and contributed to an
American diplomatic paradigm shift, which quickly urged the development o f articulated foreign policies
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and prompted moves towards professionalizing the country’s diplomatic and consular services by the mid1920s. Gerard’s embassy (1913-1917) fell at the inflection point of this far-reaching institutional transition
to the twentieth-century, and it could look back still with fresh eyes to the impetus hardly two decades
before.

CHAPTER II
NEW PRESSURES AND OLD DIPLOMACY:
AMERICAN WORLD POWER STATUS AND A
FOREIGN RELATIONS PARADIGM SHIFT, 1898-1918
Som ething new and unexpected has happened—som ething which seems to presage
im portant developm ents in world politics. For the first time in history, the United
States o f Am erica is intervening in the affairs o f Europe.1
--French Am bassador M aurice Paleologue (1905)

The mere two decades between victory in the Spanish-American War o f 1898 and the conclusion
o f the First World War in 1918 witnessed momentous change in American diplomacy. Spain’s defeat
abruptly established America as a colonial pow er-a key prerequisite to world power status at the time—
with new territories spread from the eastern Caribbean to the western Pacific. The world war marked the
threshold to the nationls undisputed elevation as a world power. In between those years, the rise to the
presidency in 1901 of the vigorous Theodore Roosevelt saw the initial exercise of the nation’s newfound
influence—the product of exploding industry, growing population, and changed perspective-as she sought
to grow into a new, at first uncomfortable, global role. A domestic preoccupation, little to no foreign
relations emphasis, and a neglected, spoils-ridden American foreign service characterized the old
paradigm. Beginning in the 1890s, however, a new paradigm began asserting itself to bring about a
decided outward focus, an emphasis on foreign trade and affairs, and mounting pressure for foreign service
reform and professionalization. Roosevelt gave the first clear direction to America’s changing international
stature, as the country’s response to a new foreign relations paradigm pushed her terminal rise to world
power status.

1Maurice Paleologue, Un zrcind tournant de la politique mondiale, 1904-1906 (Paris: Plon, 1934), p. 364,
quoted in Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to
Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), p.
'42.
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Across the Atlantic in 1905, European statesmen like Ambassador Paleologue had grown arrogant
over their long unchallenged dominance of world affairs. That year, though, saw them reel at the news of
Russia’s military defeat at the hands o f Asiatic Japan: For the first time, a non-European upstart had
beaten one of Europe’s great powers. But perhaps as important, symbolically, to the changing global
balance of power was the source o f the offer to mediate between the parties. It issued not from any
European chancellery or European statesman. It came rather from the American capital. Around the
globe, Roosevelt’s offer hailed America’s unquestioned arrival on the world power scene; across the
European continent it gave earnest occasion for diary entries like Paleologue’s; and back at home,
meanwhile, it helped serve notice that the time had come for a mature and professional American
diplomatic service equipped for the mounting demands of a new era.

THE OLD DIPLOM ACY UNDER THE OLD PARAD IG M

The change in America’s attitude epitomized by the Roosevelt initiative is best understood by
viewing it as a result of a shift in diplomatic paradigms. In this sense, “paradigm” refers to the
constellation of beliefs, values, and axioms generally shared by the community o f policy-makers at a given
time. It represents the prism or filter through which they viewed and interpreted their world, and,
therefore, the manner in which they considered the country’s domestic and foreign priorities. The heyday
o f the old paradigm played out roughly in the quarter-century between the end of the American Civil War
until around 1890. Historian Robert Beisner best describes its straightforward, insular character:
In these years the outlook of American policymakers was generally noninterventionist.
Isolationist in spirit, they preferred acting in foreign affairs apart from other nations.
Unpracticed in and ambivalent about the use of governmental power, their customary
manner of conducting foreign affairs was passive and reactive and involved waiting in
Washington for events to happen before responding ad hoc, their guidance o f diplomats
sent abroad, mostly rank amateurs, was minimal and vague. They did not equip their
country’s army and navy for serious warfare. Complacent congressmen exploited diplo
matic issues for partisan ends, just as they did rivers-and-harbors bills and Indian agencies.
High state department officials closed shop early and spent little time defining U.S.
policy’...American officials all held to the core assumption of the Old Paradigm: that their
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nation was safe, her security was threatened nowhere by anyone.2

-Throughout the nineteenth-century, a national preoccupation with domestic priorities relegated
foreign affairs to low priority. Her attention and energies consumed by a long civil war, settlement o f the
West, and the creation of an industrial society, America did not consider external developments o f any real
import. Blessed with protective oceans east and west, and inoffensive neighbors north and south, isolated,
continental America also could afford to do so for the time being. In consequence, strong foreign policy
never developed in the nineteenth century. The nation’s foreign relations remained definable as more a
series o f incidents than a product o f deliberated policies; as more a number o f distinct events, not
sequences of actions that moved from a source toward a conclusion.3 Between 1865 and the 1890s,
political leaders under the old paradigm in the United States “showed a feckless disdain for diplomacy
typical of the times.”'1 For example, just as Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps began his ill-fated
interoceanic canal project in 1879, the State Department closed down its legation in Bogota. With such
palsied decision-making, standing neglect of the department, and Washington’s general disregard for
foreign affairs, until the turn of the century a small staff handled the equally small and uncomplicated work
load constituting America’s matters of state.
Domestic political interests outweighed those of the nation often enough, particularly as officials’
day-to-day preoccupations centered around rather mundane activities as protecting American citizens
abroad—especially missionaries and naturalized citizens-who had gotten themselves into problems.
Possibilities of an interoceanic canal perennially excited general interest in Central America, but only in an
emotional sense. Fishing and sealing disputes with Canada were humdrum. America remained only very
m inimally involved in European developments, just as the diplomats of imperial Europe, who largely ruled
the world, generally disregarded and dismissed her. Meanwhile, in the Pacific and Far East, while the
United States (in Beisner’s words again) “followed an assertive, sometimes adventurous course resulting in

2 Robert L, Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the New. 1865-1900 (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan
Davidson, Inc., 1975), pp. 37-38.
3 Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of 40 Years. 1904-1945. 2 vols., ed. Walter
Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), 1: 2.
4 Beisner, Old Diplomacy, p. 69.

a sharp increase o f activity in China, Japan, Korea, Samoa, and Hawaii, [it] took place...within the limits
set by the Old Paradigm. American involvement was erratic and tentative; it was often amateurish and
almost always initiated in the field rather than Washington.” 5
“Normal confusion” consequently marked the period between 1865 and 1890, as the field took the
lead in the face of Washington’s vacuum in centralized foreign policymaking. All too often, an overlyambitious naval officer, zealous missionary, or isolated party hack-cww-diplomat provoked a crisis, which,
once finally receiving news of it in the capital, officials would hurriedly set out to compose. Just as telling
were the unusual actors in the field, who proved mature and intelligent observers of world affairs and urged
more proactive policies. To their suggestions, Washington responded infrequently if ever and by default
left them to their own initiative as well. Occasionally their actions resulted in significant advantages for
the country. If lucky, these boons might find reluctant, post facto sanction-short-term “policies”—while
other gains often died through official indifference and inaction. In any case, several things stood clear in
nineteenth-century American foreign policy. Generally, almost no one on either end perceived American
advances in any region of the world as essential to the national interest. “Policymaking” had little place in
the halls of the State Department or White House; characteristically, neither kept track of developing
situations elsewhere in the world, let alone exercised control over them. And initiative in this American
foreign affairs vacuum more typically emanated from the field, leaving Washington acting impulsively
more often than consistently in the realm of international relations.6
Neglect consequently characterized the diplomatic service between the Civil War and 1900.
Occasional lukewarm attempts at reform set sail only to promptly founder on the stormy seas o f spoils
politics. Congress’ landmark Act o f 1856 established salaries for envoys (whose meager allowances would
stand well into the next century) and, among other lesser provisions, authorized presidential appointment of
secretaries to various posts. Political influence, and not merit, still decided appointments, however, and
subsequent bills failed to gamer any interest.7 From the nation’s early republican roots stemmed many o f

5 Ibid., pp. 60-64.
6 Ibid., pp. 60-64 and 70.
7 Graham H. Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular Practice (New York and London: D. AppletonCentury Company, Inc., 1936), pp. 172-174.
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the inadequacies that militated against a professional foreign service. A republican prejudice persisted
against a permanent office-holding class. Along similar lines, concerns that public office was not for profit
helped propagate an inadequate salary scale. Sentiments meanwhile predominated of the unnecessity of
extensive diplomatic relations for isolationist America.. The country’s republican simplicity was felt to be
threatened by returning consuls and secretaries contaminated with European aristocratic foppishness after
extended stays abroad. And republican economy repeatedly frustrated attempts to improve the diplomatic
service, in contrast to the consular service, which generally was held to be useful and necessary considering
its direct business links. Diplomatic frivolities, it was felt, had nothing to do with one’s duties as a public
servant.
Altogether, these counts encouraged public and political approval of spoilsmanship and short
term s in office, especially in the case of would-be diplomats. The services’ ranks were filled with all sorts
o f party hacks and incompetents, which accurately reflected the extraordinary lack of official support and
expectations. Mediocrity or worse became the order of the day, as rogues and misfits largely operated the
American diplomatic and consular establishments abroad, placed there as reward—their “spoils”—for
faithful service to the current administration’s party. The services had to rely on annual, grudging
congressional appropriations, which invariably involved tense debates and party deals and certainly failed
to provide even the barest essentials. The shabbiest legation or consulate buildings in town hardly inspired
confidence in them or in potential foreign customers for growing American commerce. Low salaries
frequently required augmentation with income from a separate business. Barring that, overreliance on
consular fees often happened, which only provided incentive for the agent to overcharge American
merchants and shippers, or else use their official position to effect other money-making deals, all too often
without scruple.8 O f the western nations, only the United States steadfastly refused to regard its diplomatic
missions abroad as permanent and its diplomats as members o f a career service. Altogether, two key
elements o f a later, professional service remained almost entirely absent from nineteenth-century American

8 David M. Pletcher, “ 1861-1898: Economic Growth and Diplomatic Adjustment,” in Economics and
World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789. ed. William H. Becker and Samuel F.
Wells, Jr. (New York; Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 128-129.
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diplomacy, namely security o f tenure and promotion by merit.9 The collective logic behind these attitudes
and conditions, however, began to fail around the turn of the century under the demands o f America’s
sharply increasing foreign involvement and the pressures o f a new paradigm.

A NEW PARADIGM AND W ORLD PO W ER STATUS

Beginning in the 1890s, the state o f affairs in America gradually began to change and with it, the
foreign policy paradigm. Robert Beisner asserts a new era in American diplomacy dawned after 1890,
caused by a shift in diplomatic paradigms. In this decade, “[t]he passivity and drift o f American foreign
policy began to give way to more deliberateness and consistency,” according to Beisner. “ [The United
States] entered on a more aggressive and expansionist phase in its diplomatic history and reached out into
the world in an increasingly determined and deliberate fashion.” 10 This emergence o f America from its
traditional isolationism was the result p f a shift from the earlier old paradigm grown obsolete—the result of
major economic, social, psychic, and technologic developments.
The Civil War had powerfully spurred on the economy. The rapid growth continued apace after
the w ar’s conclusion, making the period 1865-1898 one o f unprecedented economic expansion in the
United States. While its population more than doubled, America’s gross national product nearly trebled
during that time. If agricultural gains were considerable, industrial advances were downright explosive.
Coal output expanded by 800%. A 523% rise in steel rail production directly fed a 576% increase in miles
o f railroad track in operation. Starting virtually from zero, the steel industry went from producing fewer
than 20,000 long tons of ingots and castings to an impressive 9 million. And during the same period the
petroleum industry’s output soared from around 3 million barrels in 1865 to an astounding 55 m illionin
1898.11 The economic boom did not fail to affect the nation’s foreign trade, either, which also grew

9 Warren Frederick Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States. 1779-1939: A Study in
Administrative History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 16.
10 Beisner, Old Diplomacy, pp. 2 and 30-31.
11 For example, wheat production increased 256%, com by 222%, and refined sugar zoomed up 460%.
Altogether the “estimated true value” o f taxable property in the country rose over 446%. Pletcher,
“Economic Growth,” p. 120.
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rapidly between 1865 and 1898. American exports rose between those years from $281 million to $1,231
million and imports from $239 million to $616 million. As the decades passed, finished manufactured
exports gradually pushed raw materials exports aside. Thus, towards the end o f the century, cotton and
cereals competed for first place, meat and meat products followed in third, iron and steel products fourth,
and refined petroleum fifth place.12
The exponential growth of America’s foreign trade had two-fold advantage. As it accelerated
upward from just over $1 billion in 1875 to nearly $2 billion in 1898 to $3.1 billion by 1908,13 foreign
trade not only brought in raw materials, luxuries, and amenities unavailable at home, but more importantly
it furnished an outlet for American production, which otherwise would have remained in the domestic
market and further depressed already low prices.. In 1890 America claimed a meager 3.9% o f world trade
in manufactured goods. By 1899, she had risen to fourth among the world’s top manufacturers, now
supplying 9.8% of the total. The next year America’s production of steel and iron nearly equaled
Germany and Great Britain’s combined output. Per capita consumption of manufactured wares stood an
estimated 50% higher than in Great Britain and 100% than in Germany or France,14 which by 1913 would
translate into the nation’s industrial production accounting for 11% of world trade in manufactures and a
full one-third o f the total world output.15 As a result, foreign trade assumed an inordinate place in the
overall economy.
Continued expansion o f American foreign commerce, then, particularly after 1890, compelled a
foreign policy to take shape that would guarantee and protect private citizens’ economic and financial
endeavors abroad.16 But several other important factors swirled about the nation’s economic boom to

12 The nation’s industrialization occurred so rapidly, that the glut of domestically produced goods forced
imports of manufactured goods to fall by nearly half from 39.8% in 1870 to 23.9% in 1900. Ibid., p. 122.
Ij Rachel West, The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War (Athens, GA: The University
o f Georgia Press, 1978), p. 11; and Grew. Turbulent Era. 1: 2.
14 Pletcher, “Economic Growth,” pp. 121 and 123.
15 Paul A. Varg, “ The United States a World Power, 1900-1917: Myth or Reality?” In Twentieth-Century
American Foreign Policy. Braeman, ed. (N.p,: Ohio State University Press, 1971), p. 208; and William H.
Becker, “ 1899-1920: America Adjusts to World Power,” in Economics and World Power: An Assessment
o f American Diplomacy Since 1789. William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., ed. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 176.
16 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920. The Making of America Series, David Donald,
General Editor (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), p. 232.
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promote the change in paradigm. Shifts in any paradigm happen in consequence of both a change in
conditions and a change in people’s perception o f those conditions. In the late nineteenth century,
transforming domestic and international circumstances combined with a new regard for them to further
prompt a shift in diplomatic paradigms. Three fairly sudden and interrelated shocks beset the old paradigm
and joined with several other developments to drive the change.
Starting in the late 1880s and into the early 1890s, American society entered into a widespread
malaise that cast a dark shadow of gloom and anxiety over the people. These doldrums were deepened by
a second shock, the severe economic crisis and depression starting in 1893-94 and lasting until 1897. The
third blow came from abroad in the form of threats, whether perceived or real, to America’s export markets
in Europe and China, a development exaggerated by the other two shocks.17 Together these upsets helped
cast the old paradigm into crisis and stimulate the birth of a new paradigm.
In the final two decades o f the nineteenth century, many Americans grew into a general
uneasiness, marked by confusion over the present and fear for the nation’s future. Its direct manifestation
centered in a sudden decline in popular confidence. Frederick Jackson Turner’s 1893 pronouncement of
the passing o f America’s frontier experience with the final settlement o f the west lent further uncertainty to
the future. The frontier safety valve had largely defined the country’s national character, democratic
government, and economic prosperity: Now it was gone. Many began doubting the efficacy o f American
institutions and suspecting a deterioration in the quality of the American “race.” Many more began sensing
American society had somehow found itself in a muddle, that the country had been somehow cast adrift.
While Turner’s words gave voice to their feelings, several concrete developments contributed to society’s
general unease. Very rapid population growth proved unsettling, particularly as demographic changes like
rapid urbanization and the altered make-up o f newer immigrants (shifting from the north and west of
Europe, to the continent’s south and east) seemed to threaten traditionally-agrarian America’s social
homogeneity and national solidarity. A mounting trust movement and labor unions’ rising numbers and
militancy proved unfamiliar organizations of economic power, which seemed to have suddenly closed the

17 Beisner, Old Diplomacy, pp. 72-73.
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doors o f opportunity to the common man. Then the boltlock slammed home in 1893. That year, the panic
and subsequent economic depression of 1893-97 brought people’s insecurity and desperation to their nadir.
The violence and radicalism that followed them eroded any remaining optimism.
As the national malaise and economic depression set the domestic scene, the third major factor
shifting the paradigm began asserting itself—a threat to America’s traditional markets abroad. As the
decade progressed, the export problem—finding new and sufficient markets abroad for the nation’s
exploding economy—went from being perceived as merely urgent to borderline desperate by the
depression’s last years, 1897-1898. In the face of America’s industrial deluge, European nations had
abruptly thrown up a protective curtain of raised tariffs against U.S. imports at home and in their colonies.
Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) soon opened up vast China to the commercial
•predations of the victor and the vulture-like great powers o f Europe. Territorial annexations and spheres of
'influence quickly seemed to endanger the very existence of the empire, as they cut o ff America’s old
markets and voided prospects o f new ones. Widely shared domestic views grew up, that only decisive
diplomatic action might blunt this threat and help prevent socioeconomic disaster in.a market-less America.
Thus, what historian Richard Hofstadter has termed the “psychic crisis” of the 1890s, sought out an
antidote for the nebulous ills o f American society and her economy. Compelled to reexamine the precepts
of the country’s foreign policy, the consensus settled on a new frontier to replace the expired West--one of
export markets and colonies. Beisner observes that “interest in foreign trade now took on obsessive
proportions. Trade could no longer be handled so casually but now demanded continuous and systematic .
attention at the highest levels o f the state.” To stave off an otherwise bleak future o f shrinking
opportunities amid increasing social unrest, the acquisition o f new foreign markets became vastly more
urgent.
Finally, several other less acute factors weighed in to provoke the shift as well. A virtual
revolution in transportation and communications technology effectively shrunk the globe. Steamships,
railroads, and, especially, transoceanic telegraph cables made the world infinitely more accessible. Events

18 Ibid., pp. 74-77.

23

abroad now seemed more likely to impinge on U.S. national interests. New steam-powered battleships,
governments’ new capacity to telegraphically dictate fleet or army movements, and other technologydriven changes in the art of warmaking made America seem unusually vulnerable to foreign attack.
Together they helped conjure new interest in a more security-minded foreign policy. Rising awareness of
the nation’s growing might also helped reshape attitudes towards the rest o f the world. Americans
increasingly understood that the country’s phenomenal economic growth inevitably translated into
increased influence abroad. This fed an already rising nationalism, that began sweeping the country and
manifesting in heightened sentiments o f chauvinism, militarism, and imperialism—eventually to find live
prey in 1898 with imperial Spain and with recalcitrant Filipinos the following year.
The net impact o f these many developments was to change the prism o f circumstances and
outlook and reveal the world, the nation, and its interests in a very new light. America’s traditional
assumption, the heart of the old paradigm, that she faced no serious international threat, rapidly evaporated.
Arguments for isolation and nonintervention lost their potency. The country’s businessmen, politicians,
and people began looking beyond her shores more and more for reassurance o f the nation’s strength,
health, and purpose. By the mid-nineties the change had settled sufficiently, so that “American
policymakers had begun to see foreign affairs from a new perspective, to confront the outer world with
new assumptions and concerns, and to seek new objectives.” 19 A new paradigm began to emerge in a
blurry, imprecise transition that would advance through Gerard’s tenure in Berlin and into the 1920s.
Several features characterized the emerging new paradigm. With a growing consciousness of
their nation’s strength and importance, Americans began increasingly to consider America as a world
pow er-and that she was now obliged to act like one. In consequence, they more and more viewed
American interests as laying everywhere, and, alternatively, events everywhere as capable o f potentially
impacting those interests. Beisner asserts the most important result was the evolution of a “policy”
approach to America’s foreign relations—of an actual “foreign policy.” “Abrupt and casual shifts” in U.S.
relations gave way to more farsighted continuity, under mounting demands for more concerted,

19 Ibid., pp. 2 and 74-84.
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governmental backing to expanding markets and business contacts abroad, to protecting perceived
American interests “everywhere,” to the nation’s new international ambitions. With the new policy
approach came “a historic shift in initiative from the field to the center,” as “ [pjolicymakers now identified
specific and important interests abroad and designed definite plans to protect and advance them.”
Washington took over the reins of the country’s foreign relations and “ [sjystem began to replace spasm.”
Perhaps most telling, America’s traditional spirit of non-interventionism began to erode. Along with her
increasing external involvement came a new willingness to intervene in other nation’s affairs and to use
force in furtherance o f policy. Beginning with a string of tense incidents in Samoa (1889), Chile (189192), Hawaii and Brazil (1893), Nicaragua (1894), and Venezuela (1895-96), America’s increasing
assertiveness in international affairs finally broke out in earnest with the Spanish-American War in 1898
and the Philippine-American War in 1899-1902.

on

The two wars joined America’s booming economy to furnish dramatic, definite signals that a
sleeping giant was rousing. As one authority described it, “A growing interest in foreign markets during
the late 1880s and 1890s created a background or atmosphere-pronounced if not uniform or consistentwhich encouraged Americans to play a greater role in international affairs, especially in those o f the
western hemisphere.”21 Formerly, commercial interests predominated in America, but by the turn of the
century territorial and political interests had moved forcefully onto the diplomatic scene in the wake of
Spain’s defeat and the Filipino conflict. In 1899, as the country assumed charge of Puerto Rico, Guam,
Cuba, and the Philippines from Spain, Assistant Secretary of State John Bassett Moore acknowledged
America’s changed status from a decade earlier. As a result o f the war, he observed, the United States had

20 In notable contrast to the relatively docile decades before, America quarreled with Germany and Britain,
to the point of hostilities in 1889, over Samoa’s superb port, Pago Pago. Crisis flared in Chile over the
assault and murder o f several drunken U.S. Navy sailors in 1891-92. An aborted, post-coup attempt at
annexing Hawaii (finally accomplished in 1898) and overt involvement with a civil war in Brazil followed
the next year. Passive-aggressive support o f Britain over Nicaragua’s 1894 attempt to absorb the Miskito
Coast and another crisis over a border dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela in 1895-96
completed the run-up to tensions with Spain beginning in 1895. In contrast to the 379 U.S. combat deaths
incurred against Spain in 1898, over 4,000 Americans were killed and 2,800 more wounded in action in the
three years o f forgotten war in the Philippines; 18,000 Filipino soldiers and 100,000 to 200,000 noncombatants died, as well. Ibid., pp. 85-89 and 95-141.
21 Pletcher, “Economic Growth,” p. 165.
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moved “from a position of comparative freedom from entanglements into the position o f what is
commonly called a world-power.”22
• For their part, Europeans recognized America’s rising stature, even as they entertained rising
concerns over the United States’ future role in world affairs. Their growing esteem found reflection in the
1893 congressional provision authorizing the President for the first time to send envoys bearing the same
rank as the representative from the government in question. Thus, for the first time Washington (under
Grover Cleveland) appointed ambassador-level diplomats to London, Paris, St. Petersburg, Rome, and
Berlin, who earlier had so-elevated their legations to the American capital.23 But some trepidation also
motivated the exchange, as they recognized industrial America obviously possessed the wherewithal to
inundate European and world markets with its manufactures. U.S. acquisition o f an empire in the wake of
the war with Spain provoked additional fears over what might follow, as did the country’s puzzling
nonconformity with traditional norms o f world power behavior. America disapproved o f any but natives
controlling countries like China; and she refused to allow herself or any other power to materially intervene
in South America. More disturbing yet was her apparent reproach of alliances, colonization and
imperialism. In this light, America appeared unpredictable to the Europeans, even as they understood her
new power status.24 By early 1900, Kaiser Wilhelm and the powerful German Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz
counted the four world powers as Germany, England, Russia, and the United States.25 .
The nineteenth-century provided a final episode o f America’s growing external involvement in
1899-1900, when a new paradigm exaggeration of the importance of the Far East to the national welfare
produced the Open Door notes. Sensing her new world power status and the vast, promising Chinese
export market at stake, America felt compelled to preserve her interests in the face of the post-SinoJapanese War frenzy of seizures, leaseholds, and spheres of influence that began to partition the country in

22 Varg, “United States a World Power,” p. 207. Modem historians assert America’s rise as an indisputable
world power came after her fight with Spain and began requiring of her nascent global foreign policies
sophisticated military and diplomatic planning. See Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States
Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989), p. 230.
Stuart, American Practice, p. 175. Tokyo received such elevation in 1906.
24 Varg, “United States a World Power,” pp. 211-212.
25 Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, My Memoirs. 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1919), 2: 161.
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1897. In a series o f diplomatic notes between the main parties--Japan, Germany, Russia, France, Italy, and
Great Britain-Secretary o f State John Hay gained multi-lateral, if grudging, endorsement o f the so-called
“open door” principle, essentially the maintenance throughout China of a nondiscriminatory trade
environment. When the Boxer Rebellion threatened to touch off a new round of divisions in 1900,
America dispatched 5,000 troops from the Philippines to help break the siege o f Peking’s foreign quarter.?6
With no troops beyond her borders in 1870, 1880, or 1890, American foreign policies had by 1900 sent
tens of thousands of soldiers and sailors to occupy lands from Cuba to the Philippines to China. Those
policies derived from the nation’s changed perspective of the world, from its altered self-perceptions, from
a shift in its diplomatic paradigm; what was unimportant in 1890 had become essential—or at least seemed
so -b y 1900.
While a few bolder patterns stand clear in late-nineteenth century United States foreign relations—
the country’s increasing dominance of the Caribbean, acquisition of an extraterritorial empire, growth of a
sustained interest in the Far East, and rise to world power status, as examples—it is also equally apparent
much disagreement surrounds these developments. The extent to which economic factors prompted and
guided them, the m agnitude o f Washington’s purposefulness in shaping them, even the chronology of these
new patterns of foreign policy occasion disagreement still. What is not in dispute, however, is that a
seachange in United States diplomacy began to appear around 1890. The transformation, in fact,
represented according to Beisner, “a major shift in the manner of thinking about and executing American
foreign policy: the old, reactive, unsystematic conduct of U.S. foreign relations was replaced by the
making o f a real ‘policy’ in international affairs and its more-or-less systematic execution.”27 In the 1890s,
one American diplomatic paradigm began gradually supplanting an earlier one, in a muddy transition that
was neither instantaneous nor ever entire. By Gerard’s time in Berlin, evidence abounded still of both the
old and the new paradigms. Indeed, starting in the 1890s, the process extended atieast into the early
1920s, as it provided the backdrop and important impetus to a crucial, though lagging, transformation of
America’s diplomatic service.

26 Beisner, Old Diplomacy, pp. 144-153,
27 Ibid, pp. 32-33.
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THE DIPLOM ATIC SERVICE FRO M AM ATEURISM TO PR O FESSIO NALISM

The movement toward career diplomacy in the United States began in response to enlarging
American world interests. Spoils politics effectively subordinated any moves in this direction at first.
Between 1884 and 1896, the American presidency ricocheted between the Republican and Democratic
Parties no less than four times. With each change in administration came wholesale upset throughout the
diplomatic and consular services, as the new administration sought to replace the outgoing president’s
appointees with its own deserving supporters. The diplomatic service proved much the more spoils-ridden,
however, and had to rely on consular reform to provide an indirect engine o f change. President Grover
Cleveland (1892-96) gave the initial kick-start.
Early in his Administration he issued an executive order attempting, among other tentative
reforms, to bring the consular service under the merit system o f the Civil Service Act o f 1883, to include
selection by examination and promotion based on merit with commensurate pay raises. Despite his good
intentions, however, the spoils system persisted in actuality, particularly under the successor McKinley
Administrations (1896-1901), which abandoned Cleveland’s effort altogether.
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By the late 1890s, this left

the diplomatic service in particular “tied down by an antiquated system o f appointments and a menacing
inflexibility,” historian Waldo Heinrichs explains. “It was chronically either shorthanded or overstaffed.
No adequate salary scale existed. Members were not selected for their qualifications for diplomacy, and
they, in turn, entered the service for reasons quite apart from desiring to serve the nation. The service was
spoils-ridden and could offer no prospect of permanent tenure or promotion by merit.”29
Until 1898, the demands o f American foreign relations remained such that their maintenance,
however haphazard, hardly required the attention o f the president and Secretary o f State, assisted by a few

28 Cleveland, however, did dispatch abroad in 1893 America’s first ambassador-level envoys, to begin
redressing chronic problems encountered by inferior-ranked ministers, a point taken up in Chapter III,
below.
29 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 18.
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experts and clerks.30 While such modest arrangements sufficiently served the foreign policy needs o f the
country in the initial post-Civil War decades, as the century’s end approached it became increasingly
evident changing conditions were leaving the services less and less adequate, and Cleveland-like reforms
more and more needed. The early, unpromising vacillation between Cleveland and McKinley at once
ignored the growing pressures for reform, but also reflected the friction-filled transition to eventual
professionalism. For beginning in the 1890s, the department’s workload in Washington grew increasingly
voluminous and varied, reflecting America’s heightened diplomatic involvement, a doubling in
immigration.between 1898 and 1908, and the boom in her foreign commerce.31 By 1898, the department
\

’

began expanding its operations quantitatively, however inadequately, to match demand with supply. But,
as the volume and importance o f American foreign relations and trade increased, mounting responsibilities-for example, to report local trade conditions or to defend American shipping and commerce against, unfair
impositions—paralleled rising pressures at home to occupy diplomatic and consular positions with reliable,
competent men. A qualitative change was needed, as well.
Adapting so far to the new paradigm, however, would lag for the nation’s diplomatic
establishment. The Spanish-American War in 1898 effectively heralded the dawning o f a different
diplomatic paradigm in America, even as it signaled the country’s rise to world power status. But the State
Department would remain a neglected branch of the government well into the next century, with the
ostrich-like proclivities of the old diplomacy hampering response to the new. Nevertheless, America’s
diplomatic service began slowly transforming and adjusting. Heretofore an essentially ragtag, amateurish
institution, the State Department’s reform and the diplomatic service’s professionalization became
imperative in the face of long neglect. Heinrichs captures well the setting which led soon to successful
reform efforts after the turn of the century:

The expansion o f American political and economic interest in world affairs towards the
end o f the nineteenth century, sharpened and symbolized by the Spanish-American War,
gave new national importance to the work o f diplomats and consuls. The glare o f public
J° Grew. Turbulent Era. 1: 2.
31 The number of daily messages flowing into the department, for example, rose from 36,925 annually in
1887 to 94,000 per year in 1907, a 156% increase with no commensurate increase in clerical help. West,
State on the Eve, p. 11.
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interest revealed them as hopelessly inadequate. Businessmen seeking new markets
received little helpful information. American travelers were rebuffed or ignored by
officials in dingy consulates and embassies located on back streets. Abroad this powerful
nation appeared weak, inefficient, and corrupt. What looked to the muckraker like
corruption looked to the businessman like inefficiency, and for both the solution was civil
service reform...32

Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1908) demonstrated early the degree to which proaction and
deliberateness characterized the new diplomacy. The McKinley Administration inaugurated America’s
world power status, a key component to the new paradigm in diplomacy, but an assassin ended any future
role for the unfortunate president. His successor, Roosevelt, would oversee America’s “new wave of
involvement in international affairs,”3'’ as he became “the first president...to have no rest from complicated
foreign issues, just as his generation o f Americans was the first to pursue more than ‘crisis diplomacy.’ ”j4
In 1903, after Colombia refused an initial U.S. proposal to take over the canal project in her northern
province, Roosevelt deliberately fomented Panamanian independence and promptly concluded a treaty
with the new government to finish the strategically critical Panama Canal eleven years later/5 His 1904
proclamation o f the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine further formalized America’s new
ascendance. And his offer to mediate an end to the Russo-Japanese War and subsequent Treaty of
Portsmouth in 1906 further signified America’s rising wave of foreign involvement, which by James
Watson Gerard’s time in Berlin (1913-1917) would begin cresting at unimagined heights.
The wave needed a deft helmsman in the shape of a competent mechanism for foreign policy
formulation and able diplomats to execute it. So, in order to better handle the expanding volume and
complexity o f twentieth-century international affairs, around 1900 initial efforts began to impose a crude
order upon the nation’s disorderly foreign affairs environment. A basic, qualitative shift asserted itself, as

’2 Waldo H. Heinrichs, American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development o f the United States
Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: Little,, Brown and Company, 1966; paperback edition published New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 10-11.
33 Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to TwentiethCentury Diplomacy in France and Germany (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), pp. 41-42.
34 Beisner, Old Diplomacy, p. 153.
35 In contrast to the illogical 1879 shut-down, mentioned earlier, o f America’s Bogota legation at the
moment the French Panama canal project got off the ground. The shut-down reflected the old paradigm,
while Roosevelt depicted the new.
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America sought to reorganize and reform the diplomatic service into a new diplomatic institution along
more scientific and rational lines. With a growing desire for regularity and predictability and the increasing
need for a government o f continuous involvement, a new emphasis upon executive administration
characterized the shift.36 Beginning essentially with Roosevelt, American foreign policy grew increasingly
flexible, largely through the introduction of the fundamentals o f bureaucratic management.37 From
administration to operations, the broad roots o f the State Department’s reorganization rested in pragmatism
and the establishment o f the department, its operations, and its work along more practical, business-like
lines. It was a “new diplomacy” based on scientific policy, and the new State Department was to be a
machine capable of efficient coordination.38
Only in the initial years of the twentieth century, then, did lasting diplomatic reform finally
establish a beachhead. Tellingly, all the important developments during the initial decade came as a result
o f executive orders, not congressional legislation. Roosevelt issued the first, but only after overcoming
much political resistance. The President listened sympathetically to voices like future career diplomatic
officer, Joseph Grew, who exhorted his presidential patron soon after his 1904 appointment to the consular
service: “ We must develop a career. As a great nation with steadily expanding interests abroad we must, if
only as a simple business proposition, develop and maintain a professional [diplomatic] service. Otherwise
we shall be steadily handicapped in competition with other nations.”39 Grew’s lowly voice joined a chorus
o f others in urging an already outwardly-disposed Roosevelt, but only the next year were the political
winds finally right for action. In November, ! 905, Roosevelt issued two executive orders returning the
consular service to Cleveland’s merit system and for the first time placing the diplomatic service on a Civil
Service basis for all ranks below minister and ambassador. The second order also promulgated the filling

36 This development paralleled a similar move in the increasingly industrialized American business
community. Wiebe, Search for Order, p. 229.
37 Ibid., p. 235.
38 The movement toward reform of American diplomacy and its apparatus fit into the period’s broader
concern with efficiency. Roosevelt perceived significant progress “in the introduction o f labor-saving
devices, with consequent industrial evolution.” Roosevelt message to Congress, 8 December 1908, quoted
in Jerry Israel, “A Diplomatic Machine: Scientific Management in the Department o f State, 1906-1924” in
Building the Organizational Society: Essays on Associational Activities in Modem America, ed. Jerry
Israel (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 192.
39 Grew. Turbulent Era, 1: 13.
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o f secretarial vacancies by transfer or promotion from within the diplomatic service or by appointment
after oral and written examination for competence in international law, diplomatic usage, and modern
languages. In April, 1906, Congress passed legislation to extend Civil Service grading and classification to
consular officers (but not yet diplomatic secretaries), and to provide for the appointment of five inspectors
o f consulates to ensure at least biennial inspections of every consular location for efficiency. A new
presidential order in June executed Congress’ act and thereby effectively removed the consular service
from the patronage system.
Meanwhile, no such inspection regime existed for the diplomatic branch and diplomatic
secretaries remained tenuously protected by Roosevelt’s earlier order—always subject to overthrow with a
change in administration—even as Secretary of State Elihu Root at last managed to put through a major
overhaul o f the State Department. When Root took office in 1905, he likened himself to “a man trying to
conduct the business o f a large, metropolitan law-firm in the office o f a village squire,”40 a situation which
he set out promptly to rectify. In addition to a major structural reorganization (discussed below), Root
established an examining board to screen candidates for both services an.d instituted a variety of lesser
reform measures, which were carried on in the administration of Roosevelt’s hand-picked successor,
William Howard Taft (1908-1912). Taft echoed Roosevelt’s sentiments in holding industrial efficiency as
the key to national economic health. Ballooning “nation-wide industries which combine to increase
efficiency and to promote, not to restrain trade,” were America’s future, and a reformed, more efficient
diplomatic (and consular) service would be essential in ensuring this “modem evolution o f industrial
efficiency.”41 With Roosevelt’s 1906 order as precedent, Taft very shortly brought appointments and
promotions for all diplomatic ranks below minister and ambassador under the Civil Service Act through an
executive order of November, 1909. Taft also established a new Board of Examiners, constituted with
high-ranking officers o f the State Department, to administer his order’s provisions. Thus, in short shrift
under Roosevelt and Taft, the rudiments o f a merit-based diplomatic service were set up, gradually to be
expanded by their successors. The perennial problem facing the consular and, especially, the diplomatic

40 Quoted in Beisner, Old Diplomacy, p. 93.
41 Taft speech in Chicago, 18 October 1912, quoted in Israel, “Diplomatic Machine,” p. 192.
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services rested with recruiting and retaining quality personnel. Success ultimately depended largely on the
services’ ability to offer a convincingly worthwhile career. Roosevelt’s and Taft’s early efforts made
significant headway in eroding the entrenched spoils system and saw the quality o f the personnel begin
improving materially in consequence. Their 1906 and 1909 reforms were the first important steps in the
development of a professional American foreign service.42
As America’s external relations widened in both depth and scope, bureaucratic specialization
within the State Department became necessary to handle the greater volume of work and to provide the
heightened expertise required to adequately deal with American diplomacy’s increasingly complex,
substance. Soon after the turn of the century, substantial reorganization o f the State Department began,
with bureaucratic specialization at the vanguard. In 1907 under Root, the department began requiring a
' thirty-day period of instruction to all new consular officers before proceeding to their posts. Two years
7 later in 1909, the department began assigning newly-appointed diplomatic secretaries to a similar period of
■■'-instruction in its offices. Despite wise intentions, however, the non-rigorous training for the most part
. - consisted merely of reading reports and visiting various department divisions and bureaus. New diplomatic
‘' ■'secretaries received no formal, let alone structured, instruction and would endure the haphazard
arrangement until the Rogers Act of 192.4 43
The process of reorganization inevitably touched the department’s information storage, retrieval,
and communication flow. As the volume o f despatches, cables, and memoranda expanded without end, the
department sought ever greater systemization o f its filing methods. Prior to 1906, documents were filed
primarily alphabetically, which proved fatally inelastic as topics grew more multifaceted and interrelated.
The Numerical File system superseded this archaic method in 1906, only to give way itself to the more
comprehensive, efficient, and flexible Decimal File system after 1910.44 As the storage and retrievability
o f information improved, its communication did as well. The accelerating pace o f the industrialized world
required more rapid decision-making, which in turn demanded speedier means o f communication. During

42 Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History of its Organization. Procedures, and Personnel '
(New York: MacMillan Company, 1949), p. 230-231; and Pletcher, “Economic Growth,” p. 128.
43 Stuart, American Practice, p. 153-154.
44 Israel, “Diplomatic Machine,” p. 186.
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the initial years after 1900, various technologies were introduced to the department’s operations, like the
telephone and telegraph, which helped further transform the diplomatic service.45 In 1909, a separate
functional Division of Information came into being and used the new technology to handle information and
data distribution to American diplomatic missions abroad. That same year, Taft’s Secretary o f State Knox
sought to better coordinate departmental activities at the top through reorganization along functional lines
with the establishment of the office of Counselor and the appointment o f five Special Assistants to the
Secretary.46
Perhaps the most important example of the reorganization process came with the creation of
geographic divisions in the State Department. Before 1900, questions of policy intermingled with those of
administration, but so long as the department’s work remained easily manageable, the small staff
•encountered no real problems. After the turn of the century, however, as the workload grew rapidly and
•the issues grew in complexity, mixing administrative and policy matters caused excessive confusion and
.•hindered efficient treatment of the often delicate matters that increasingly arose: It soon became clear the
State Department needed focused expertise. The solution appeared in erecting a policy-formulation
/mechanism separate from administrative lines, namely one of specialized divisions responsible for
geographic regions of the world and manned by personnel suitably equipped by their training and
experience in the field.
In 1908 Secretary Root established the first such division, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, as a
trial run of a plan submitted by Third Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson. The.Far Eastern
Division was conceived of as a policy branch, not a mere geographical convenience, and reflected the
department’s basic, reorganization rationale of efficiency. The division’s establishment was intended to
provide “much better machinery” for overall policy coordination and “direction of the Far Eastern
business.”47 Experienced diplomatic service officers staffed and directed the office, and now handled all

45 See Chapter IV below for a much fuller discussion of this point.
46 In 1921, its title became the Division of Current Information, with primary attention given to public
relations. Stuart. Department o f State, p. 182.
47 Huntington Wilson to Willard Straight, 23 March 1908, quoted in Israel, “Diplomatic Machine,” p. 187.
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political correspondence to and from their region of responsibility.48 The scheme proved so successful,
that Root strongly favored its future expansion to other regions. His successor, Philander C. Knox, gained
Congressional authority the following year for further reorganization on similar lines and issued two
administrative orders in November and December, 1909, establishing the Division of Latin American
Affairs and the Divisions o f Western European Affairs and of Near Eastern Affairs, the latter o f which
included the German Empire.49 In the course o f the next several years, other new divisions would emerge
for similar reasons and along identical lines. Due to increasingly difficult relations with Mexico during its
revolutionary period, a Departmental order established a separate Division of Mexican Affairs in the
summer o f 1915.50 In 1917, another created a section of the Division o f Near Eastern Affairs for Russia
and Romania, which became the Division of Russian Affairs two years later in the wake of the Bolshevik
revolution and civil war, before expanding finally into the Division of Eastern European Affairs in 1922.51
!<■! '

The jurisdictional distinctions between the American geographic divisions seem arbitrary and, to

irthe modem mind, peculiar. The Near East Division’s area of responsibility was a smorgasbord that ran
from the advanced nations o f Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy; through the relatively backward
k countries o f Russia, Turkey, Greece, and the Balkans; and into downright undeveloped states like
Abyssinia, Persia, and Egypt. The small size of the Near East and Western European Divisions reflected
. the State Department’s much greater interest in the Far East and Latin America, whose divisions enjoyed
much larger stature right up to the war. Overseeing an area that included important France and Great

48 Stuart, American Practice, p. 89. Knox’s reorganization also established a Division o f Information to
disseminate information among the diplomatic missions abroad. The new division assumed responsibility
as well for compiling and editing a new, annual State Department compendium, called Foreign Relations of
the United States. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
49 Stuart, Department of State, p. 182.
50 Stuart, American Practice, p. 100.
51 Ibid., pp. 67 and 102; and Stuart, Department o f State, p. 182. In Berlin, the Germans also eventually
implemented a similar Regionalsystem in the Wilhelmstrasse’s operations, to replace an antiquated and
rudimentary scheme based rigidly on functional separation of political, commercial, and legal affairs.
Along with many other drastic and long-overdue reforms, however, the change (along with the rest of
Germany’s belated institutional response to twentieth-century diplomacy) had to await the purge o f a much
more tradition-bound foreign office elite after the empire’s collapse in 1918. Drastic reform o f her Ministry
for Foreign Affairs occurred largely between 1918 and 1920 under the vigorous direction of Friedrich
Edmund Schueler, whose extraordinary influence on the course o f the internal restructuring saw the
changes commonly labeled as “the Schueler reforms.” See Lauren, Diplomats. Chapter 4, “The German
Response: Reforms and Innovations for the Wilhelmstrasse.”
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Britain, the Western European Division counted a mere three staff and the Third Assistant Secretary of
State as supervisor--when he was not preoccupied with his manifold other duties. While encompassing the
German Empire and three other great,European powers, the Near East Division made due with only a chief
and his busy assistant.52 The divisions provided the first point of contact for missions abroad.
Correspondence and cables from the Berlin embassy, for example, were initially screened by an officer
assigned to the Near Eastern Division before eventually arriving on Assistant Secretary William Phillips’
desk through the opening months o f the war, and on an Acting Chief of Division’s desk beginning in
1915. The chief would then resolve the matter himself by reading the dispatch for his own knowledge
before having it filed for future reference; or, if necessary, by drawing the matter to the attention o f the
Secretary o f State for consideration. In this way did reorganization and specialization serve to facilitate
;i administrative and executive flow between the department and the field. Unlike the consular service, the
diplomatic service continued to lack an inspection system until the 1924 Rogers Act. In consequence, the
* new geographic divisions additionally served an important role in linking the State Department with its
many posts and in allowing more responsive attention to the field’s concerns by regional specialists--so
, went the theory, at least.53
The Lowden Act, of 1911 took the next significant, although ultimately modest, step towards
professionalizing the diplomatic service. While the earlier executive orders had addressed issues of
organization and personnel, this act moved on the serious matter o f their lodgment at post. Previously,
American diplomatic and consular establishments abroad possessed no permanent housing for their offices,
let alone for agents’ residences. For years Washington had heard chronic complaints over the issue, but
had failed to find sufficient political resolve to do anything. Meanwhile, each minister and ambassador had
to provide housing out o f his own pocket and very often only after an arduous search in a crowded capital

52 West, State on the Eve, pp. 19-20. At first, the Division o f Near Eastern Affairs fell under the direct
supervision of the Third Assistant Secretary o f State as an additional duty. The increased work entailed by
the war, however, compelled the appointment of an autonomous Acting Chief o f Division in 1915. After
the first-appointed career officer William Walker Smith, Gerard’s First Secretary, Joseph Grew, and then
one of his Third Secretaries, Albert Ruddock, served in turn until .1921, when the first real Chief was
appointed. Stuart, American Practice, p. 93.
53 Ibid.
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for something even remotely suitable. While the act signified continued official attention to the nation’s
neglected representatives abroad, it proved sadly lacking in both material provision and commitment. A
very modest $500,000 was earmarked annually for the purchase or construction o f suitable living and
working quarters. Unfortunately, over three years would pass before the first appropriations were made,
when in 1914 embassy buildings were purchased in Tokyo and Mexico City. The war indefinitely ended
any prospects of further acquisitions, leaving the housing problem very much alive, again until after the
1924 Rogers Act.54
Against the persistent strains of isolationism, in the years leading up to the enormous catalyst of
the First World War American diplomacy could only seek tentatively in fits and starts to accommodate the
country’s new world power status. In spite o f the United States’ larger role in world affairs since the late
1890s, Congress and the American public kept the domestic agenda in the fore even as late as the eve of
“’the war. American newspapers seldom placed correspondents in Europe and developments there were
; either ignored or obscurely reported in the back pages. Grew sounded a hauntingly familiar plaint from
Vienna in 1911, griping, “I have almost given up reading them now [American newspapers], for even the
'best of them are filled with page after page of murder and suicide accounts, while the most important
i

political matters o f world interest are given short paragraphs and sandwiched in where one can scarcely
find them.”35 In 1913, Woodrow Wilson’s choice of William Jennings Bryan as Secretary o f State was
linked to the continued neglect o f foreign matters. Although Wilson once said Bryan had “no mental
rudder,” he conferred the position as an honorary reward for Bryan’s long stewardship over the party. The
domestically oriented Wilson regarded the office as peripheral and unimportant, and, as historian Wiebe
puts it, “ In an era of such speculative freedom in foreign affairs, Wilson believed he could afford a useless
First Lieutenant.” While Wilson retained the consular service on the merit-basis established under
Roosevelt and Taft, he allowed Bryan to “turn [the diplomatic] portions o f the foreign service into a junk
heap o f party patronage.”36

54 See Chapter IV below for a fuller discussion of the housing issue.
55 Grew, Turbulent Era. 1: 2.
36 Wiebe, Search for Order, pp. 254-255.
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The government’s insular orientation reflected the public’s. In adjusting to her new world power
status, consequently, America showed an unmistakable immaturity in her increasing ventures into foreign
policy. Gerard’s compeer across the Channel, Walter Hines Page, captured the struggle as late as October,
1913, when he bluntly told President Wilson, “We are in the international game—not in its Old World
intrigues and burdens and sorrows and melancholy, but in the inevitable way to. leadership and to cheerful
mastery in the future; and everybody knows that we are in it but us. It is a sheer blind habit that causes us
to continue to try to think of ourselves as aloof [from the rest of the world].”57 The country persisted in
using strictly domestic standards to interpret the globe and “remained remarkably undisciplined by an
external reality [beyond her shores],” according to Wiebe.58 America was a world power, yet she resisted
involvement in world affairs. This became abundantly clear, when the system for gathering and assessing
^information from abroad abruptly proved itself utterly hollow. Once the war began, Washington realized
tSits pre-war intelligence collection had not approached the nation’s actual requirements, resulting in almost
%panicky demands for even basic data.
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The outbreak of the First World War almost broke the State Department with the enormous work
■■load that followed. Legations and embassies like Gerard’s in Berlin assumed representation o f belligerent
•-'states, which entailed among much else supervision of millions o f dollars o f assets and funds on their
behalf. Prisoner o f war (POW) camp inspections and reports through the State Department added to the
new burden. Passports, previously not required o f American citizens, now became essential for travel in or
out of war-torn Europe and countless thousands had suddenly to be issued to stranded travelers. A deluge
o f over 60,000 inquiries regarding Americans traveling abroad flooded department in-baskets, as daily
outgoing correspondence abruptly swelled from less than one hundred pieces to a thousand. The w ar’s
demands also spurred a jump in neutral America’s foreign trade and investments, which added further to
the department’s work. Undermanned, the department had to expand quickly to meet the emergency.
. Experienced men were unavailable for the multitude of new duties, so the department resorted to all sorts

57 Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page. 2 vols. (Garden City and New York, NY:
Doubleday, Page & Company, 1923), 1: 150-151, Page to Wilson, 25 October 1913.
58 Wiebe, Search for Order, p. 225.
59 West, State on the Eve, p. 59.

o f expedients. The diplomatic and consular posts abroad were tapped to help fill its ranks. The spoilsoriented Wilson administration now asked back on a volunteer basis diplomatic officers it had earlier
“retired.”60
The duress o f war underscored the striking practical disadvantages of leaving America’s foreign
relations in the hands o f a non-professional diplomatic corps. Wilson already had earlier begun heeding
the political disabilities. His initial acquiescence to Bryan’s controversial return to spoilsmanship quickly
saw the State Department overturned with wholesale dismissals, which soon severely demoralized the
diplomatic service. To deflect some of the persistent criticism, Wilson began stepping over Bryan’s head
to restore confidence in the service and disarm the administration’s antagonists. Only with difficulty was
Bryan brought over to the President’s desire to hold examinations for secretaryship vacancies in
VfNovember, 1913. Holding them implied Wilson’s intent to honor the merit system, as applied first by
.^predecessor Taft in the merit provisions o f his 1909 Executive Order. In 1914, the resignation of overtworked State Department counselor John Bassett Moore created a vacancy in the Assistant Third
■Secretaryship. Contrary to Bryan’s wishes once again, Wilson decided to fill the opening with a “career”
•'diplomat, William Phillips. O f much wider significance, however, Wilson furthermore sought to prepare
'•legislation to codify Taft’s merit provisions by making it Phillips’ top priority. The result would be the
Stone-Flood Act of 1915.
The First World War lent sudden urgency to the final drafting and passage o f the Stone-Flood bill.
The w ar’s outbreak left every American mission in Europe entirely ill-equipped and undermanned to
handle the deluge o f demands that broke upon them. In Berlin, as in London and Paris, a volunteer staff of
. American travelers and expatriates immediately coalesced around the embassy to temporarily augment
permanent staffs working exhausting hours. Heads of mission like Gerard resorted to paying for trained
. clerical assistance out o f their own pocket. Ambassador Page in London required six additional secretaries
alone to handle the workload, but, like Gerard, he needed them more urgently than the department could
send them. One major obstacle to the ready availability of diplomatic secretaries lay with the anachronistic

60 Stuart, Am erican Practice, pp. 66-68.
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restriction o f their appointments to specific posts, instead o f to generic classes. With embassies and
legations service-wide variously and illogically over- and understaffed in August, 1914, the State
Department legally could not move officers freely between posts as conditions warranted. This was a
condition which Stone-Flood proposed to redress.
Assistant Third Secretary Phillips convinced Secretary Bryan early to grant his full approval to the
bill, which by June, 1914, was introduced into Congress and received favorable reporting from the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Just after the war began, Bryan wrote Senators Flood and Stone of
W ilson’s hope the bill would “become law at the earliest possible moment.” Bryan emphasized, “The
President feels that the responsibilities of the American Government in its relations with the belligerent
nations makes it essential that the staffs of our embassies, legations, and consulates in certain capitals
•■should be enlarged and equipped so as to ensure the highest degree of efficiency...” In December, as the
j*- , .

.

.

i'bill lingered, Wilson himself wrote Flood: “At the present time when so many responsibilities are thrown
■'upon our Foreign Service not only in caring for the interests o f many other governments but also in seeking
new ways in which to enlarge our commerce; it seems to me that nothing should be allowed to stand in the

’ ’way of making both the diplomatic and consular services, thoroughly adaptable to the new and changed
conditions” o f the new century.61
Congress finally approved the bill on 5 February 1915, though the legislation did not emerge
unscathed. Its explicit merit provisions were sacrificed to win better chances for passage and would have
to wait nearly ten more years before finally becoming law. Still, the Stone-Flood Act relaxed
administrative rigidity by promulgating diplomatic and consular appointments to five ranked classes (Class
1 through Class 5) based on such elements as length of service and, indirectly, merit. In Berlin, an
optimistic First Secretary Joseph Grew considered its provisions to be “a tremendous step forward.”62 The
State Department thus gained unprecedented personnel mobility and now could quickly, responsively shift
secretaries and consuls wherever needed.

61 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 123-129.
62 Grew, Turbulent Era. 1: 123, Grew to Albert Ruddock, 2 June 1914.
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In this and other ways, the First World War elicited the response that directly led at last to the
“strengthening and expanding of the concept of professional diplomacy” in America.63 The volume and
gravity of wartime responsibilities quickly overtaxed the State Department and prompted a period of rapid
institutional expansion. A protracted process o f “haphazard accretion” ensued, in which new desks,
bureaus, and divisions blossomed as needs arose. As the structural lines already were largely laid, the
changes were essentially matters of augmenting and adapting the superstructure as circumstances
demanded. The war “marked a period of important metamorphosis” for the State Department, according to
historian Graham Stuart.64 It helped make clear, that the progress o f the world, not just o f America, flowed
from a “coordination of forces” and, therefore, strongly encouraged an enhanced national efficiency for
dealing with the new challenges of a chastened, post-war era. Further centralization of power in the
^government was felt to be a primary means to achieving better efficiency, and as foreign relations assumed
new prominence, further reform of the State Department became imperative.
More practically, the war underscored the importance to America o f competent foreign
representation, skillful reporting of foreign affairs and conditions, and professional treatment of the many
unprecedented issues arising as America emerged victorious. A year after the war, Wilbur Carr accurately
blamed the department’s “inadequate equipment” for America’s unpreparedness at the conflict’s outset and
asserted “the first essential in equipping the Government for the handling of these ponderous interests [of
the post-war era], should be the reorganization of the Department of State, being itself the axis around
which the entire machinery must revolve.” 65 Political, social, and commercial pressures emanating from
the war conspired to define the modem, twentieth-century environment in which America’s diplomacy
would operate from now on. The new century demanded a thorough reorganization and adjustment of the
nation’s diplomatic mechanism to better serve her national interests; closure to the process would come
shortly with the establishment o f the United States Foreign Service under the Rogers Act o f 1924.

63 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 186.
64 Stuart, Department of State, p. 183.
65 Carr statement, 4 December 1919, quoted in Israel, “Diplomatic Machine,” p. 193.

While the shift in American diplomatic paradigms occurred roughly between 1890 and 1918, the
essence of the lagging institutional response by the country’s diplomatic service, from nineteenth-century
amateurism to twentieth-century professionalism, developed broadly between 1898 and 1924. Two wars
marked either ragged end, and mid-point embassies like those of James Watson Gerard and Walter Hines
Page reflected both the changing paradigm and a maturing American diplomacy. In the fall o f 1914, the
inevitability of professionalization impressed itself early upon Ambassador Page in London. In the second
month of the war, he perceived a professional diplomatic service as the key to the nation’s prominent role
in twentieth-century foreign affairs: “The whole world is bound to be changed as a result of this war,” the
former newspaper editor divined for Woodrow Wilson’s top advisor, Colonel House. “All of which means
it is high time we were constructing a foreign service,” one reorganized, he explained, in line with the best
o f other foreign offices, and which included permanent diplomatic housing for career representatives
abroad and offered key positions and “dignified treatment” to them as professionals. “W e’ve got to play a
-part in the world,” Page concluded, “whether we wish to or not.”66 Two years later Gerard’s new Second
Secretary, Hugh Wilson, experienced acutely the shock wave of turbulence between two paradigms. By
1916, six years o f diplomatic experience in sleepy Lisbon, Guatemala City, and Buenos Aires had steeped
him well in the plodding nineteenth-century pace and manner. His arrival in Berlin that year, however,
fast-forwarded him into the diplomatic demands of embassy work in the new century. “Those months were
o f the greatest educational value,” he recalled later. “ [I]t was as if a curtain had been rolled back from a
world o f which I suspected the existence, but where I had never before entered.” 67 There, in the tense,
complicated milieu o f wartime Berlin, Wilson encountered along with Ambassador Gerard, First Secretary
Joseph Grew and the rest of the Embassy staff, twentieth-century diplomacy.

66 Hendrick, Walter H. Page, 1: 334-335, Page to House, 22 September 1914.
67 Hugh R. Wilson, The Education o f a Diplomat (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938), pp. 185186.

CHAPTER III
THE EMBASSY AND ITS STAFF
I shall be very much surprised if before the end o f W ilson’s A dm inistration none
o f us secretaries is promoted to...m inister...and I still optim istically feel that within
the next ten years, the D iplom atic Service will be established on a perm anent basis
which no succeeding adm inistration will dare tamper with...[Am erican diplom acy]
is in the making, with the outlook for the future a thousand tim es brighter than it
was a year ago...1
-Joseph Clark Grew (April, 1914)

These words of April, 1914, give poignance to how far American diplomacy had come by the first
year o f James W. Gerard’s ambassadorship in the German capital o f Berlin. Gerard’s First Secretary of
Embassy penned them to his father-in-law in the glow o f the promise o f the American Diplomatic Service
in transition. That Grew could record them after nearly a decade of continuous foreign service was
testimony in itself to great strides towards professionalism. When he joined in 1904, entrance
examinations were a thing of the future; amateurism not nearly a thing o f the past; and job security always
t

a present concern, with the dagger of rampant spoilsmanship pointed at its heart. By 1914, administrative
guidelines for recruitment, retention, promotion, and assignment o f American diplomatic officers had
helped largely safeguard American diplomacy as a legitimate career field and had populated the
Diplomatic Service with increasing numbers o f professionals. Grew’s new boss, Gerard, howev er, was not
among them. Ten years later, the creation of the United States Foreign Service by the Rogers Act o f 1924
proved Joe Grew a prescient observer. As the first Chairman of the Foreign Service Personnel Board, and
Chairman of the new Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Grew could reflect back on two decades
o f active duty and point to his time in Gerard’s embassy as the watershed.
Variously described as “the first city in Europe,”2 “the most important post next [to] England and
in some respects more so,”J “the centre o f diplomatic Europe,”4 “one o f the two most important American

1Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of 40 Years, 1904-1945, 2 vols., ed, Walter
Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), 1: 121, Grew to his father-in-law, Thomas Sargeant Perry,
6 April 1914.
2 Gerard Papers, Folder 5-3, Carroll to Gerard, 16 July 1913.
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diplomatic stations,”5 and “that most intricate of posts,”6 the capital of the German Reich vied with London
in 1913 as the preeminent American diplomatic assignment. A vital, industrial nation feverishly pushing
its Weltpolitik in pursuit of Great Power status, the Empire received that year a curious, yet telling, legation
from the United States o f America: A wealthy, wide-eyed amateur, Gerard, as ambassador; his able first
assistant, Grew, an anomaly by way o f uniquely long tenure in a volatile, spoils-ridden diplomatic service;
the Second and Third Secretaries, Spencer, Harvey, and Ruddock, all recent products o f a service belatedly
making its final, grudging steps to professionalism. Collectively and individually, these men and the rest
o f the staff eventually to serve under Gerard embodied in almost every regard the opposing elements o f the
old and the new diplomacies. Like a geological rift, the shift of the diplomatic paradigm can be recognized
and read through their experiences. Through them, one can witness the American diplomatic service’s
pivotal transformation to maturity, catalyzed by the conflict that would end the past century and, finally,
their embassy in Berlin.

JAM ES W ATSON GERARD: AM BASSADO R

Only in 1893, a bare twenty years before James Watson Gerard first arrived in Berlin, did the
United States first begin dispatching abroad ambassador-level envoys. Called a “landmark in the
development of American diplomacy,” the 1893 law providing for such high-level appointments gave the
beginning administration of Grover Cleveland authority to appoint full ambassadors to Berlin, Paris,
London, Rome and St, Petersburg for the first time in the nation’s history. Previously,.mere ministers
were deemed sufficient, a view as much a product of America’s insularism as of the stigma surrounding the
diplomatic service as undemocratic and elitist. By the early 1890s, however, the handicaps of the inferior
rank in the capitals of the major powers had become intolerable. Frequently outranked by ambassadors of
lesser countries, American ministers like her final one in Berlin, William Walter Phelps (1889-93), often

3 Gerard Papers, Folder 7-22, Lanier Winslow to Gerard, 18 July 1913. Winslow quotes to Gerard these
words of Colonel House from an interview with House two days earlier.
4,Gerard Papers, Folder 6-12, McCarthy to Gerard, 27 June 1913.
3 Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 102.
6 Gerard Papers, Folder 18-5, Spencer to Gerard, 19 October 1916.
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labored at great disadvantage to effectively represent U.S. interests. Junior rank before the foreign courts
of Europe restricted their ability to assume the prominent position and access, to which America’s growing
power should have entitled them. Cleveland’s appointments not only helped rectify the trouble, but served
as the first major change to the U.S. diplomatic and consular services since before the Civil War.7
Like half his ambassadorial predecessors in the post, James Watson Gerard possessed scant
diplomatic experience prior to his appointment.8 His most material claim stemmed from a month-long stint
as a Special Commissioner of the United States in Mexico City, where with the rank o f Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary he ceremonially represented America during the Republic’s
first centenary celebration in September, 1910.9 His maternal grandfather Angel had been Ambassador to
Sweden in the mid-1800s and travels abroad had naturally introduced Gerard to America’s foreign
representatives. But otherwise, unlike most his underlings and most his predecessors, he had no prior
diplomatic exposure before his arrival in Berlin. In 1913, he well represented the quintessential “amateur
diplomat” of America, courtesy o f nineteenth-century spoilsmanship.
Born in Geneseo, New York, in 1867, Gerard graduated from Columbia University with a B.A. in
1890, an M.A. in political science the next year, and Columbia Law School in 1892, the same year he was
admitted to the New York Bar. He went to work for the law firm Platt, Bowers, and Sands, a partnership
established in 1812 by another grandfather.10 His family was wealthy, connected, and politically involved.
From the year of his initial two hundred dollar donation upon joining the Democratic Party in 1888 until

7 Hugh Robert Wilson, The Education of a Diplomat (London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green and
Co., 1938), pp. 229-230.
8 Six ambassadors preceded Gerard in Berlin, three o f whom had little to no diplomatic background:
(William Walter Phelps, Minister to Vienna, 1881; Minister to Berlin, 1889-1893.) Theodore Runyon,
Minister to Berlin, 1893-1894, then Ambassador, 1894-1896. Edwin F. IJhl, Ambassador to Berlin, 18961897. Dr. Andrew Dickson White, Attache in St. Petersburg, 1854; International Commissioner, 1871 and
1878; Minister to Berlin, 1879-1881; Minister to St. Petersburg, 1892-1897; Ambassador to Berlin, 18971902. Charlemagne Tower, Minister to Vienna, 1897-1902; Ambassador to Berlin, 1902-1908. Dr. John
Jayne Hill, Ambassador to Berlin, 1908-1911. John G.A. Leishman, posts in Switzerland, Turkey, and
Ambassador to Rome, 1897-1911; Ambassador to Berlin, 1911-1913. Compiled from Henry E. Mattox,
The Twilight of Amateur Diplomacy: The Foreign Service and Its Senior Officers in the 1890s (Kent, OH:
The Kent State University Press, 1989), pp. 147, 151, 153, and 156-157; and Graham H. Stuart, American
Diplomatic and Consular Practice (New York, London: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1936), p.
492.
9 James Watson Gerard, My First Eighty-Three Years in America: The Memoirs o f James W. Gerard
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1951), pp. 155-160.
10 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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his death in 1951, Gerard proved a very generous financial supporter o f the party, which would be key in
his ambitions for an ambassadorship. He morally supported the party as well, serving as a poll watcher in
the 1892 presidential election; a defense attorney for Democrats accused o f illegal or faulty registration;"
chairman o f New York’s Tammany Hall campaign committee in 1902;12 and active promoter of fellow
New Yorker, Alton E. Parker’s Democratic presidential nomination in 1904. Otherwise working tirelessly
for the Democratic cause, by 1907 Gerard found himself in a position to secure Tammany’s backing in a
successful bid for the position of Justice of the New York Supreme Court."
The Republicans’ iron grip on the White House since 1896 finally ended in the presidential
election o f 1912. Dutiful Democrats like Gerard, who had donated an estimated $130,000 to the
Democratic cause, had stood hopeful of victory and, now, of the expected rewards that would follow ." “It
had always been my ambition to be an ambassador,” Gerard once remarked, and with Woodrow Wilson’s
accession his desire would become reality.15 Wilson selected as his Secretary o f State, the man whose
repeated bids for the Presidency in 1896, 1900, 1904, and 1908 had failed, William Jennings Bryan. Bryan
had accrued a great deal of political debt through those years. Indeed, copper-king Marcus Daly, the father
of Gerard’s-wife, Molly, had contributed more than $300,000 to his campaign o f 1896.16 New Bryan,
found himself positioned as head of the very department of government most suited to pay them off.
immense clammering ensued, as thousands o f office seekers deluged Wilson and Bryan for positions in the
consular and diplomatic, services. Most administrative posts in Washington were changed. And abroad,
within six months of its inauguration the Wilson Administration changed no less than twenty-nine of some
forty diplomatic chiefs of mission. Many “career men” found their services no longer required, with men
like the politically-connected James Gerard replacing them. The changes applied essentially only to
ambassadors and ministers, but many like Gerard’s future deputy, Joseph Grew, feared that secretaryships
might next be on the auction block.

" Theodore R. Berthold, “Assignment to Berlin:- The Embassy o f James Watson Gerard, 1913-1917”
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, 1981), p. 7.
12 Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 11.
14 Ibid., pp. 12-15.
15 Gerard, Eightv-Thres Years, p. 168.
16 Ibid., p.
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Wilson generally gave Bryan carte blanche with respect to appointments to lesser posts, while
reserving ambassadorships and major department positions for his own fmal decision. Occasionally,
W ilson’s selection came with help from the same political shrewdness which tempered all Bryan’s
decisions. The secretary fretted, for example, that there be an American diplomat from every state. And
he felt It appropriate, perhaps with an eye to the important hyphenate vote, to recognize naturalized
American citizens by accrediting them to their erstwhile homeland. A disgusted Ambassador White wrote
afterward, that “it never occurred to him [Bryan] for a moment that the slightest training was necessary, or
the interests of our Government should be in any way hampered...by the substitution of a ‘good Democrat’
possessing no knowledge whatever o f the intricacies of European diplomacy for the man who spent many
years o f his life in close contact with all these questions.” 17
While Bryan ultimately preserved most of the secretaryships, his otherwise thorough-going
reshuffle of diplomatic appointments to “deserving Democrats” incited wide criticism.18 Wilbur Carr,
Chief o f the Consular Bureau for very many years, described the new Secretary of State Bryan as “cold
blooded about it—speaks not o f efficiency, fitness or long service, but merely o f places for Democrats.”
Bryan’s attitude toward the diplomatic chiefs of mission, the ambassadors and ministers abroad, rightly
caused real anxiety since those positions stood unprotected under Roosevelt’s order. In. 1906, Bryan had
told then-Ambassador to Italy, Henry White, that once in office, the Democrats would send only
Democrats to occupy these positions. By July, 1913, Bryan’s attitude had only hardened, telling Minister to
Panama, H. Percival Dodge, that career diplomats should expect no favoritism by his State Department.1''
Wilson went along with Bryan’s pronouncements generally, for both desired sincerely to democratize the
diplomatic service. The two men regarded the service, populated largely with Roosevelt and Taft
' appointees, as representing a virtual aristocracy o f Republican wealth and exclusivity. Even so, Wilson
finally balked at the Secretary’s request for the President to revoke former President Roosevelt’s Executive
Order of 1906, which had classified consular officials and diplomatic secretaries according to merit.

l' Rachel West, The Department of State on the Eve of the First World. War (Athens, GA: University of
Georgia Press, 1.978), p. 31:
ll‘ Grew, 'Turbulent' Era.. 1: 101-102, editor Walter Johnson’s preface to Crew’s Chapter VII, “Return to
Berlin, 1912-1914.”
lv West, State on the Eve, p. 30.
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Along with other political considerations, then, personal wealth continued to operate, a la old
paradigm, as an important criterion for selection to an ambassadorship. An ambassador’s capacity to
entertain stood as a widely regarded essential in the fundamentally social diplomatic milieu in which he
functioned. The more money at his disposal, the more impressive quarters he might let, the more lavishly
he might entertain. In 1890, the American envoy to Berlin received $12,000 per annum salary, which
climbed in 1894 to $17,500 with the post’s elevation to ambassador-level.20 No further raise would
materialize until some years after Gerard’s time in the capital, and across the board the pay remained
entirely inadequate. In March, 1908, “rumor reached print” that Germany viewed the appointment of Dr,
John Jayne Hill to succeed American Ambassador Charlemagne Tower as unacceptable. Doubts allegedly
had been expressed over Hill’s financial wherewithal to execute to the Kaiser’s satisfaction his attendant
social responsibilities.21 Walter Hines Page at last found his costs in London so burdensome that he felt
constrained to resign-but not before the President could arrange a surreptitious $25,000 annual subsidy *
from the wealthy Mr. Cleveland Dodge. For fear o f a similar indignity, numerous o f an exasperated
Woodrow Wilson’s other nominees declined for financial reasons. Among their ranks stood Wilson’s first
choice for Berlin, Henry Fine, an old friend from Princeton who declined, even once Offered a Dodge
subsidy like Page’s,22 The President publicly mourned this unfortunate reality of American diplomacy:
“The sacrifice o f time, of means, and o f opportunity at home is very serious for any but men o f large means ■
and leisure, and the diplomatic service is necessarily hampered.”23
Gerard’s Second Secretary towards the end, Hugh Wilson (no relation to the President),
encountered similar doubts during an earlier tour in Buenos Aires. Wilson had been “really apprehensive”
over the pending arrival of America’s first ambassador to the Argentine, Mr. Frederic Stimson. Considered
a man of great distinction, among the capital city’s great wealth his moderate income could likely land him

20 Mattox, Twilight of Amateur. Appendix C, “Annual Compensation o f Chiefs of Diplomatic Mission and
Consuls General, Selected Posts, 1890, 1899,” pp. 162-163.
21 Ibid., p. 64 and Footnote 6, p. 64. On 29 March the German Government officially withdrew any
objection to Hill’s appointment Grew wrote his mother on 6 February 1910 and described how very well
Hill had acquitted himself nevertheless.
22 Berthold, “Assignment to Berlin,” pp. 21-22.
'3 As quoted in Berthold, “Assignment to Berlin,” pp. 19-20, from The New York Times. March 24, 1913,
p. 1; and Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. 4 vols. (Boston and New York:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926-28), House Diary, March 2.0, 1913.
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“ in embarrassment and difficulty.” Perhaps Wilson put the situation most directly: “Great fortunes are a
comfort to an Ambassador. They ease his contact with the people of the country where he is living, and if
he can afford constant and generous entertainment, he has a wide opportunity to bring to his house men
and women of interest and value to his work.” Stimson’s great spirit, character, and graciousness averted
any problems and convinced Wilson that wealth only eases the path and does not make it. Still, Stimson
was an exception. An ambassador in the early diplomatic service could, according to Wilson, “seldom live
on his salary alone in a way that is dignified, nor can he on his salary pay the many unavoidable
obligations that accrue to his position.”24
Wilson’s solution advocated a state-provisioned entertainment allowance over any salary increase.
Official entertainment o f other countries’ officers and diplomats simply could not be avoided in the
conduct of business. “[I]t is as indispensable to [an ambassador’s] tasks as is the entertainment that a
salesman gives his customer, and no employer in business would fail to recognize the necessity and make
allowance for it.” For all the observation’s self-evidence, Wilson could recount how non-elitist Americans
could still be “startled” to discover that all other great nations and most the smaller ones o f the day had
long recognized and provided for this state of affairs; and he could tell o f foreigners’ surprise that the
mighty United States did not and left the ambassador to his own devices.25 As late as World War II,
barring suitable salary increases or special embassy allotments for entertaining, Am erica’s “great
democracy [had to] rely on an undemocratic criterion [namely, wealth] when choosing its
representatives.”26
After Henry Fine’s refusal on financial grounds, then, the President next sounded his second
choice, Rudolph Spreckels. Spreckels made his fortune in sugar, but evidently saw no comfort in draining
some of it into a pricey ambassadorship and, so, also demurred.

27

Gerard, then, was Wilson’s third string

for the Berlin post with money and politics playing arbiter. Wilson detested Gerard as a wealthy partisan

24 Wilson, Education, pp. 120-121.
25 Ibid., p. 122.
26 Ibid., p. 121.
27Berthold, “Assignment to Berlin,” pp. 21-22. The amateur Spreckels was later considered for St.
Petersburg, but failed to get the position as Colonel House considered him “too opinionated, too dictatorial,
and altogether too uncertain” for a diplomatic appointment. West, State on the Eve, p. 52.
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with hardly more than his money and Tammany to recommend him, and determined “...that he would not
appoint Justice Gerard or any man who was conspicuous for his money.”28 But Gerard’s long and
generous financial and moral backing to the Party had made their mark on key Wilson advisors and allies.
Several influential senators joined Colonel House, who felt Wilson underrated the candidate,29 and Bryan,
who o f course stood eager to acknowledge the party’s political debt with Gerard, to decide the reluctant
president in at last appointing the New Y orker/0 Any other qualifications aside, an approving Count
Johann von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to Washington, aptly considered “...that Mr. Gerard would
be welcome in Berlin for social reasons alone. Everybody knew that the Kaiser liked to have Ambassadors
who entertained on a lavish scale.” Besides, Bernstorff concluded, “an American Ambassador in Berlin
really never had any political business to transact, for it was the tradition with the United States
Government to conduct all negotiations almost exclusively with the Diplomatic Corps in Washington ”jl
Bernstorff s words would soon be given to test. At the outbreak of war, the ambassadors serving
in America’s most important posts in Europe were all Democrats (except, temporarily, Herrick in Paris),
generally wealthy, long-involved in American domestic politics, and all amateurs. The State.Department
provided Gerard and his fellow chiefs of mission with almost no instructions before their departure. jDy
law the department regarded as an “instruction period” the thirty days after the appointee took his oath of
office. - Although Gerard possessed virtually no prior diplomatic experience, however, the department
/

subjected him only to a cursory exposure to his post before leaving. Gerard was duly requested to take the
oath in late August/early September and then visit Washington shortly thereafter, but only “to remain for a
few days receiving instructions and in conference with officials o f the Department” before embarking.32
Once there, he “had some difficulty finding out what my ambassadorial duties were” and cringed at the oftheard response to his entreaties, “Oh, just go over and be an ambassador!”33 The Department did provide

«

him a copy of its printed “Instructions to Diplomatic Officers” and the latest issue o f the “Diplomatic and

28 Seymour, House Papers, House Diary, 13 February 1913.
29 West, State on the Eve, p. 52.
j0 Berthold, “Assignment to Berlin,” pp. 16-23.
Jl Johann H. Von Bernstorff, My Three Years in America (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), p.
407.
32 Gerard Papers, Folder 7-15, J.B. Moore to Gerard, 31 July 1913.
3j Gerard, Eighty-Three Years, p. 171.
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Consular List.”"54 Along with whatever advice could be gleaned from the surviving embassy staff,
Ambassador Gerard’s ingenuity would otherwise have to suffice in discerning his responsibilities and the
manner o f their execution.35
Gerard’s diplomatic career for the present purpose really begins, then, with his appointment as
Ambassador to the German Empire. His appointment and experience as a new, amateur envoy from the
United States serve to well illustrate a transitioning American diplomacy. His embassy tells a story
repeated in London, Paris, Rome and elsewhere, each similarly an example o f the curious amalgam of old
amateurism and new professionalism, each a milestone o f the State Department’s adolescence. On 28 July
1913, enroute to Europe on the first eastern voyage of the German liner Imperator, Gerard received a
wireless message announcing his selection to the Berlin p o st/6 Almost forty-six years old, Gerard had
achieved a life-long ambition still essentially denied all his professional subordinates in the embassy.

JO SEPH CLARK GREW: FIRST SECRETARY OF EM BA SSY

As “the model professional diplomat of his generation,” First Secretary Joseph Clark Grew
represented of all the embassy staff the quintessence of the diplomatic transition figure.37 Entering the
service against the advice of many in 1904 and straining his relationship with his father, Grew’s
distinguished career would stretch through the end of World War II and see him rise to become
Ambassador to Japan during the crucial 1930s and Special Assistant to the Secretary o f State in 1942.
Before retiring in 1945, Grew’s impressive career included two ambassadorships, two undersecretaryships,
and every junior rank in the service. He truly stood as a founding father in the professional development of

j4 United States National Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1910-1929, File 123G31, John E.
Osborne.(Acting Secretary o f State) to Gerard, 6 September 1913.
’5 Gerard, at least, also had the benefit of outgoing Ambassador Leishman’s parting counsel “about the
German court and officials,” derived from a quick visit to Berlin during the Gerards’ vacation. Gerard,
Eighty-Three Years, p. 171.
36 Ibid., p. 169.
j7 Waldo H. Heinrichs, American Ambassador: Joseph C . Grew and the Development o f the United States
Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966; paperback edition published New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. ix.
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the American diplomatic service into the United States Foreign Service. His observations o f the
transformation consequently count as among the most insightful and deserve attention at length.
Grew came into the world in Boston, Massachusetts, on 27 May 1880. His family possessed
considerable wealth and sent him to Groton School before Harvard University, whence he graduated in
1902. After eighteen months traveling around the world in 1902-1903, Grew developed an unshakable
Wanderlust which gave foreign service its initial, lasting appeal for him. As with many o f his peers, he
experienced the tribulations o f entering a field which his father and his generation held in great contempt,
for the diplomatic service at this early time lacked all the characteristics which would later mark it as a true
professional organization, like entrance by examination, tenure, and merit promotions. In the end, an
imbued Grotonian emphasis on public service, a Harvard influence towards international affairs, and an
unslaked yen to travel together outweighed his father’s disapproval. Like so many others who with him
would compose America’s first generation of diplomats, Grew opted for a line of work which promised at
least temporary adventure, if no legitimate profession, and which only later would develop into an actual
career.

38

He first “entered” foreign service for his country as Deputy Consul-General at Cairo, Egypt, in
July, 1904, at a salary of $600 per year. Also occasionally levied with charge d ’affaires, Grew’s principal
jobs included, among other duties and ample leisure time, “making out invoices and superintending the
disinfection of evil-smelling hides.” 39 Nevertheless, early on Grew exhibited professional dedication to his
new work. The summer he first arrived in Cairo, he spent his evenings studying Arabic and, on his own
initiative, “bring[ing] some order out of chaos in our archives.” The chancery’s records being “filed”
strictly chronologically, all documents relating to a given issue were effectively lost. Grew card
catalogued, with cross references, every document of the previous decade—a task finished through three
months o f night work. An accurate sign o f the times came with the arrival that autumn o f Grew’s new
boss, American Agent and Consul General at Cairo, Mr. Lewis Iddings. Iddings took one look at Grew’s

38 Ibid., pp. 7-10.
39 Grew. Turbulent Era, 1: 17-18.
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filing system before chiding and abandoning it.40 Innovation and originality generally were regarded by
the unprofessional cadre as threats or as otherwise unnecessary.
Grew ‘s early “schooling” in American diplomatic method left much in the way of thoroughness.
In preparing to take Grew to his first audience with the Khedive in Cairo, Abbas Hilmi Pasha, American
Vice Consul General Fred Morgan “guessed at the appropriate costume without inquiring and we were a
little chagrined to find ourselves quite inappropriately dressed.” As for another of his supervisors,
American Diplomatic Agent and Consul General John W. Riddle (“..one of our first career officers, if the
holding o f several successive posts could in those days be so construed...”), Grew said bluntly, “In the way
o f instructing the aspiring neophyte in the intricacies o f diplomacy, he did very little.”41
In 1906, Grew moved from the consular to the diplomatic service. The biographic Register of the
Department of State pronounces that after Cairo; Grew was “appointed after examination, Third Secretary
o f the Embassy...,” but the actual details of the circumstance belie the statement’s solemn ring.42
Regarding his entry, Grew once confessed, “My appointment was, I think, the last under the old political
system, and I was certainly the last to slip through without examination. Heaven knows whether I could
ever have passed one!”43 For him, not some recognized mark o f competency opened the door to foreign
service, but personal connections—and good ones. “This is what counted in those days—political pull,” he
later reflected. So, through Alford Cooley, a close family friend and Roosevelt’s Assistant Attorney
General, Grew sought to gain a diplomatic appointment from the President. But, repeatedly, Grew heard of
Roosevelt’s response: “Too much political pressure. I can’t do it [appoint Grew].” The stonewall
persisted until one day Cooley recited to the adventurous, active President the tale o f Grew’s thrilling kill
of a ten-foot tiger in China during his world tour. Teddy so appreciated Grew’s evident brave heart, that a
Third Secretaryship was found for him in Mexico City effective 1 March 1906. “That tiger-shooting was
the only examination I ever took.”44

40 Ibid., 1: 21.
41 Ibid., 1: 18.
42 Register of the Department of State. December 19, 1917, p. 99.
4j Grew, Turbulent Era. 1: 14.
44 Ibid., 1: 12-13. Two decades later, as chairman of the newly organized Foreign Service Examining
Board, he would kid candidates about the “easy” entrance requirements they endured: “All you have to do
is answer a few questions. I had to shoot a tiger.”
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With his transfer from the consular to the diplomatic service, Grew now doubled his salary to
$1200 per year—a sum still entirely inadequate. Supplementation from a private income and allowances
from his mother raised his annual income roughly to a substantial $15,000, which alone made it possible
for Grew and his wife to meet the social demands of the post.45 As for the diplomatic demands, Grew’s
workload at Mexico City was “steady but not exhilarating.” He handled some o f the incoming
miscellaneous correspondence, but mostly he found himself tasked merely to typewrite copies o f outgoing
documents for the permanent file. The document was “moistened and impressed on tissue pages in a
copybook and then again typed for the bound archives,” and admitted “tremendous waste o f time and
labor,” with “the risk of errors in typing...ever present...” Forgetting the original reason for not using
carbon paper, he surmised that its smoochiness was unacceptable, or that it

. was due just to the old conservatism which looks askance at any change in the system. I
remember very well that one British Ambassador in Paris absolutely refused to allow a
typewriter in his chancery at first, insisting that every document must be written longhand
according to sacred tradition, but even he had had to give in at last although, as I remember
it, he strictly limited this infamous intrusion of mechanized diplomacy to a single machine.
How I wish he could have seen, and heard, the big ballroom in our Embassy in Berlin along
about 1915 which sounded something like a boiler factory with thirty or forty typewriters
banging away at the same time.46

From Mexico City, the State Department transferred Grew to his next assignment, Third Secretary
at St. Petersburg, Russia, in May, 1907.47 There he kept the same sparse hours at the embassy as was
characteristic o f the pre-war period. He walked the very long distance from home between nine and ten
o ’clock in the morning and then returned about three in the afternoon. With lunch squeezed somewhere in
between, Grew reminisced, “We didn’t have to keep very long hours in the office in those comparatively
idle days.”48 In the Russian capital, “there was little enough official work” and Grew’s duties, as in
Mexico City, centered largely on miscellaneous correspondence and typing permanent records. He
retained his conscientious approach to his diplomatic work, however, and experimented with ways to
facilitate the work. After several months in the embassy, Grew won over the ambassador, his former chief

45 Heinrichs, American Ambassador, p. 16.
46 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
47 Register o f the Department of State. December 19, 1917, p. 99.
48 Grew, Turbulent Era. 1: 41-42.
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in Cairo, John W. Riddle, to the advantages o f the carbon-copy system. The savings in labor and the
accuracy conferred by direct copies o f an original promised much greater efficiency in rather boring work
and Riddle ordered the system to be instituted the first of the year. But, Grew’s official diplomatic “career”
being not yet three years old, he had inadvertently committed a blunder. In gaining the ambassador’s
approval, he had gone over the head of the First Secretary, his immediate superior. The latter caused such
a furor over the transgression that Riddle rescinded his order and the embassy retained the “old, old
system” o f transcription, “which must have accorded with diplomatic usage ever since Noah made out his
inventory for the ark.”49
Hardly a year had passed before the State Department promoted Grew to Second Secretary,
entailing a salary raise to $2,000 per year, and transferred him to his first tour in Berlin in June, 1908,
where he met again the prevailing attitude in the diplomatic service. Here, “ in the good old times when our
chanceries generally closed at one o ’clock for the day,” Grew embarked on a project to compile and graph
data on the embassy’s success in securing the release of naturalized American citizens from the German
Army. Caught one afternoon on the task, a pitying colleague advised him, “Cut it out. Work won’t get
you anywhere. Only politics count in our Service. Better enjoy yourself while you’re in it.” Unconvinced,
Grew reflected later, “That was the guiding spirit in those days...I felt differently. I had no political
backing. I enjoyed work and it seemed to me that a reputation for hard work could not come amiss if we
were to develop a professional Service.”50
With the election that November of Roosevelt’s hand-picked successor, William Howard Taft,
Grew’s unusual tactic would be put to the test, as he and the rest o f the diplomatic corps girded themselves
for the inevitable political game of musical chairs that attended every presidential accession. Work hours
in Berlin demanding a 10:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. daily regimen, they were availed o f ample leisure time to
fret.51 But, as the months after Taft’s inauguration passed, it became clear he did not mean to ransack the
diplomatic service, but, instead, to strengthen it even while still paying off his political debts. In June,
1909, Grew received unofficial intelligence from the circle surrounding Secretary of State Philander C.

49 Ibid., 1: 42.
50 Ibid., 1: 20-21.
51 Ibid., 1: 89, Grew diary entry, 31 March 1911.
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Knox and relayed it to his friend, John Van A. MacMurray,- assigned to the U.S. embassy at St. Petersburg.
With great relief, Grew reported, that, “Although Mr. Taft has been obliged to put in a good many rank
outsiders as chiefs of mission, they are all determined in Washington to keep on the efficient secretaries,
promote them duly and make them chiefs of mission when the time comes. But [now] it’s heraus mit the
loafers.”52
In Berlin, Grew experienced the most extensive reorganization o f the State Department in nearly
four decades. On 26 November 1909, President William Taft issued an Executive Order promulgating farreaching improvements in the department’s structure in the interests o f better meeting current and projected
diplomatic demands placed on the country’s foreign service. Under the direction o f Secretary Knox and
Assistant Secretary Huntington Wilson, new offices were constituted, like Counselor o f the Department
and Resident Diplomatic Officer. New department divisions of Latin American, Near Eastern, and
Western European Affairs were established.53 Taft’s order also made explicit the fields to be tested in the
department’s entrance examination. Topics now included international law, diplomatic usage, American
history, U.S. economic resources, a foreign language, and modem history of Europe, Latin America, and
the Far East. An oral portion o f the exam would determine a candidate’s general knowledge, ability to
think, and overall suitability for the diplomatic service.54 Of these changes, Grew wrote his father-in-law
the next month, “Every new Executive Order of [this] kind...will make it just so much harder for a new
administration to overturn things and reclothe the Service in its former character o f a Congressional plum
orchard. This is very gratifying.” A few weeks later in January, 1910, Grew wrote his friend, Edward Bell,
Vice Consul General in Egypt. Bell had hoped to transfer from the consular to the diplomatic service, but
Taft’s order now prohibited such moves without examination, as was accepted before. But while Grew
sympathized that the department had “stiffened” the entrance examination before his friend could take it,
he proclaimed, “as a principle it is a splendid thing” and urged Bell to gain entry into the diplomatic
service soon, “for once this house-cleaning is over and the rotten boughs are all weeded out, there won’t be

52 Ibid., 1: 76, Grew to MacMurray, 11 June 1909.
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so many vacancies occurring.”55 To another friend, Secretary Paxton Hibben at The Hague, he observed,
“On the whole the Service has taken big strides in the right direction and I think it has a great future...”56
Indeed, the Taft Administration would go far in establishing some permanency to America’s diplomatic
, machinery.
During his next assignment, to Vienna on in January, 1911, Grew’s experience served as a
reminder that the service had still much road to travel in escaping the onus of amateurism. Promoted to
First Secretary at $3,000 per annum, he met his new ambassador, railroad builder and Republican politician
Richard C. Kerens. While suitably impressed with the man, Grew remembered very well how Kerens
“began at once and continued during our subsequent walks in the Schwarzenberg Gardens to tell me of the
state o f affairs in Vienna, namely that he had come last spring without experience or knowledge of
diplomatic usage o f any kind...” That the embassy itself would shortly prove substandard in the view o f the
professional Grew, came as no surprise then either. A veteran o f four previous posts and their methods of
business, Grew’s learned eye quickly surmised, “There are very many reforms to be made in the
Embassy...if it is to be made an up-to-date office; a very brief examination o f the chancery showed me that
the system was hopelessly antiquated and that much useless labor is expended. My suggestions must come
slowly and by degrees [remember St. Petersburg!].” But the ambassador recognized the real boon in his
competent, new secretary and of Grew’s suggestions, the “few which I ventured to take up with the
Ambassador at once [were] met by him in the most friendly manner possible and I hope eventually to have
the place running as it should.” 57 Despite his giving wide latitude to facilitate change, however, the
amateur Kerens still posed a burden. Several weeks later, a gala Hapsburg court ball in Budapest provided
a poignant opportunity. “The Ambassador did his best to present me to everyone; to those who spoke only
French or German I had to act as interpreter which shocked me and made me realize the handicap which
Mr. K[erens] is under in his diplomatic relations.”58 In his efforts to bolster the embassy’s operations to
professional standards, Grew came across uncomfortably telling evidence o f the extent a neglected post’s
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shoddiness might descend left unchecked. He detailed in his diary how he “found the [financial] accounts
in a very much muddled condition, and discovered errors in simple addition...after five minutes
examination; also cleaned out the safe which had apparently not been orderly arranged for many years as
there were important documents there which nobody in the Embassy knew existed.” Only a few weeks
earlier, similar laxness in the embassy staff manifested, “when [a staff member’s] failure to read a letter-because it was in Germ an-kept a wretched American in prison a week longer than was necessary.”59
The staff exhibited their unpolished ways more publicly, too, much to Grew’s chagrin. Attending,
on the spur o f the moment, a regal mass to celebrate the Prince Regent o f Bavaria’s 90th birthday in
March, 1911, he and the rest o f Vienna witnessed a real comedy act by the embassy’s military attache.
Major William Allaire “pushed in ahead of me, though he is my junior in rank, and tried to wedge himself
into the front pew next to Mr. Kerens and the other Ambassadors who occupied the first two rows, but he
was immediately shown out by an usher and obliged to move back several rows.” Grew related the episode
as an illustration of
how our Embassy here makes itself the laughingstock of the place. The Ambassador and
I should have been in full evening dress, no matter how unpleasant that may seem..., the
frock coat [in which they dressed], which is regarded by all Europeans as less formal, is
on such occasions incorrect and frequently gives offense as showing a lack of due courtesy.
[Private Secretary to Ambassador Kerens, Philip] Hoefele had no possible right to be there
at all as he is not officially accredited and does not appear in the diplomatic list. Thus much
for the savoir faire of the Embassy,60
he concluded.
During a Congressional recess,, in September, 1912, the Taft administration appointed Grew First
Secretary at the Berlin embassy. Happiness to once again reside in Berlin abruptly denatured, however,
with the news o f a reconvened Senate’s refusal to confirm his and many other of Taft’s eleventh-hour
diplomatic nominations. And Wilson’s defeat of Taft the next month put the Republican-appointed Grews
firmly into a deep gloom, much worried now over the “prospect of walking the plank” once the new
administration was installed in March. Concerns over job security cast a long shadow. Because of the
Senate’s inaction, Grew and his compatriots would “automatically lose our jobs at the end o f the present
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session o f Congress. Whether Dr. [President] Wilson will reappoint us to the same post seems very
uncertain, even if he retains most of those already in.” Even if not outright ousted in the shuffle, the Grews
could not financially afford reassignment to a lesser-grade post, nor to an equal post for reasons of the
great expense involved in moving yet again. The U.S. government for a few years more would still require
its diplomats to pay their own travel and moving expenses. To Grew, the dismal outlook was “sad...after
eight interesting years of work in the Service, which, as a Service, has been very close to my heart.”
Expecting the worst, he advised a friend just before Christmas, “I may come home in February and see if
we can do anything to get reappointed, but I have no connecting links with [the new Democratic president]
Mr. Wilson whatever and I’m afraid that nothing we could do would be of any use...”61
America’s diplomatic service stood to lose an experienced, competent, and proven representative
in First Secretary Grew, on the grounds of domestic political expediency. As it turned out, an old friend of
Grew’s at Groton and Harvard, named Franklin Delano Roosevelt, had been appointed Assistant Secretary
o f the Navy by Wilson. Elected in 1910 to the New York State Senate and from the beginning a strong
supporter of Wilson’s Democratic presidential nomination two years later, Roosevelt posed the ideal
conduit o f influence for Grew. He expressed interest in Grew’s plight and promised assistance towards
retaining him in the diplomatic service. Grew, in turn, conveyed his appreciation and a gentle alarum in
late February, that “You must not embarrass yourself in any way...with the new Administration, but you
may be sure that I shall be exceedingly appreciative and deeply indebted to you for any word of
recommendation that you may be able to say. I have found this old Service intensely interesting in the last
nine years and should be sorry to leave it if that could be avoided.” Whatever weight Roosevelt’s backing
carried in the outcome, the Senate at last voted to confirm Grew’s appointment to Berlin on 1 March
1913.62 But this temporary decision only anticipated the final, rockiest shoal, that of an executive decision
to once and for all retain Grew.
Wisely, the future ambassador kept a wary eye on the patronage squall-line looming ahead over
the extent and depth o f diplomatic personnel changes to be initiated under the Wilson regime. As indicated
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above, Wilson’s Secretary o f State, William Jennings Bryan, sought assiduously to repay prominent
political supporters from the spoils o f coveted diplomatic positions abroad, positions like Grew’s.
Consequently, Bryan threatened to turn upside down all the progress that had been accomplished in the
previous decade by ignoring the earlier executive orders and returning the State Department to an amateur
footing. To protect himself, Grew immediately began garnering whatever formal support he could o f his
incumbency. He explained to his mother a few weeks later, “...You say that I seem to have several strings
to my bow and this is true, for I have made a point o f getting as many endorsements sent in to the new
Administration as possible. If there is any question of overturning the Service they will come in useful.”
At least five different influential Democrats had already made overtures on his behalf, despite his
reluctance to play the patronage game. As it had to be done, Grew rationalized, “ I don’t like to blow my
own trumpet, but have no objection to others doing it for me at this critical period, and if we should be
'turned out while others were kept in, I should always regret having left any stones unturned...”63 Later in
the fall, he also procured Ambassador Gerard’s support, who wrote Bryan to plead against Grew’s removal
from the embassy. Explaining “his presence is absolutely essential, and will be for some time, to the
smooth running of the Embassy,” Gerard’s letter perhaps combined with the influence o f Roosevelt and
other prominent Democrats to finally dissuade Bryan from targeting Grew.64 He would remain in Berlin
unmolested and prove a central figure throughout Gerard’s embassy until the break in relations in
February, 1917.

^

HUGH RO BERT W ILSON: SECOND SECRETARY

Hugh Wilson’s was the diplomatic career that almost never was. After boldly entering the service
against the advice of the family patriarch, he not only weathered the transition to a professional corps, but
eventually rose to become himself Ambassador to Germany in 1938 and a Special Assistant to the
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December, 1913.
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Secretary o f State in 1940.65 Like Gerard and Grew, Wilson hailed from a monied family. Bom in
Evanston, Illinois, in 1885, he grew up among Chicago’s wealthy elite, spent four years at the elite Hill
School in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, and finally graduated from Yale in 1906.66 Ivy League connections
naturally developed and he soon counted as friends Kermit Roosevelt, the President’s son, and Hugh Knox,,
offspring o f succeeding President Taft’s Secretary o f State, Philander Chase Knox. They would prove
useful later to his final decision to enter American diplomacy.
Wilson’s initial exposure to America’s representatives abroad came during a year’s traveling
around the world in 1906. Pondering a few years later his own entrance into the diplomatic service, his
views o f the cadre reflected the popular perception o f them. “Political hacks” populated the large majority
o f posts abroad. Since the Civil War, American envoys had been “largely...the failures at home,” often
“the relatives and friends of those in authority who had been unable to make a living for themselves of
whose absence gave their families a momentary relief.” His first-hand experience during his year o f travel
provoked in him “indignation” towards these incompetents, and whether his emotions moved or dissuaded
him from ultimately joining the service, he does not say. After his travels in any case, it took Wilson threeand-a-half unsatisfying years with the family shirt-making business in Chicago before finally resolving to
try his hand as a diplomat. Entering America’s diplomatic corps represented a “temporary enjoyable means
o f passing a few years...a pleasant interval only” for the young Wilson newly made independently wealthy
thanks to an inheritance from his mother. Both parents now dead, he turned to his father’s friends, who
“without exception” saw in his plan a foolhardy and ill-advised move. “They declared with reason that
diplomacy in the United States was the football of politics; that there was no money in it and usually ended
by saying that ‘frivolous society in Europe was no place for a young American.’ ” Echoing the
commonplace perceptions of American amateur diplomacy, Wilson’s well-meaning advisors “had no belief
whatever in the prospects of the youthful [diplomatic and consular] services... [and] were sure the services
would be wrecked by succeeding Presidents.” Wilson’s uncle, the family patriarch and president o f the
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family corporation, expressed unreserved disapproval as well and gave Wilson to clearly understand he
would be “remiss in [his familial] duty” should he really act on his plan to join.67
Suitably cowed if not disillusioned, Wilson journeyed to Washington, D.C., to more clearly sound
out the service’s prospects. Young diplomat Arthur Orr advised his childhood friend o f the service’s
future, explaining, “You won’t get anywhere, but you will have a lot o f fun going there.” On the train east
Wilson encountered none other than old Yale friend Hugh “Hootie” Knox, who took him to meet his
father, the Secretary of State. The elder Knox “didn’t think much o f the diplomatic service,” and Wilson
next sought advice of the First Assistant Secretary o f State, Huntington Wilson (no relation). The
Secretary gave Wilson “my real advice as to how to prepare for the examinations,” steering him away from
the “cramming school” that had cropped up in the wake of the introduction o f entrance examinations
hardly four years before. Instead, Wilson ought to study at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques in
Paris, an institution well regarded as a polishing school for ambitious American Ivy Leaguers and hopeful
diplomats wishing to prepare for the examinations. An encouraged Wilson took the other’s advisement
and in 1910 began an idyllic year of study, refining his French and sharpening his intellect with two of his
future Berlin peers, Albert Ruddock and Alexander Kirk. In the end, however, he did not graduate and
instead opted for practical experience in diplomacy. In 1911, Wilson declined further study at the Ecole to
accept the position of private secretary to Mr. Edwin V. Morgan, U.S. Minister to Portugal, to whom a
mutual friend had recommended Wilson. In Lisbon, Wilson’s duties “certainly weren’t arduous” and
allowed motor trips every weekend over Portugal’s “abominable” roads in M organ’s automobile, “one of
the few in the country at the time.” Wilson also found ample time to prepare for the coming
examinations.68
Late that autumn, Wilson regretfully left his paradise and in early December, 1911, took the
written and oral examinations in Washington. He found the written “exhausting,” but “only different in
degree from what I had become accustomed to in school and university.” The orals, however, proved “a
real ordeal” and, to Wilson’s surprise, required responses “that demanded thought and careful presentation,
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rather than a knowledge of fact.” His preparation stood him well in the end and a telegram followed him
home to Chicago advising the new diplomat of his appointment as Secretary of the Legation at Guatemala
City. He returned to Washington in January for his month of instruction at the Department, which
amounted to “rare fun” as Albert Ruddock and he reveled in “[a] feeling o f partnership in the organization”
with “companions in my profession.”69
Arriving at his post the next month, Wilson soon took unlikely charge as acting-minister.
Assuming responsibilities which he ultimately carried nearly two years until another minister arrived,70 his
duties were not especially onerous meanwhile, being primarily “protection o f interest” cases on behalf o f
private U.S. citizens. Wilson conducted his quiet work in a virtual vacuum. One boat weekly arrived
from New Orleans at Puerto Barrios on the Caribbean coast, the mail pouch from which would arrive at the
legation by Monday morning. Any travelers typically called with their business, if any, by Wednesday,
and Wilson, pushing hard, could have all work and visitors resolved by Thursday afternoon, in time to
begin a long weekend of adventure across the idyllic countryside. Washington’s remoteness helped ensure
little chance of interruption; cables were rare, correspondence only once per week, no telephones, no
airplanes.71
With his arrival in 1913, the new minister, Dr. Leavell, provided Wilson’s “first experience of a
non-Service C hief’ and occasioned a display of the more professional inclinations o f this first post-fin de
siecle generation of American diplomats. The secretary, a product o f a transforming American diplomatic
service-form al entrance exam, periodic fitness reports, expectations o f promotion—found himself “startled
by the difficulties with which [Leavell] was faced” as an amateur diplomat enjoying the spoils o f the new
Woodrow Wilson administration. Secretary Wilson worked diligently to get the doctor and his family “as
comfortable as possible, as independent [from the veteran Wilson] as possible, as quickly as possible,” in
order to facilitate his early departure. He not only desired to escape the unsatisfying burden of a clueless
new boss, but also sought to get back to Washington to see the new regime’s State Department.72
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While traveling in the summer o f 1914, Wilson and his new wife received simultaneous telegrams
in Como, Italy. His, from the department, explained he had been assigned as Third Secretary of Embassy
in London. Hers, from a friend, expressed congratulations over their new post. Wilson suspected
“unwarranted interference” on his behalf and, possibly feeling the tug of professionalism, he resented this
remnant of patronage. Expecting the London position to mean only menial duties on top o f all, Wilson
consequently complained to the department and found reassignment to Buenos A ires-his penultimate post
before Berlin.73 For two years in sleepy Argentina, Wilson watched the war unfold from afar, his time
punctuated only by his promotion in February, 1915, to Secretary of Embassy or Legation of class three.
On 2 June 1916 while on vacation, Washington suddenly notified him o f his next assignment as
Second Secretary o f Embassy under Ambassador James Gerard in Berlin.74 The news o f adventure excited
the Wilsons. News from the German capital was “scant” and “information vague and contradictory,”
making the city seem “then the centre o f a great fortress,”75 “in a state o f siege by the whole world:”76
Enroute they visited his hometown o f Evanston and Wilson discovered a distinct shift of attitude amongst
family friends and business acquaintances. Previously disparaging of the diplomatic service, even men of
his father’s generation had adopted during Wilson’s five-year absence “a more tolerant attitude towards my
profession than they had” before his entry in 1911. “Their tolerance,” he found in some cases, “even
reached the point of sympathetic interest! They had been deeply stirred by the foreign events of the past
two years. They had learned a lot of [U.S.] policy, some geography and even traces of history...[and] they
recognized our own country’s interest in alien events, so their interest grew in a service which was destined
to administer our interests and look out for them.” From that moment on, Wilson felt convinced “the
business men of America believe in the Foreign Service [since a] trained service represents to their minds
the normal and logical way of going about the nation’s business.” Armed with renewed conviction in his
noble duty and with scant authentic news emanating from Central Europe, Wilson and his wife boarded
their ship in the summer of 1916 “to plunge into the unknown” of wartime Berlin.77

73 Ib id , pp. 97-98.
74 Register of the Department o f State. January 1, 1928, p. 217.
75 Wilson, Education, p. 162.
76 Hugh R. Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars (New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green and C o , 1941), p. 4.
77 Wilson. Education, pp. 162-164.

64

OTHER SECRETARIES

While Hugh Wilson served as Gerard’s Second Secretary towards the end, Willing Spencer
occupied the position during the initial months of the ambassador’s tenure in Berlin. In echoing Wilson’s
personal and diplomatic background, Spencer’s represents, almost ad nauseum, the leitmotif among the
personnel ultimately to pass through the Gerard embassy. Bom of wealth, Spencer spent much o f his
younger years in private schools in Philadelphia, Massachusetts, Switzerland, and Germany. A year at the
Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris followed Harvard in 1899 and led to a Juris Doctor degree
from the University o f Pennsylvania in 1903. Several years’ practicing law then preceded successful
negotiation of the diplomatic service entrance examinations in March, 1910, and subsequent posting to St.
Petersburg as Third Secretary. In August of the next year the State Department transferred Spencer to
Berlin’s vacant Second Secretary position, where he would remain into the early months of Gerard’s
embassy before his reassignment to Caracas in February, 1914.
Replacing the outgoing Spencer as Second Secretary, forty-three year old Roland B. Harvey
arrived in Berlin in early 1914 to begin work at the fourth, and last, post o f his short career. Private schools
in Baltimore; tutors in Switzerland, France, and Germany; Johns Hopkins University; University of
Maryland Law School; thirteen years’ lawyering-Harvey’s pre-diplomatic life held no surprises. Passing
the entrance examinations in May, 1909, he held various posts in the Balkans, Lima, and Santiago, until
finally called to Berlin on the eve of the war.78 Harvey’s misfortune there helps highlight the State
Department’s residual, nineteenth-century torpor inadequate to twentieth-century, wartime demands. For
the strain o f the coming conflict exacerbated a nervous condition, which soon developed into a fullfledged and, finally, fatal insanity.
Under Gerard, Harvey performed well enough to warrant promotion to Secretary o f Embassy or
Legation of class three in February, 1915. But as the year progressed, Harvey began developing symptoms
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o f a nervous condition, including loss of knee jerks, sluggish pupils, and ataxia.79 By November, Gerard
reported to Colonel House, that he had requested Secretary o f State Lansing to remove Harvey, as he “is
too sick to be o f any use and there seems no chance of improvement.”80 But the State Department proved
remarkably nonresponsive to the situation and Harvey lingered on in wartime Berlin. By spring, 1916, his
condition progressively worsened until his forgetfulness, lack o f concentration, and general carelessness in
his work had become unacceptable and something absolutely had to be done. In early June, 1916, while on
leave in America, First Secretary Grew met with Third Assistant Secretary o f State William Phillips.
Phillips already had received from Colonel House a letter indicating Gerard’s opinion that Harvey “was
unfit to remain in Berlin,” but it took Grew’s personal visit to finally convince Phillips o f an immediate
transfer. Together they settled on Harvey’s effective elevation to Buenos Aires and on Hugh Wilson as his
Berlin replacement.81 The department had required a mere eight months and personal intervention to at
last respond to a potentially incendiary personnel problem.
Back in Berlin, news of his “promotion” amounted to more than Harvey’s diseased mind could
handle. As embassy medical attache, Dr. Karl Ohnesorg, described it to a colleague,-“The amount of
mental elation over this change of duty was in his case out of all proportion to the degree o f advancement
[in light o f it constituting a promotion]. This, instead of subsiding, has progressively increased and has
during the past week been associated with a pathological...exaltation o f the ego, a decided perversion in his
character in the nature of obscenity, both as to action and conversation.” Already a very loose cannon on
Gerard’s deck, Harvey furthermore “developed a delusional attitude in connection with his voice, thinking
God has recently given him a wonderful voice, and acts upon this not only while alone but also in public.”
In exercising his new-found vocal talents, it seems Harvey also set to “talking wildly lately of the most
confidential matters of Embassy; telling German friends of his garbled reports o f [Gerard’s] conversations
with Emperor [Wilhelm] etc., and mixmg these up.”
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condition” and, pending his imminent return to America, should be excused and disregarded for any
“undiplomatic” behavior he might display as a result.83 The strained ambassador also complained frankly
to his superior, Lansing, that he was “[s]orry the Department left him here so long after my request for his
removal to another post. I do not know what may turn up after he leaves, or what he may have said of
confidential matters.”84 Harvey left Berlin for America in mid-June, 1916, and never recovered. The
department “unassigned” him that September and retired him in October, 1917. The next month former
Second Secretary o f Embassy Harvey died at home in Baltimore.85
The senior Third Secretary, Albert Billings Ruddock, claimed Chicago as his home and origins
rooted in wealth and prominence. Hopkin’s Grammar School in New Haven, Connecticut, prepped him for
eventual graduation from Yale in 1907 and a master’s degree from Columbia in 1910. At the Ecole Libre
des Sciences Politiques the next year, he became close friends with future Berlin diplomat-in-arms,
Alexander Kirk, whom Ruddock’s sister later married. Hurdling the entrance examinations that December
(1911), Ruddock left for Berlin the next February as a new Third Secretary.
As with the rest of the largely Republican-appointed cadre in America’s diplomatic service,
Ruddock felt concern over the Democratic takeover after the 1912 elections. Like First Secretary Grew
and Second Secretary Spencer, he discerned the dangers of the Phoenix-like rise of spoilsmanship under
the Wilson administration, especially once the axe fell on their boss, the experienced Ambassador
Leishman. In due course, the Third Secretary’s hedge made its arrival, as letters extolling him reached his
new boss, Gerard, hardly a month after his confirmation. Close family friend and Chicago attorney, Roger
C. Sullivan, wrote of his “very great, interest” in Ruddock’s “success and future.” Emphasizing the
Secretary’s eminent background, education, and wealth, Sullivan suggested Albert “ [njaturally...would like
to be 2nd Secretary, or even higher, if this be possible.” Such lauding reflected 19th century methods o f
discourse and contrasted with the more modem element of professionalism with which Sullivan concluded
his commendation, namely that Ruddock “stood high in the [diplomatic service entrance] exams...”86
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wealthy uncle and Gerard acquaintance, C. K. G. Billings of New York, wrote to congratulate Gerard on
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While a word from Gerard could only help Ruddock, the influence o f connections slowly was
waning, for Ruddock’s advancement, in contrast to even a decade earlier, now depended more and more on
less subjective criteria. His performance on the entrance examination, periodic fitness reports from Gerard
to the department, and other factors increasingly shaped a diplomat’s future. The State Department sought
now to assess its personnel more with an eye toward performance, placement, and promotion potential.
For example, in December, 1914, then-State Counselor Robert Lansing requested from Gerard “for the
confidential information o f the Department a detailed report [using enclosed forms for the purpose] on the
ability, fidelity to duty and efficiency” o f Grew, Harvey, and Ruddock. Lansing expected the reports
promptly and that they would be “so complete, frank, definite and just in character as to be o f real value to
the Department in the keeping o f a satisfactory record o f the merits, qualifications and demerits o f the
personnel of the diplomatic service below the grade of minister.”87 Thus, letters o f recommendation from
high personages carried less and less weight, as the diplomatic service pressed to escape the clutches o f
patronage and professionalize its ranks.
Once the war began, the work load for foreign service personnel quickly grew unbearable and
required urgent remedies. One natural avenue was to boost the number of diplomatic secretaries. In 1914
the American diplomatic service boasted seventy embassy secretaries, up from a mere twenty-four in 1898.
By w ar’s end in 1918 the number rose to a record 122, as the service sought to meet workload with
manpower.

88

Gerard’s embassy, probably the busiest in all the service, received six Third Secretaries of the

fifty-two who entered during the war years, or more than one-tenth the total (11.5%). Alexander Comstock
Kirk,. Lithgowe Osborne, Oliver Bishop Harriman, Robert McGregor Scotten, Lawrence Lanier Winslow,
and Charles Howland Russell, Jr., ultimately populated the embassy’s lowest professional rank. Except for
the striking similarity o f their backgrounds, their biographies are unremarkable. The leitmotif o f elitism
established by their superiors Grew, Harvey, and Ruddock, applied without exception. All hailed from
wealthy families. Each received an Ivy League education, with two graduating Yale and five ultimately

his appointment to Berlin and took the opportunity, predictably, to endorse his nephew. Gerard Papers,
Folder 4-50, C. K. G. Billings to Gerard, 11 September 1913.
87 Gerard Papers, Folder 9-29, Lansing to Gerard, 12 December 1914.
88 Kenneth W. Thompson, American Diplomacy and Emergent Patterns (New York: New York University
Press, 1962), p. 79.

68

having some affiliation with Harvard (Winslow’s single year at Columbia was the exception). In each case,
some prior overseas or diplomatic experience prefaced their entry into diplomatic service. Scotten taught at
Yale Mission School in Changsha, China, for one year; Kirk served a short while in Washington as private
secretary to Third Assistant Secretary of State Phillips; Harriman served as private secretary to the
American ambassador to Chile; Winslow proved himself Ambassador Gerard’s “chinesische Mauer” as his
private secretary for the first two years o f his embassy;89 and Osbome and Russell worked 1-1/2 and two
years, respectively, in Berlin as non-commissioned civilian attaches in Gerard’s embassy. Finally, perhaps
o f most significance, all of the six entered the American diplomatic service after formal examination and
directly began reaping the benefits o f graded rank, regular promotions, assignments and transfers, and
other gains from legislation, like the Stone-Flood Act o f 1915. While the State Department’s slow
evolution towards democratizing and professionalizing its ranks would mature only after a few more
decades, these men, along with Ruddock and Wilson, represented really the very first generation of
American diplomats raised under the new paradigm.90
Ultimately, because of the bureaucratic slowness of recruiting and examining potential candidates,
and because such men invariably were without badly needed experience, other sources of manpower were
pursued. As another means to quickly augment the chronically short staff, the State Department also
eventually attached'four Special Assistants (or the equivalent) to Gerard’s embassy. In November, 1916, a
newly-appointed novice, the wealthy Herman Oelrichs, journeyed from America to work in the embassy
for the final few months,91 only to disappear thereafter from the diplomatic scene. Caught in Germany at
w ar’s outbreak, the independently wealthy, Harvard-educated Ellis Loring Dresel volunteered to assist the
embassy staff as a civilian attache, whereupon he began an eight year diplomatic “career” o f distinction.
Dresel’s naturally great aptitude for diplomatic work earned a formal commission the next year as a State
Department Special Representative. While this exempted him from any examination requirements, it also

89 Gerard Papers, Folder 5-19, Fenske to Gerard, 15 November 1913.
90 Their biographies can be found in Register o f the Department o f State. 1 October 1945, p. 162 (Kirk); 23
December 1918, p. 148 and 1 May 1922, p. 164 (Osbome); 1 January 1927, p. 213 (Harriman); 1 April
1949, p. 344 (Scotten); 1 January 1928, p. 218 (Winslow); 23 December 1918, p. 158 and 1 May 1922, p.
174 (Russell).
91 Gerard Papers/Folder 18-17, Phillips to Embassy, telegram dated 17 November 1916.
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meant he was ineligible for any career benefits and protection, like tenure, afforded secretaries in a
professionalizing diplomatic service, though promotions proved no problem in the meanwhile. After the
break in relations in 1917, Dresel served in a variety of diplomatic capacities, including Special
Representative to the American minister in Berne, U.S. Assistant Commissioner in Berne to the AmericanGerman and American-Austro-Hungarian Prisoner Conferences in Berne, attache to the American
Commission to Negotiate Peace in 1918-19, and attache with the rank o f Counselor to the embassy in
Paris, where he headed the German section o f the American delegation to negotiate the war settlement. In
January, 1920, the department sent him as American Commissioner to Berlin, where he proved popular and
gained great standing with the Germans, with whom he negotiated a treaty of peace in 1921. Dresel stayed
on as charge d ’affaires until America’s first post-war ambassador, Alanson B. Houghton, arrived the next
year, whereupon to Dresel’s great disappointment, and his friend Hugh W ilson’s dismay, the Department
withdrew its commission and abruptly put his immense talents to pasture.92 Dresel’s “career” served as a
telling illustration of how America’s diplomats might still be directly commissioned, yet ultimately remain
outside the developing professional diplomatic framework.
In contrast to Oelrichs and Dresel, the embassy’s two other Special Assistants, John Brinkerhoff
Jackson and George Barclay Rives, were highly experienced, older, former diplomats. Their entry and exit
from America’s diplomatic service illustrated well the vagaries of the old paradigm and the professional
urgency o f the new. Bom into old New England society, Rives’ life traced a not unusual course for a turnof-the-century American diplomat. Private and Ivy League schools and law studies preceded his 1902
appointment without examination as Third Secretary at Berlin. His “career” continued with quick
promotions to Second, then First Secretary and charge d ’affaires at Vienna, and then transfer to Rio de
Janeiro in early 1911. But an altogether promising diplomatic career of eleven years abruptly ended in
August, 1913, when the new, patronage-minded Wilson administration “retired” Rives without fanfare.9’
Only the exigencies of the war allowed him a fitting cap to his diplomatic pursuits, when he “volunteered”

92 Wilson, Education, pp. 176-177; Register o f the Department o f State. May 1, 1922, p. 113; and January
1, 1924, p. 119.
93 Register o f the Department o f State. December 15, 1916, p. 126; and December 19, 1917, p. 132.
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his considerable expertise to Gerard. The desperate State Department appointed him Special Assistant in
April, 1915,94 and Rives served dutifully until the final break in February, 1917.
John Brinkerhoff Jackson’s roughly parallel experience proved somewhat more galling. Bom in
1862, Jackson enjoyed what his close friend Hugh Wilson called “a rather remarkable career in those days
when even the Secretaries o f Embassy were political appointments,” 95 a career which culminated between
1902 and 1913 with a string of Balkan ministerships in Greece, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro,
and Persia, broken only by a twenty-two month hiatus as minister to Cuba in 1909. Jackson’s “retirement”
in 1913 came directly in the wake of the new Wilson administration’s ravages on ministerial positions. Just
three o f fourteen career ministers survived, while Jackson and ten others were unceremoniously ousted.
The standard practice o f the day obliged all chiefs of mission to tender their resignation to a new president
as a matter of courtesy, which Jackson dutifully did in March, 1913. Accompanying the document went
his expression o f earnest desire to continue his nonpartisan service to America in the region that in hardly a
year would provide the spark to world war. The Third Balkan War (June-August, 1913) continued a year
long spat of violence, which kept the Administration chary o f removing the veteran Jackson. In midAugust, however, within days o f his reporting a signed peace his latent resignation quietly was accepted by
Secretary o f State Bryan. Despite his extraordinary and long service, despite understanding the region
perhaps better than any other American, Jackson, the diplomate de carriere, was dropped to be replaced by
Democratic Party supporter and Chicago brewer, Charles Vopicka.96 The action, o f course, returned a year
later to haunt the Administration. With the outbreak of war, Bryan shamelessly stooped to the expedient of
requesting former career ministers “retired” by the administration to return to service without
compensation. Only Jackson and three others accepted,97 and in, January, 1915, the Department appointed

94 Gerard Papers, Folder 12-46, Gerard to House, 19 April 1915.
9:> Wilson, Education, pp. 173-174.
96 Warren Frederick Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States. 1779-1939: A Study in
Administrative History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 121-122; Register of the
Department o f State. December 15, 1916, p. 103; and May 1, 1922, p. 137.
97 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 133. The others included H. Percival Dodge, John W. Garrett at
Paris, and Lewis D. Einstein at Constantinople.
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him a Special Agent to assist Ambassador Gerard in Berlin, from where Washington “retired” him again in
February, 1917.98
Gerard’s embassy also retained a great many military, naval, medical, commercial, and civilian
attaches on its staff, who came and went like the tide. Among the military attaches assigned to the embassy
were successive U.S. Army Majors J.A. Ryan, George Langhome, and Joseph E. Kuhn. Commander
Walter R. Gherardi, USN, served as Gerard’s Naval Attache throughout the duration of his embassy.
Among these otherwise unremarkable officers stands an interesting account of nineteenth-century trickledown spoilsmanship surrounding Gerard’s cousin, U.S. Navy Ensign Charles Fitzhugh Angel. A Naval
' Academy graduate, Ensign Angel found himself aboard the U.S.S. Rhode Island at the beginning o f the
w ar." Many friends and relatives urged “Hugh” to seek assignment with his cousin in Berlin and in the
fall of 1913, Gerard’s close friend and advisor, Thomas McCarthy began efforts to procure Angel’s
assignment as Assistant Naval Attache to his cousin’s embassy.100 The youthful Angel wrote Gerard in
September, 1914, to introduce himself since their “last meeting” twelve years previous,when Angel was a
mere “youngster of ten in knickerbockers.” Angel expressed his “desire to be detailed to Berlin as Asst.
Naval attache [sic] during the remainder o f the war,” primarily on account o f “the present professional
advantages and experiences to be gained from such close contact with the war.” He cited as qualifications,
“a fairly good speaking knowledge of French and a smattering of German, which could be very readily
improved;” dubious familiarity o f Berlin and German customs derived from a cruise to Europe several
years previously; “International Law” as one o f his “chief hobbies”.at the Academy; and confidence. It is
unclear whether such qualifications, or the fact of their common antecedents persuaded Gerard to
eventually pursue the matter as he did.
In late 1915, Gerard pulled high-level strings to arrange a meeting between Angel and Secretary
o f the Navy Josephus Daniels, which produced only warm promises.101 Further proddings eventually
pushed Daniels in the fall of 1916 to direct, but then rescind, Angel’s assignment to Berlin. Initially

98 Register of the Department of State. December 15, 1916, p. 103; and May 1, 1922, p. 137.
99 Ibid., December 15, 1916, p. 70; and Gerard Papers, Folder 7-34, Angel to Gerard, 17 September 1914.
100 Gerard Papers, Folder 6-12, McCarthy to Gerard, 28 October 1913.
101 Gerard Papers, Folder 12-13, Daniels to Gerard, 29 December 1915.
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inclined, the Secretary felt persuaded by the Navy’s Chief of Bureau o f Navigation, who argued that
“unfavorable comment” would surely arise over the appointment o f so young and inexperienced officer to
“such an unusual assignment.” On grounds of Angel’s greenness and because o f his delay in completing
the N avy’s requisite five-years’ sea duty before an initial shore duty post, the Chief tentatively convinced
Daniels that the disadvantages would too greatly prejudice Angel’s chances for future promotions.102
Gerard, however, renewed his request and at last prevailed on Daniels, who, once the German Foreign
Office relayed the Kaiser’s approval, ordered the assignment in late November, 1916.103 But meeting
Angel for the first time in years just before sailing from New York on 5 December 1916 (Gerard had
returned to America for several weeks’ vacation and consultations in October), Gerard “noticed [Angel]
talked like an ass on the ship coming over” and once back in Berlin prudently delayed presenting the young
officer to the Imperial court and German officialdom. As the days passed, Gerard’s caution proved
justified as Angel’s condition grew increasingly serious, until finally in early January, 1917, the.
ambassador had to declare him “violently insane” and reported Angel “strapped to his bed in a
sanitorium.” 104 Gerard’s nepotism had ironically amounted to a symbolic rejection o f patronage.
Angel’s late arrival nevertheless contributed to the dramatic wartime expansion o f the Gerard
embassy. In December, 1913, the amateur Gerard’s professional diplomatic staff counted six total.104 As
the work load expanded with the war, additional Third Secretaries and various attaches augmented the core
professional staff of a First, Second, and Third Secretary, and military and naval attaches. Commercial
attache Erwin W. Thompson arrived in the fall, 1914, to join several volunteer civilians like iater-Third
Secretary Charlie Russell and later-Special Representative Ellis Loring Dresel.106 By December, 1914, the

102 Gerard Papers, Folder 15-14, Daniels to Gerard, 13 October 1916; and Gerard to Daniels, 31 October
1916.
103 Gerard Papers, Folder 14-32, Winslow to Gerard, undated note; and Register o f the Department o f State,
December 15, 1916, p. 70.
104 Gerard Papers, Folder 12-46, Gerard to Lansing and Colonel House, 10 January 1917.
105 Author’s assessment. As a political appointee, Gerard himself does not count as a “professional.”
Lawrence Lanier Winslow, Gerard’s private secretary for the first two years, is counted as a professional,
as he nevertheless performed the diplomatic duties o f a Third Secretary, even though not passing the
diplomatic entrance exams until November, 1914, and receiving the following July formal assignment to
Berlin as a Third Secretary.
106 As a consular officer, Thompson had to pass a formal examination process for entry into a service that
had earlier set the pace for the diplomatic service’s reform towards institutional professionalism. Because
Russell essentially perfonned the same POW camp inspections and other duties which were the primary
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■number had risen to ten and then to thirteen a year later. The course of 1915 brought onboard State
Department Special Agent John Brinkerhoff Jackson, Special Assistant George Barclay Rives, and two
Third Secretaries, Alexander Kirk and Lawrence Lanier Winslow.107 During 1916, in addition to three
further Third Secretaries, Robert Scotten, Oliver Harriman, and Lithgow Osborne, several medical attaches
came to the embassy as well, including Doctors Jerome Webster,108 Alonzo Englebert Taylor, Karl
Ohnesorg of the U.S. Navy, and others, for the purpose of inspecting belligerent POW camp sanitation,
rations, and general conditions.109 And late that year on the eve of the break, Lieutenant Angel’s arrival as
assistant naval attache and Herman Oelrich’s appointment as Special Representative brought the
professional staff to its numerical acme of twenty, a 233% increase in four years.110

THE EMBASSY’S CORPS DIPLOMA TIQUE

As a group, the embassy’s eleven secretaries and four special assistants faithfully bore out the
State Department’s stigma of elitist wealth.111 Like the unofficial criterion o f wealth for ambassadors,

purview o f the embassy’s Third Secretaries, and as he finally entered the service as a Third Secretary in
June, 1917, he is considered a “professional” for the purpose of this analysis. Likewise, despite his non
professional recruitment, Dresel also is included based on his subsequent “career” as American
Commissioner and charge d ’affaires in Berlin.
107 Jackson’s and Rives’ extraordinary diplomatic careers before their “retirement,” subsequent
rehabilitation, and final departure under Wilson conferred professional status on them.
108 Gerard Papers, Folder 18-26, Reverend Lorin Webster to Gerard, 11 October 1916.
109 In March, 1916, four American doctors arrived at Gerard’s request, including a Dr. Irwin, a Dr.
McCarthy, and Dr. Webster. Despite Gerard stipulating on 16 February that the men sent be over 30 years
old (for maturity reasons) and conversant in German, he found it necessary to ask for Irwin and Webster’s
recall on grounds that one was a gynecologist (there being, of course, no female POWs), both were under
30, and neither could speak German. Gerard Papers, Folder 12-46, Gerard to House, 28 March 1916.
110 While the absolute numbers o f non-professional clerical staff are unknown, their ranks, too, rapidly
expanded, quadrupling by late 1916 as the professional staff more than doubled by that time. Gerard
Papers, Folder 13-35, Gerard to The London Morning Post, date unknown, but late 1916. Prior to the war,
the full-time clerical staff consisted o f two appointed clerks, British subject Laurence Harwood Hoile
(appointed 1903) and Harvard-educated Charles Bowker Dyer (appointed 1906). The non-professional
staff also included various native service workers, as a chauffeur, an automobile washer, handy-man “old”
Wilhelm Knoth, a French chef, and the new embassy’s Hausmeister, Herr L. Vanderk. With diplomatic
secretaries, naval, military, and civilian attaches, special representatives and agents, and the household
staff, Gerard’s embassy personnel numbered perhaps over thirty at its height. O f these, roughly half were
“professionals.”
111 One First Secretary (Grew), three Second Secretaries (Spencer, Harvey, and Wilson), and six Third
Secretaries (Ruddock, Kirk, Osborne, Harriman, Scotten, and Winslow) constitute the bulk of the group.
The group excludes the military, naval, medical, and civilian attaches, none o f whom counted as a foreign
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private income applied for secretaries for the same reason and perhaps to a greater degree. The historically
inadequate wage scale o f the diplomatic service meant poor pay in comparison to other diplomatic services
and would change significantly only after the Rogers Act in 1924 and the Moses-Lithicum Act in 1931.
An American First Secretary in 1914, for example, received half the pay (including housing and
representational allowances) earned by his British counterpart. Put another way, a Secretary o f Legation in
Bucharest, having to pay for the sundry, but significant, expenses of his diplomatic position, earned $2,800
per year compared to “the lowest living wage in New York City for a day laborer’s family” o f $2,600
annually. Like for ambassadors and ministers, the meager pay secretaries received did not nearly suffice
to cover the necessary costs of diplomatic high society. The natural solution lay in reliance on men of
independent wealth used to the graces o f the haut monde. Consequently, almost without exception
diplomatic service secretaries possessed private income derived from families o f fortune and stature.112
The inherited wealth of every one of Berlin’s secretaries served as the key to what one observer called “a
national, inter-city metropolitan upper class,” that was emerging by the turn o f the century and that found
its mold largely by the common experience o f boarding schools and Ivy League institutions. “Service
spirit bound the secretaries closely together. In a sense they knew each other before they ever met. The
career only deepened and circumscribed existing ties. They possessed a common background, common
experience,” and a common elitist outlook.” One amateur ambassador once snidely referred to their ranks
as a “Secretaries’ Union,” and Hugh Wilson called them “a pretty good club,” as it was indeed.113
Service-wide, the majority of the professional secretaries and attaches were well-educated, rich,
and had attended preparatory schools, a characterization which fitted all at Berlin. Exclusively, every man
had been born into the purple, hailing from the monied upper stratum of New England and Mid-west
society. Six originated from the New York City area; three from Chicago; two from Boston; and one each
from Detroit, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Most the service’s secretaries were graduates o f Ivy League

service officer subject to the service provisions under the various executive orders and the Stone-Flood Act
o f 1915. Although the Wilson administration “retired” Rives and Jackson in 1913, they are included in the
group total along with Dresel, since their commissioning as attaches hardly two years later counted as the
real terminus o f their careers. The group, therefore, includes thirteen men for its analysis.
112 Ilchm an. Professional Diplomacy, pp. 167-168.
113 Heinrichs, A m erican A m bassador, p. 97-98.
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colleges. O f sixteen First Secretaries in 1914 Europe, six were Harvard (including Grew) and two were
Yale graduates. O f 29 secretaries o f all ranks, all but 10 were Ivy League. With a sole exception, every
man at Berlin enjoyed a privileged private education, though three (Winslow, Osborne, and Harriman) did
not graduate. Represented were Harvard (six), Yale (four), Princeton (two) and Columbia University (one),
while a mix of private and state-supported schools graduated Second Secretary Harvey (A.B. Johns
Hopkins, LL.B University of Maryland). Four held law degrees (two more studied law), one earned a
master’s degree, and one had both-all advanced degrees from Ivy League institutions again,, except
Harvey’s Juris Doctor from the University o f Maryland.114 For further preparation, many in the service
had attended Eton or the Ecole des Sciences Politique-, at Berlin evidently none attended Eton, but four of
fourteen studied at the Ecole. Finally, perhaps needless to say, all were male Caucasians.115
It seems clear Gerard’s professional staff preserved a significant remnant from earlier days in
their uniformly elite backgrounds, even as it mixed with the developing careerism o f a new age. In 1917,
the older embassy hands like Grew, Wilson, and Jackson might recall a time when political preferment
ruled the American foreign service. Even still, they might genuinely marvel at the odd American
statesman able to claim long, continuous service. The newer generation, however, experienced a different
kind of diplomatic service. Reform efforts since the turn of the century had transformed the service along
more professional lines. All the younger secretaries in Berlin essentially entered after Taft’s executive
order further supplemented Roosevelt’s in 1909. By 1913 over 50% of all secretaries of embassy and
legation had passed the examinations; by 1917 Gerard’s embassy could claim 90% .116 Also, since 1909 all

114 Grew evidently sought Harvard men for the Berlin post, and especially those who had also attended
Groton, as he did. In the course o f the war, Berlin received nine Harvard graduates, four o f them also from
Groton; that Harvard alumnus William Phillips handled the service’s personnel affairs as Third Assistant
Secretary of State probably did not hurt. West, State on the Eve, p. 118.
115 Under unusual circumstances, the extraordinary ex-slave Frederick Douglass proved an early, and sole,
exception to this rule. In 1871, he served as secretary o f a commission dispatched to examine the
possibility o f annexing.the Caribbean island of Santo Domingo. Later, in 1889, Washington appointed him
Minister to Haiti and charge d’affaires to Santo Domingo until his resignation in 1891. The rule retrenched
until Lucile Atcherson passed the entrance examinations in 1922 and became the first woman foreign
service officer. William Jennings Bryan left the service a more positive legacy, when his daughter, Ruth
Bryan Owen, became the first woman chief of mission, serving as Minister to Denmark from 1933 to 1936.
116 Entering the service in 1890, 1902, and 1904, respectively, Jackson, Rives, and Grew avoided the
entrance examinations instituted under Roosevelt’s executive order of 1904. Directly appointed a Special
Assistant in 1915, Dresel thereby uniquely escaped the exams, also--as well as any job security. The other
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new secretaries had undergone training at the State Department, limited as it was. In 1913, despite a
regrettable backslide into patronage for high level posts, the Wilson administration nevertheless stood firm
on maintaining the lesser secretaries on a Civil Service footing. With the Stone-Flood Act in 1915, “The
reclassified diplomatic service...was administered to stimulate career aspirations; advancement in [the
consular and diplomatic branches] of the diplomatic service now reflected “service” to the nation, not to
any political party.” 117 American diplomacy increasingly offered unprecedented opportunities for merit
advancement through established ranks; promised security from the vagaries o f domestic politics; and more
and more sought further incentives designed to attract the highest quality o f men. After rigorous, formal
examinations, young Third Secretaries like Kirk (1914), Winslow (1914), Harriman (1915), Osborne
(1916), and Scotten (1916) now entered what quickly was establishing itself as a bona fid e career field.
Whereas Grew (1904) and even Wilson (1911) initially perceived entry into service as a mere hiatus before
pursuing “real work,” these new men arrived with more-or-less legitimate aspirations for a career in
American diplomacy.
Evidence o f the new diplomatic paradigm taking hold came in the careerism that abounded among
Gerard’s staff. The politically-appointed ambassador, of course, left diplomatic service once developments
l iquidated his position. Three o f four tenuously appointed Special Assistants were decommissioned with
the dissolution of Gerard’s embassy in 1917. The fourth, Dresel, survived until 1922 after helping
compose the peace and war settlement, and very successfully serving first as American Commissioner, then
charge d'affaires in Berlin pending new Ambassador Houghton’s arrival. In particular contrast, however,
all the embassy’s ten secretaries essentially continued their foreign service careers after leaving Berlin.
Harvey’s strange insanity, o f course, led initially to his reassignment to Buenos Aires, then “unassignment”
from active service, and, finally, death in 1917. At his post in Copenhagen, Harriman’s unexpected death
ended in 1926 an eleven-year career otherwise destined for high office. Three others left the service for
unknown reasons. After four post-Berlin years, Osborne retired in 1921. Eleven years o f active duty

nine of the group, however, were obliged to pass them. The 50% figure from Werking, The Master
Architects, p. 240; 90% statistic calculated by author.
117 Richard Hume Werking, The Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign Service. 1890-1913
(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), p. 240.
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promoted Ruddock to Secretary of Embassy at Peking by his unassignment and retirement in 1924.
Winslow rose to First Secretary at Havana, when thirteen years o f diplomacy ended with his departure in
1927. The new careerism, however, found best expression in the surprising number of ambassadors to
emerge from the group. No less than four o f the eleven secretaries eventually secured ambassador-level, or
higher rank in the 1930s and 1940s—Grew (Turkey, Japan, Special Assistant Secretary o f State), Wilson
(Germany, Special Assistant to the Secretary o f State), Kirk (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Italy), and Scotten
(Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Ecuador, New ZeaIand)-before retiring with pension.
A successor to Ambassador Gerard would not be appointed until almost exactly five years after
his 1917 departure. Only in February, 1922, with a formal peace finally negotiated, would Alanson B.
Houghton arrive to reestablish U.S. representation in Weimar Germany. His embassy would be America’s
first in Berlin whose spirit would be largely o f the new diplomatic paradigm. Gerard’s tenure in Berlin
' between 1913 and 1917 marked the point o f inflection in the American evolution o f a career foreign
service. His time in office illustrated the mounting efforts being made towards professionalizing the
recruitment, promotion, administration, and retention o f the service’s personnel, while still evidencing yet
the dangers o f lingering nineteenth-century-style patronage. This process shifted into high gear under the
impetus of the war period and, more and more, informed opinion considered the great advantages afforded
with professional statesmen. The Stone-Flood Act o f 1915 temporarily patched the more glaring
deficiencies under the exigencies of wartime. Together, the act’s legislation and the demands of the
conflict and its aftermath largely set the course leading directly to the Rogers Act o f 1924 and the formal
establishment o f the United States Foreign Service. In 1914, the year o f Grew’s hopeful remarks prefacing
this chapter, not a single American mission in the great capitals could boast a professional diplomat as its
chief. By 1939, twenty-five of over fifty-one chiefs o f mission were career Foreign Service officers,
including Ambassador to Germany Hugh Robert Wilson.118 Strong winds of change had carried the service
so far and would not leave untouched other grave deficiencies left over from the closing century. Obstacles
to professionalism had more concrete manifestations as well, as Gerard’s housing crisis upon his

liS Thom pson, A m erican Diplomacy, p. 87..
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appointment in 1913 helped further spotlight the pressing issue o f permanent diplomatic residences and
embassy buildings abroad.

CHAPTER IV
THE EMBASSY AND ITS TOOLS
[It is] a palace in far the prettiest part o f Berlin. The house [sic] is surrounded by
a huge garden with ivy growing on the walls, and best o f all the bridle path to the
Tiergarten comes right to the door. Altogether it’s an enchanting spot...1
—Harriette Post (July, 1914)

In the mid-summer of 1914, the Gerards’ youthful visitor regarded the new American Embassy
rightly as a blissful sanctuary in the heart o f the Imperial German capital. But while Miss Post’s fanciful
description certainly conveyed its truth, in other, more discerning eyes the imposing manor impressed
.something arguably much more meaningful. For from the view o f Berlin’s corps diplomatique and
German officialdom, to behold the palatial, three-story, carved-granite structure at Wilhelmsplatz 7 was to
behold the United States itself: a sturdy, imposing edifice to proclaim the world power status of America.
One might wonder, however, to judge otherwise from the country’s standing neglect o f proper, permanent
housing for its representatives abroad, including at Berlin up until Gerard’s arrival. In glaring contrast with
the major nations of the world, the United States in the years up to World War I was peculiar—and alone
among the European powers—in not providing such essentials to its diplomats. By the turn of the century,
every other nation represented in Berlin and the other large European capitals either owned outright or held
a long lease on a residence suitable for respectable diplomatic receptions and entertainments.

The United

States government, however, considered this necessity to be the ambassador’s problem and simply left him
to his own devices and, for the most part, his own finances. Well into the twentieth century no provisions
were made by Congress to house and furnish delegations abroad with offices. As the end of the Edwardian
Era fast approached, Ambassador Gerard’s new residence and embassy exemplified the first, fundamental,

1 Gerard Papers, Folder 10-29, Post to Gerard, undated but certainly in July, 1914.
2 Andrew D. White, Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White (New York: The Century Company, 1905),
p. 142.
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and consuming task for virtually every incoming American ambassador, namely finding—and paying for—a
place in which to live and a place from which to conduct his diplomatic work.
Straight off upon arrival, new American ministers and ambassadors typically had to consider their
predecessor’s housing and work accommodations. Decisions had to be made whether they sufficed in
location, suitability, and, particularly, whether they excessively strapped the new m an’s personal resources.
More often than not, the last factor determined the others. Exacerbated by the low salaries offered
American diplomats, the situation helped encourage the early practice of appointing wealthy men. In 1906,
Representative Nicholas Longworth complained to his fellow Congressmen:

No one but a very rich man...can be an ambassador of the United States in any
European capital, and no man who is not at least comparatively wealthy...can be a
minister o f the United States at any important diplomatic post. In other words, these
offices, among the most dignified and important in the gift o f the American people,
are for rich men and rich men alone. This republic...has today an officeholding
aristocracy... an aristocracy purely and solely of the dollar.3

Such observations were commonplace among not only the nation’s politicians, but also its populace. The
diplomatic service felt the disdain for its “elitism” in all kinds of neglect, not least of all in proper housing
arrangements.
While personnel comfort and lost efficiency counted among the casualties, more fundamental and
serious damage emerged in the loss of American prestige and dignity. The State Department heard chronic
complaints over the shabbiness, indignity, and vagueness o f accommodations overseas as wholly
inadequate for an aspiring world power as America. But despite, or in spite, o f these pressures, official
moves to provide larger housing allowances or invest in permanent buildings consistently proved
politically unpopular and, so, made the Lowden Act an aberration. Passed in February, 1911, it
represented Congress’ first act in recent memory to address the increasingly serious issue. The act
authorized the Secretary of State a very modest $500,000 annually to acquire suitable living and working
quarters for U.S. diplomats and consuls abroad. By Gerard’s arrival at his post, the United States owned

3 Hugh R. Wilson, The Education o f a Diplomat (London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1938), pp. 280-281. Quote o f 23 May 1906 from Tracy H. Lay, The Foreign Service o f the United States
(NY: Prentice-Hall, 1925).
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only four embassy or legation structures, two o f which were deemed adequate-Constantinople’s $150,000
embassy and Peking’s $60,000 legation-and none o f which stood in Berlin.4 With no more ambitious
provisioning expected, new administrations like Woodrow Wilson’s had no choice but to rely on a newlyappointed ambassador’s private wealth to suitably establish the embassy and his residence.
As noted before, the sheer expense o f high diplomatic office on top o f innumerable and
considerable other costs made Wilson’s ambassadorial recruitment a painful process. His first pick for
Berlin, Henry Fine, could not afford the post even with a $25,000 annual subsidy from Cleveland Dodge.
Wilson did find a benefactor for Dodge in his ambassador to London, Walter Hines Page, who as early as
April, 1914, wrote Wilson that he must resign unless an honorarium might be found. Harvard’s Charles
Eliot and the head of the Young M en’s Christian Association, John Mott, both declined China for reasons
o f solvency. Cleveland Dodge himself, while sufficiently wealthy to provide at least $50,000 per year for
the support o f ambassadors o f lesser means, refused to take any foreign post at all on financial grounds.3
For those like Gerard who might afford an embassy on the other hand, capacity to impress
naturally stood in direct proportion to the m an’s resources. Limited funds meant equally unimpressive
housing, while independent wealth allowed accommodations more closely meeting the par of the European
diplomatic community. Money or no, the task required extended and distracting searches immediately
upon the ambassador’s arrival. Even with respectable means, suitable housing very often proved nearly
impossible to find in the cramped capitals—a perennial contingency for no foreign diplomat in Berlin but
the Americans. A predecessor o f Gerard’s, the second ambassador to Berlin, Andrew D. White, once
explained the urgent pressure to quickly secure proper housing:
On his arrival [the new ambassador] is expected to visit the Emperor and the princes of
his family, the imperial chancellor, and the minister o f foreign affairs, but all others are
expected to visit him...ministers o f the crown, the diplomatic corps, the members o f the
Imperial Parliament, the members o f the Prussian legislature, the foremost men in the
army and navy..., hence the most pressing duty on my arrival was to secure a house, and,
during three months following, all the time that I could possibly spare, and much that I
ought not to have spared, was given to excursions into all parts of the city to find it. No
house, no ambassador.6

4 Ibid., p. 281. The consular service stood in even worse shape.
3 Berthold, “Assignment to Berlin: The Embassy o f James Watson Gerard, 1913-1917” (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, 1981), p. 19.
6 White, Autobiography, pp. 141-142.
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A NEW EM BASSY BUILDING

Walter Hines Page, Gerard’s amateur colleague in London, encountered the classic case upon his
arrival to assume his duties in 1913. Residing at the Coburg Hotel for the first three months o f his tenure,
Page complained o f the “indignity and inconvenience—even the hum iliation-of an ambassador beginning
his career in an hotel, especially during court season, and a green ambassador at that! I hope I may not die
before our Government does the conventional duty to provide ambassadors’ residences.”

He wrote

President Wilson in October, that “[The British] commiserate me on having a Government that will not
provide an Ambassador’s residence-from the King to my servants.”8 Indeed, after his initial introduction
and welcome on the occasion o f Page’s official presentation to the King o f his diplomatic credentials, the
latter “immediately proceeded to express his surprise and regret that a great and rich country like the
United States had not provided a residence for its ambassadors. ‘It is not fair to an ambassador,’ said he;
and he spoke most earnestly.” All Page could muster in defense was a tactful suggestion that America’s
“so many absorbing domestic tasks and...so few absorbing foreign relations” had delayed her developing
until now “what might be called an international consciousness.”9
Despite never having been in an American embassy and having only ever visited a single (British)
embassy before in his travels, Page’s initial sortie to the Chancery at 123 Victoria Street made his “heart
s[ijnk.” He entered “between two cheap stores-the same entrance that the dwellers in the cheap flats
above used.” .After passing “immodest looking women” in the corridors,10 he arrived to find his new office
“dingy with twenty-nine years of dirt and darkness, and utterly undignified.” The flat’s bedrooms, kitchen
and other rooms served as the “offices” for the secretaries and attaches. O f the “cheap hole,” he declared
“the offices of the United States Government...ought at least to be as good as a common lawyer’s office in

7 Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters o f Walter H. Page. 2 vols. (Garden City and New York City:
Doubleday, Page & Company, 1923), 1: 133.
8 Ibid., p. 146, 25 October 1913.
9 Ibid., p. 136.
10 Rachel West, The Department of State on the Eve o f the First World War (Athens, GA: The University
o f Georgia Press, 1978), p. 82.
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a country town in a rural state of our Union. Nobody asked for anything for an embassy: nobody got
anything for an embassy. I made up my mind in ten minutes that I’d get out o f this place.” 11
While Page would struggle almost another year to move his chancery to the much more
respectable No. 4 Grosvenor Gardens, Gerard began assessing his options even before he had departed
America officially on 9 September 1913. He understood early the inadequacy o f the existing embassy and
ambassador’s residence in Berlin. The Gerards happened to be embarked on a European vacation when
they received confirmation in late July of the judge’s nomination to Berlin. Since Gerard was on the
continent, Ambassador John Leishman invited him to visit incognito “...to see the house and familiarize
yourself with the business of the Embassy and matters generally,” 12 and Gerard made a “flying trip” in
early August “to look into the house question.” There he found Leishman living pleasantly situated in a
small, two-family apartment house-tumed-villa, but two miles from Berlin’s center.13 Leishman had felt
constrained to keep the place upon his predecessor David Jayne Hill’s departure, despite that “while the
present place is pleasantly located[,] the house is not at all suited for an Embassy and affords no room at all
for guests.” 14 Gerard agreed directly and declared it “entirely unsuitable for an Embassy.” 15 Likewise, the
current embassy offices in the Rauchstrasse suffered in “rotten and inadequate quarters,” 16 and the new
ambassador condemned them as well. The wealthy Gerard thus quickly settled, that Leishman’s house must
be abandoned and the embassy quarters enlarged, if not relocated.17
In pondering how best to proceed, Gerard found it impossible to neglect the public dimension in
resolving his housing dilemma. As he began shopping around for a suitable property within his means,
diplomatic peer pressure vied for influence against a sensitive American public. On the one hand, the
Kaiser’s imperial sentiments for pomp and decor led him to “expect something o f [all foreign envoys in

" Ib id , pp. 133-134.
12 Gerard Papers, Folder 6-9, Leishman to Gerard, 30 June 1913.
Ij James Watson Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1917), pp.
18-19.
14 Gerard Papers, Folder 6-9, Leishman to Gerard, 27 September 1913.
15 Gerard, Four Years, p. 19.
16 Gerard Papers, Folder 7-19, Wile to Gerard, 29 September 1913.
17 Leishman’s lease Gerard allowed to lapse and he advised Grew from Paris on 20 September to not
exercise the renewal option o f the lease on the embassy building at Rauchstrasse 16. See Gerard Papers,
Folder 5-25, Grew to Gerard, 22 September 1913.
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Berlin],” as he considered he did more for them than any other sovereign. If Gerard’s embassy were to be
successful and of greatest use to his country, he ought to procure appropriately imposing, dignified quarters
satisfactory to the Emperor’s taste.18 And as for German high officials and the rest o f Berlin’s diplomatic
community, a majestic embassy counted for much in the way o f prestige and honor, intangibles which
brought untold favor in their wake.
On the opposite horn o f Gerard’s dilemma, however, fumed democratic egalitarianism back in
now-Democratic America. Americans, steeped in Jeffersonian values and Franklin simplicity, despised
anything that smacked of elitism and riled at any sign o f ostentation. Unfortunately, the trappings of just
such qualities essentially defined an embassy building’s capacity to impress. Whatever his decision,
Gerard had to consider ticklish public opinion at home. Hardly had he arrived in Berlin, when New York
Times correspondent Louis Wiley sent him a clipping from the paper of a report cabled from Berlin, which
announced Gerard was “anxious to make a proper selection, as he tells his friends that he and Mrs. Gerard
attach great importance to the maintenance of social representation of a character which will enable the
American Embassy in Berlin to rank with those of the other great powers.” Wiley’s friendly advice
reminded the ambassador of the imprudence “to emphasize by publication the fact that social display is
necessary for representation of our interests abroad.” “Possibly you are misquoted,” he suggested, but “I
hope you will avoid any indication that you are becoming undemocratic...” 19 Friend Don C. Seitz of the
New York World seconded Wiley, when he admonished, “I do not think I would agitate the house question
much [regarding a more permanent structure for the Berlin embassy]. There is still a live American
prejudice against Embassies, foolish as it is.”20 Indeed, so sensitive was the issue, that when German
newspapers disclosed the considerable rental cost for 7 Wilhelmstrasse, over which negotiations had just
collapsed in late October, Gerard grew furious.21 But, as his brother Sumner made clear at one point, “Of

18 Gerard Papers, Folder 5-23, Sumner Gerard to James Gerard, 10 August 1913. Sumner relays to Gerard,
Wilhelm l l ’s views from a family friend, Mr. George L. Meyer, who had recently luncheoned with the
Kaiser in Berlin.
'
19 Gerard Papers, Folder 7-20, Wiley to Gerard, 13 October 1913.
20 Gerard Papers, Folder 7-1, Seitz to Gerard, 10 November 1913.
21 Gerard Papers, Folder 6-40, Schmidt to Gerard, 28 October 1913.

85

course, with an imperial court on one hand and a Jeffersonian democracy on the other, you will be
criticized no matter what you do.”22
Four options suggested themselves for consideration: Building an addition to Rauchstrasse,
constructing a new structure on vacant land, leasing a wing of the luxurious Hotel Esplanade, or renting
another more suitable building-if one could be found. Initially Gerard considered constructing an annex
to the existing structure at Rauchstrasse. An investigating architect, American expatriate A.F.M. Lange,
reminded Gerard o f the structure’s “decidedly German, and at that, very bad architecture” and warned it
would require a new, expensive facade in any event. Lange otherwise broadly condemned the old building
as insufficient, pointedly contrasting its mediocrity with Germany’s planned $500,000 new embassy in
Washington on 300 feet of prime frontage. “There are better [property] plots to be had [in Berlin] for our
embassy than that of the present building,” 23 Gerard finally concurred. Meanwhile, the option to outright
build a new embassy involved its own fatal frustration, namely cost. Lange estimated $200,000 and one
year to construct an entire new building on excellent land available in the Drakestrasse.24 Bryan and the
State Department supported Gerard’s efforts to determine costs involved in bringing America’s diplomatic
presence in Berlin up to permanent par, for at this time the Wilson administration began contemplating
legislation to deal with the “building crisis” in Berlin and elsewhere.25 But while some relief was promised
in what would become the Stone-Flood Act of 1915, in the meantime political will in Washington
remained lukewarm and inordinate personal expense helped Gerard ultimately dispense with the annex and
new construction options.
From his arrival in Berlin on 5 October 1913, Gerard took up temporary residence in the courtly
Hotel Esplanade until he resolved his housing matter. Running into difficulties finding an acceptable
building, Gerard seriously considered a third option of collocating the embassy and his official residence in
a separate, new wing of the grand hotel. In mid-September, he initially discussed the propriety o f such a

22 Gerard
23 Gerard
24 Gerard
missing).
25 Gerard
1913.

Papers, Folder 5-23, Sumner Gerard to James Gerard, 10 August 1913.
Papers, Folder 6-10, Lange to Gerard, 6 August 1913.
Papers, Folder 6-10, Lange to Gerard, dated September, 1913 (actual day is torn through and
Papers, Folder 6-10, Lange to Gerard, 5 October 1913, p. 1; and Lange to Gerard, 6 October
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plan with New York Times journalist and confidante, Frederic William Wile.26 Wile sounded out several
influential Germans, Americans and others, and advised Gerard strongly against what the acting British
ambassador in Berlin ambiguously termed “an [American] diplomatic innovation.” While the embassy
would stand separately from the Esplanade, Wile concluded, its dignity would inevitably suffer by its sure
inability to escape being known as “American Embassy, care o f Hotel Esplanade.”27 Still, the ease o f the
solution, the savings in living expenses and furnishings, and the Kaiser’s unaccountable approval all kept
-the idea alive until Gerard’s final decision.

28

A fourth option existed, o f course, to lease an entirely different and more suitable building
elsewhere. By early September, embassy servant Herr Grassmiicke informed Gerard enroute in London,
that realtors armed with prospective properties had been “thick as flies” at the Embassy and that he would
continue to put them off until Gerard’s arrival.29 Gerard considered an endless stream o f properties but
due to poor location, prohibitive cost, inadequate facilities, ostentation, failed negotiations—for whichever
of numerous reasons, all the properties were passed up. Former Ambassador Andrew D. White once
cautioned o f Berlin’s difficult housing market, explaining, “Such a thing as a large furnished apartment
suitable for a foreign representative is rarely to be found in Berlin. In London and Paris such apartments
are frequently offered, but in Berlin hardly ever.” Ten years earlier, White had occupied a large apartment
as the better of two mediocre houses. The one stood nearly three miles from Berlin’s center, so White
opted for the otherwise less suitable residence located more centrally-only then to have it purchased four
years later “from under my feet by one o f the smallest governments in Europe as the residence for its
minister.” An ambassador in Berlin, he wrote, was “not infrequently obliged to take up his residence in
unfit apartments and in an unsuitable part o f the town,”30 and America’s latest ambassador teetered on
becoming the latest case in point.

26 Wile, an American, was additionally correspondent in Berlin for the London Daily Mail and several
other American newspapers.
27 Gerard Papers, Folder 7-19, Wile to Gerard, 29 September 1913.
28 Gerard Papers, Folder 7-23, Gerard to Wyvell, 23 October 1913.
29 Gerard Papers, Folder 5-26, Grassmiicke to Gerard, 10 September 1913.
30 White. Autobiography, pp. 142-143.
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It was not until very late October, that Gerard would at last settle on a final solution and be able to
move on to the real reason he had come to Berlin. An initial offer o f Wilhelmsplatz 7 came in August, but
Gerard had preferred to establish all his options first. Upon his arrival the first week of October, the
ambassador quickly took up keen interest in the property. Originally built as a palace for the Princes
Hatzfeld, the structure now stood unoccupied and somewhat dilapidated. It most recently had passed to the
ownership of the von Schwabachs, a prominent banking family, and its elderly owner now used it only for
occasional entertaining.31 Aside from the building’s respectability, Gerard also enthused at once at its
excellent location in Berlin’s heart: He and the staff would need only to cross the square and
Wilhelmstrasse to conveniently arrive on the doorsteps o f the German Foreign Office and the German
Chancellery.32
On the debit side, however, tallied the great costs of renovation. Just after his arrival, Gerard
received from architect Lange an assessment of the property. The building, he reported, possessed several
deficiencies, including a single entrance for all traffic, very limited heating by a stove and small heater, a
rather small dancing hall, and only a single bathroom on the ground floor and “an apology for one” on the
second. Only the ballroom and 20 of the building’s many rooms would be useful for office and living
purposes, the remainder fit only for servants’ quarters. Several rooms required extensive redecoration (e.g.
tapestries, picture panels, statues). Finally, the house lacked hot water and functional electric fixtures.
Lange estimated “three months [sic] time and a big sum of money to make the house habitable.” 33
The palace was “nothing but a shell” in Gerard’s eyes, but in the end a variety of factors conspired
to win him over. Wilhelmsplatz 7 ’s location certainly could not be beat. The structure’s potential grandeur
assured a very respectable diplomatic presence for Gerard and America. The $15,000 annual rent would be
largely offset by a generous $9,500 allowance from Washington. And, like a deft fly, White’s utterance,
“no house, no ambassador,” perhaps buzzed an insistent background noise. Together these looming
prospects helped overshadow the monetary cost to Gerard. The untold thousands on the other hand spent
paying the architect Lange, replacing the missing gas and electric light fixtures, upgrading the hot water

jl Gerard, Four Years, p. 19.
32 Wilson, Education o f a Diplomat, p. 171.
3j Gerard Papers, Folder 6-10, Lange to Gerard, 5 October 1913.
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and heating systems, furnishing all three floors “from top to bottom,” and a host o f other expenses were
absorbed by Gerard him self and hardly to be recouped when he finally left.34 Even considering Gerard’s
success in arranging with the department to rent a larger embassy building, the entire venture had sunk his
$17,500 annual salary “far [past] the minus point.”35 By late November, the contractor Gebrueder
Hammer had completed the detailed kitchen improvements36 and the next month Gerard hired the company
o f Herr Gustav fCnauer to move the embassy’s contents to the new quarters/7
The ambassador and his staff now endured the remainder o f the common experience o f virtually
every American post, past and present, after a change in the presidency: Survival o f the service’s spoilsdriven plundering, followed by the removal o f the embassy to a new location. To pack up and move the
entire embassy—its furniture, its records, its reputation—virtually every time a new ambassador came to
town proved immensely disarranging. Gerard’s move to Wilhelmsplatz merely repeated what his
predecessor, Leishman, did when he first moved the embassy quarters to the Rauchstrasse in October,
1910. Leishman’s First Secretary, Grew, described the event’s upset to his mother, writing,
We moved our chancery to Rauchstrasse this week and for the last three days have
been working in the midst of the most awful confusion you ever saw...All our furniture
is heaped in clumps and piles in the middle of the various rooms, while the workmen
work at the walls, and we have somehow set up our desks in the midst of this confusion
and try to compose diplomatic Notes and Dispatches as on a battlefield amidst the
“trump of war.” I fear it will be a month or six weeks before we are settled...38
Considering the unavoidably frustrating impact on the embassy’s diplomatic work, for formerAmbassador White the perennial ordeal of moving amounted to “a labor and care to which no
representative o f the United States or of any other power ought to be subjected.”

39

Certainly, White’s

words applied to Grew’s move with Gerard barely three years later, as the disruption came heaped onto the
sta ffs lingering agitation over the Wilson administration’s earlier far-reaching personnel changes.

j4 Gerard, Four Years, p. 20.
35 Gerard Papers, Folder 7-19, Wile to Gerard, 29 September 1913. The State Department gave allowances
for an ambassador’s residence only if it were large enough to accommodate the embassy offices as well.
See Gerard, Four Years, pp. 19-20.
j6 Gerard Papers, Folder 5-37, Gebrueder Hammer to Gerard, 28 November 1913.
37 Gerard Papers, Folder 6-6, series of three letters from Knauer to Gerard, dated 6-9 December 1913.
jS Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of 40 Years, 1904-1945, 2 vols., ed. Walter
Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), 1: 78, Grew to Mrs. Grew, 2 October ,1910.
39 White, Autobiography, p. 143.
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In any case, with renovations finalized and the move complete, Gerard could confide to Secretary
Bryan the impressive, new embassy was such, that his “successor will be very well off.” There still
appeared exaggerated accounts of the “extravagance” of Gerard’s lease and the building’s furnishing,
particularly from one “very anti-[Wilson] administration” correspondent, but the majority of observers, in
Germany at least, acclaimed the new American embassy building.40 Finally, after over three months’
distraction, a relieved Gerard at last opened the new embassy to business in January, 1914. Just in time for
Berlin’s busy social season, not to mention that August’s global wake-up call to the new century, Gerard
had to appreciate former ambassador to Paris, Henry White’s appraisal. Wishing every success to Gerard’s
tour of service, “in marked contrast to [those] of your...immediate predecessors,” White advised him, “1
cannot but feel that the solution of the house question is a very important step towards that end.”41
America’s latest envoy to the German Empire had, indeed, brought closure to, as one native newspaper
described his housing problem, “a long burning...question for the capital city and for the [American]
Union.”42 But best o f all, Ambassador Gerard now had some place to sleep and work.
Washington was indeed aware of the difficult issue o f permanent diplomatic housing abroad.
Over ten years earlier, Ambassador White insisted acquisition of suitable housing was “the very first thing
to be done” with regard to reforms in the diplomatic service.43 Despite meager gains from the Lowden Act
in 1911, a lack o f political resolve continued to hamper any real progress towards resolving the housing
crisis. Three years after the act, a chorus of Gerard’s peers repeated White’s plaints. Ambassador Thomas
Nelson Page in Rome intended early to raise the permanent and suitable housing issue with Washington.44
Walter Hines Page (no relation) in London, o f course, made his housing experience the subject o f many
letters back to Colonel House and President Wilson. And while Gerard himself seems conspicuously silent

40 Gerard Papers, Folder 4-47, Gerard to Bryan, undated, but sometime between late October, 1913, and
January, 1914.
41 Gerard Papers, Folder 7-24, H. White to Gerard, 26 October 1913.
42 Gerard Papers, Folder 7-19, Wile to Gerard, 11 October 1913. Encloses a clipping, entitled
“Amerikanisches Botschafts-Hotel in Berlin,” from an unknown German newspaper dated 11 September
1913.
43 White, Autobiography, p. 364.
44 West, State on the Eve, p. 104.

90

on the issue, his painful experience in Berlin provided only so much more grist for Washington’s parochial
mill. Something clearly had to be done.
The Wilson administration assumed an early interest in possibly procuring permanent housing in
Berlin and elsewhere to begin resolving the housing crisis. Not until 1914 were the first appropriations
finally made under the Lowden Act to purchase embassy buildings in Tokyo and Mexico City.45 In mid1914 Grew reported Secretary Bryan’s enquiry of the prospects o f purchasing the new embassy building in
Berlin,46 but the war immediately made its consideration moot. While the conflict gave great urgency to
the diplomatic and consular services’ other shortfalls and hurried preparation and passage of the StoneFlood Act in early 1915, no further efforts at rectifying the housing problem came until after the war. In
1921 Congress appropriated $300,000 to acquire embassy, legation, or consular accommodations in each
of fourteen cities, including Berlin, Rome, and Vienna, but a special oversight commission succeeded only
in gaining a legation site in Christiana, Norway. The Rogers Act of 1924 authorized the commission to
secure a maximum of $500,000 worth o f property in each of six capitals, including Berlin, Rome, Paris,
Madrid, Buenos Aires, and Tokyo; and no more than $200,000 each in Lima, Vienna, Brussels, Hankow,
Tientsin, and Canton. By 1925, however, only eight additional embassies and legations had been procured,
one being a gift and Berlin still on the waiting list.
But political resolve continued to mount and the Foreign Service Buildings Act o f 1926 created
the Foreign Service Buildings Commission, consisting of the Secretaries o f State, Treasury, and
Commerce, and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Senate and House committees on
foreign affairs. The Commission would use no more than $2,000,000 in any one year o f a $10,000,000
Foreign Service Building Fund to oversee acquisition, alteration, repair, and furnishing o f suitable
buildings for diplomatic and consular establishments abroad. The State Department’s new Foreign Service
Buildings Office would supervise, coordinate, and administer the diplomatic and consular housing
acquisition program. With the Depression and the international tumult of the 1930s hindering acquisitions,
the Commission did manage to grudgingly procure new residences in several capitals, including London,

45 Graham H. Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular Practice (New York and London: D. AppletonCentury Company, Inc., 1936), p. 155.
46'Grew, Turbulent Era. 1: 123, Grew to Ruddock, 2 June 1914.
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Paris, Rome, Tokyo, Santiago, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and Mexico City. Land for eventual
construction o f a residence was purchased in Berlin, Moscow, Lima, and Havana, as were excellent sites
for chancelleries in Berlin, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and Havana.47 Through the end o f World War II,
America’s Foreign Service would expend roughly $25 million, as it gradually and belatedly sought to
rectify a permanent housing problem too-long-delayed. Not until after that war would any real momentum
mount in finally resolving an issue that bedeviled Ambassador Gerard in 1913.48

NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND NEW DIPLOM ACY

In January, 1914, the Gerards, the Grews, the Ruddocks, and the rest of the small staff rushed to
ready the new embassy. As in countless years past, January marked the start of yet another social season in
Berlin and Wilhelmsplatz 7 stood now to prove its mettle. Outside the embassy’s temporary bustle, time
ambled along as it always had; to its occupants, “[c]hange in the world was inconceivable...[and ] [w]ar
between civilized Western Powers was an absurdity,” as Second Secretary Wilson later reminisced o f this
belle epoque before the Great War. “We lived in the illusion of immutability, but we had unquestioning
faith in the illusion.”49 For Gerard and his diplomatic colleagues, the social calendar ordered their lives
and all was yet well, even as the cataclysm o f the coming world war swirled just beyond the horizon,
invisible and unimaginable to their Edwardian repose.
Wilson’s words notwithstanding and the war’s immense change impending, however, all was not
so “immutable” in the world o f the new occupants o f Wilhelmsplatz 7. For they were, paradoxically,
playing passive witness to a virtual revolution in the offm g-an unprecedented technological Putsch that
was transforming their world and the nature of diplomacy before their eyes. The progress o f technology in
the few decades before the war had brought vast innovations in communications, travel, entertainment,
office equipment, and a host of other tools and amenities. Beginning roughly around 1880, the revolution
stood in full swing by the turn o f the century as such diverse novelties as the automobile, the cinema, the

47 Stuart American Practice, pp. 156-158.
48 Wilson, Education, p. 281-282.
49 Ibid., p. 3.
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telegraph, the telephone, and electricity quickly became commonplace and dramatically altered the pace
and character o f modem life, as well as the tempo and nature o f twentieth-century diplomacy.
Before the First World War, notions o f time were viewed everywhere as more or less eternal.
Tim e’s passing subject only to slow change, people remained confident that the future would naturally
resemble the past. The rapid march of technology in the preceding four decades, however, had
nevertheless profoundly modified such notions. While temporal senses o f “past” and “future” resembled
the previous modes o f experience, it was the sense of the “present” that became most distinctively altered.
Technology profoundly compressed people’s experience of the present, which combined with an
unprecedented spatial expansion “to create the vast, shared experience o f simultaneity.” As Stephen Kern
.explains,
The present was no longer limited to one event in one place, sandwiched tightly between
past and future and limited to local surroundings. In an age of intrusive electronic
communication “now” became an extended interval of time that could, indeed must, include
events around the world. Telephone switchboards, telephonic broadcasts, daily newspapers,
World Standard Time, and the cinema mediated simultaneity through technology.50

An age of simultaneity was bom, in which people separated by great distance could experience
events together, virtually as they happened. A telegram or telephone call prompted an immediate response
and, along with fledgling wireless (radio) technology, introduced an unheard-of compression o f time
between the occurrence and the news of an event. The circumstances of Gerard’s ambassadorial
appointment vividly dramatized the point. In early July, 1913, the State Department received a cable from
Berlin advising the embassy there had just received a telephone call from the German Foreign Office,
which reported the Kaiser had wired his approval o f Gerard’s appointment.51 A few weeks later, delayed
only by the final deliberations o f the Wilson administration, a wireless telegraph message flashed to
Gerard, then in the middle o f the Atlantic Ocean on board the modern German steamliner, Imperator, to
notify him of his official selection as the new ambassador to the German Empire.52

50 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1983), p. 314.
51 United States National Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1910-1929, File 123G31, “Gerard,
James,” Leishman telegram to Secretary o f State [Bryan], 1 July 1913.
52 James Watson Gerard, My First Eightv-Three Years in America: The Memoirs o f James W. Gerard
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1951), p. 169.
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Whereas communication and transportation were limited previously to the speed of a horse and
the velocity and direction o f a capricious wind, now telegraphs, telephones, new steamships, automobiles,
and airplanes completely transformed people’s sense of distance and spatial proximity.53 More to the point
at hand, technology’s innovations were wielding likewise momentous impact on the conduct o f diplomatic
work as well. The rapidity of communication and transportation induced two particular changes
characteristic o f twentieth-century diplomacy. One occurred in the power o f plenipotentiaries. Enjoying
nearly instantaneous communication, foreign ministries could exercise greater control over their envoys
abroad. Sir Horace Rumbold, British ambassador to Vienna, bemoaned in 1902 “the telegraphic
demoralisation [s/c] o f those who formerly had to act for themselves and are now content to be at the end
o f the wire.”54 Micromanagement had come of age in international diplomacy.
The second change came with the accelerated pace of diplomacy, which no longer allowed the
ameliorating effect of delay to soothe and cool tempers. An age o f slow communication and its common
assumption that “time alone is the conciliator” had given way to greatly “shortened elapsed time between
transmission and receipt o f diplomatic dispatches,” which, in turn, stole away “the relaxed luxury of
contemplation and careful judgment [previously] enjoyed” and “necessitated rapid [increasingly
impersonal,] and often ill-considered responses.”55 Certainly the failure of diplomacy counts as one root of
the First World War, but one principal cause o f that failure was the inability o f diplomats to “cope with the
volume and speed o f electronic communication.” The flurry o f telegrams and telephone calls that largely
constituted the diplomatic communications of the critical post-Sarajevo July crisis exemplified the
accelerated, technology-driven tempo of the new diplomacy. With implied or explicit threats of war
hanging in the balance, between 23 July and 4 August 1914 parties issued five ultimatums with

53 One sign o f technology’s shrinking o f the world appeared a few years before Gerard’s appointment,
when Theodore Roosevelt personally visited the Panama Canal’s construction in 1906, in doing so
becoming the first American president ever to leave the United States while in office. Walter LaFeber, The
American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750 (New York: W.W. Norton
& Co., 1989), p. 230.
54 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth
tury (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1981), p. 132.
lul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to TwentiethCentury Diplomacy in France and Germany (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), pp. 38-39;
and Kern. Culture o f Time, pp. 274-275.
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unprecedentedly short time limits. Snap judgments and hasty reactions jumped before the hot breath of
unbending mobilization timetables fixed to the second. Daily press and the new technology o f mass
communication, including the cinema, “directly accelerated popular response to the already frenetic
diplomatic activity.” The unique, temporality o f the twentieth-century “Age o f Electricity” had introduced
a pace unfathomable to people and diplomats o f the expired “Century of Steam,” complete with crossed
messages, transmission delays, unexpected surprises, and unpredictable timing, which “supercharged the
masses, confused the diplomats, and unnerved the generals.” When on 28 July the Austrians finally
declared war on Serbia and precipitated the crisis into cataclysm, they did so like no nation ever before: by
telegram.56
Gerard’s embassy in Berlin directly experienced the accelerating impact o f the new transportation
and communications technology. Telegraphs allowed nearly instantaneous communication between Berlin
and Washington. Speedier intelligence on important issues now might better inform the picked up pace of
relations, public and foreign, and the rapid decision-making they increasingly compelled. Better
coordination o f policy became possible, though not necessarily exploited. Telephones and automobiles
made embassy work more efficient as labor-saving devices. Steamships introduced more timely and
reliable transatlantic mails, for some time to come the preferred method of communication due to relative
inexpense. The diplomatic paradigm shift in the early twentieth-century had a technological dimension as
well, that played an important role in shaping the manner in which the Gerard embassy went about its
business. For Gerard and Wilhelmsplatz 7, as indeed for every diplomatic service, the technological world
o f the new century helped compel a further shift in the diplomatic paradigm in which, as one recent scholar
explains it, “Ambassadors who only a short time before had calculated correspondence time in terms of
days and weeks now thought of hours and minutes.”57
Because of the relative inexpense, the Berlin embassy relied primarily on the mails for the bulk of
its routine pre-war communications with Washington and the rest of the world. In early 1914, mail required

56 Kern, Culture o f Time, pp. 259-260, 268, and 275-276. For an intensely interesting discussion of
technology’s role in precipitously rushing the July crisis see Kern, pp. 259-286.
57.Lauren, Diplomats, pp. 133-134. Accurate reconstruction of the July crisis, Kern explains, “requires a
temporal precision to the day; after that the hour, sometimes even the minute, becomes crucial.” Kern,
Culture o f Time, p. 264.
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roughly ten days to three weeks to reach its destination, including approximately seven days’ steam travel
between Bremen and New York City.58 Once the war started, the mails slipped into a very delayed and
uncertain state, often taking six weeks to three months over the same route.59 Prominent Bowers and Sands
attorney, Frederick J. Middlebrook, handled much of Gerard’s financial and property matters and
suggested in mid-August, 1914, that Gerard consider sending a power o f attorney if the conflict did not
clear up by the fall, so that the mails could be relied upon.60 Two days earlier, Colonel House remarked in
a letter to Gerard on the unsure state o f mail service and whether his correspondence might ever reach
Gerard.61 By December, 1914, Gerard could complain o f the embassy being “so shut off here, so deprived
o f newspapers and news that it is impossible to know what is going on in the world.”62 A Baron Seidlitz of
the German Army wrote Gerard that month asking him to forward some enclosed correspondence to points
outside the country. “It seems to be impossible to get any news to [the] U.S.A.,” he lamented to a
sympathetic Gerard. “[I]t is a sad feeling to be without any connection with the outer world...”63

58 Gerard Papers, Folder 11-3, Winslow to Scharps, 10 February 1914.
39 For example, a letter from Alfred H. Curtis to Gerard left New York on 22 October 1914 and arrived in
Berlin on approximately 7 December; Gerard Papers, Folder 9-20, Curtis to Gerard, 22 October 1914.
Frederic J. Middlebrook refers to the “uncertainty o f the mails;” Gerard Papers, Folder 17-6, Middlebrook
to Gerard, 30 March 1916. In May, 1916, Middlebrook resorts to sending messages via State Department
cable “owing to the difficulty in communicating with him in the usual method [mail];” Gerard Papers,
Folder 17-6, Middlebrook to Secretary of State [Lansing], 19 May 1916. Also that month, Mr. Gustav
Schwarzwald in Germany complained to Gerard that letters from his sons in New York took not the normal
10-20 days, but nearly three months, due to delays by censors and the restrictions imposed by the British
blockade; Gerard Papers, Folder 18-12, Schwarzwald to Gerard, 27 May 1916. In July, Middlebrook now
used Gerard as intermediary, asking him to forward enclosed Berlin-addressed letters, “as it [currently
takes over two months to receive correspondence through the mails besides the chances of loss;” Gerard
Papers, Folder 17-6, Middlebrook to Gerard, 10 July 1916. On the other hand, transit time for official
correspondence dispatched by Gerard to the State Department in Washington, D.C., between August and
December, 1914, took just under a relatively normal 20 days, possibly due to its diplomatic immunity from
the censor’s inspection. Based on author analysis of correspondence dates and indicated dates o f receipt by
the State Department of communications in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,
1914 Supplement. The World War. United States Department o f State (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1919). Actual average was 19.6 days. Also, the embassy enjoyed numerous
American newspaper subscriptions gratis, but issue currency quickly lapsed after the war broke out until
the most recent were over 3 weeks old. Gerard Papers, Folder 7-42, Gerard to John M. Bowers, 15
September 1914.
60 Gerard Papers, Folder 10-10, Middlebrook to Gerard, 14 August 1914.
61 Gerard Papers, Folder 9-47, House to Gerard, 11 August 1914.
62 Gerard Papers, Folder 8-5, Gerard to Charles C. Burlingham, 7 December 1914.
63 Gerard Papers, Folder 11-3, Seidlitz to Gerard, 12 December 1914.
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By the summer o f 1915, the mails had become more or less reliable again, although remaining
naturally slower than normal.64 But another difficulty now emerged. The open mails had to transit through
the German postal system, a situation fraught with obvious security problems, particularly under wartime
conditions. By April, 1915, the embassy had received “special warning” from the State Department to
refrain from discussing current developments even in private correspondence.65 Gerard’s options for
effective communication had become so limited by late that year, that he expressed great relief upon
hearing o f Colonel House’s pending journey to Europe for the opportunity it would provide him to convey
sensitive, otherwise deemed uncommunicable, information back to the President. “There are many things I
want to tell the President but which I do not dare commit to paper,” let alone dispatch by cable.66 In late
December, 1916, Gerard finally received firm evidence that the German authorities opened and inspected
the embassy’s mail, when a private investigator for Gerard, George A. Taylor, wrote him from France
desiring advice on the safest way to send Gerard “important information.” Taylor’s caution stemmed from
a recent episode in Berlin’s Alexanderplatz where he had been confronted with a letter he had earlier sent
Gerard by registered mail. At that time, Taylor was warned by “one who knew, that all letters to you
[Gerard] are opened (in Berlin).”67
To avoid such compromises of its official business, the embassy relied as much as possible on
official and unofficial couriers. Every Tuesday a dedicated courier, typically a civilian attache or one of
the Third Secretaries, departed for London carrying embassy correspondence and miscellany to the outside
world too lengthy to send via encrypted cable or too sensitive to risk through the regular mails. Returning
later in the week with the “London-Berlin bag,” the diplomatic pouch and its weary runner took three days
each way traveling via Berne and Paris.68 An alternate route might also take an armed escort through the
Netherlands, accompanying back hard-to-obtain household items.69 The London embassy’s censorship,

64 Gerard Papers, Folder 11-34, Winslow to Armendt, 20 July 1915.
65 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-31, Gerard to O ’Laughlin, 17 April 1915.
66 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-10, Gerard to Lansing, 28 December 1915.
67 Gerard Papers, Folder 18-13, Taylor to Gerard, 31 December 1916.
68 Gerard Papers, Folder 12-6, Gerard to U.S. Legation in Berne, Switzerland, 26 April 1915; and Folder
17-24, Walter Hines Page to Gerard, 4 April 1916. Sent by pouch on 4 April, its receipt stamp by the
embassy indicates 7 April.
69 “Household items” proved a broad category. Wilson recalled once when a broken bottle of whisky
drenched personal letters and all the week’s correspondence from Washington, the barroom odor
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however, posed another obstacle to the embassy’s communications security. Ambassador Page’s post
evidently felt bound “out o f respect for the British censorship regulations to be aware o f the contents o f
every [mail] bag sent out o f England.” In November, 1915, a “boiling” Gerard complained to Colonel
House o f the impropriety, explaining the “harmless nature,” but extreme confidentiality o f the letters
addressed to (and, presumably, from) the Berlin embassy, including one from House which he had received
with its seal broken.70 The next month Gerard wrote House after missing his heretofore weekly missive in
the London-Berlin bag, remarking, “Hope no one requisitioned your letter if sent.”71 Even as late as
January, 1917, Gerard showed overt concern House’s letters might have been “taken somewhere on the
line.”72 Because o f the uncertainties o f using the German postal system and, to a lesser degree, the
London-Berlin bag, the embassy occasionally relied upon Americans traveling out of the country as
couriers, particularly to Belgium, Holland, England, and America. They might deliver embassy mail to
other legations or embassies direct, or merely mail correspondence through normal postal channels from
outside Germany.7'’ Gerard later described one such episode, when he ferried through his brother-in-law,
Marcus Daly, an important report to President Wilson of a recent interview with the Kaiser. Intent on
preventing its contents from being intercepted by the Germans, he relied on an unofficial courier, curiously
remarking afterwards, “That was a little old-fashioned diplomacy.”74
In 1858, after nearly two tedious years o f effort, the final stretches o f the first underwater

.

telegraph cable between America and the European continent settled onto the Atlantic sea floor and
flickered to life. Although the line died out after only a few messages, it represented the initial step in a

eventually leaving the embassy offices only grudgingly. Page’s embassy disapproved o f the arrangement,
leading to a “constant feud” between London and Berlin over the diplomatically immune shipments.
Wilson, Education, pp. 181-182.
70
■
Gerard Papers, Folder 12-46, Gerard to House, 23 November 1915.
71 Gerard Papers, Folder 12-46, Gerard to House, (no day indicated) December, 1915.
72 Gerard Papers, Folder 12-46, Gerard to House, 23 January 1917.
73 For example, in late August, 1914, the embassy entrusted mail to Professor K. McMurray of the
University of California for delivery to U.S. Minister Van Dyke in The Hague, Holland; Gerard Papers,
Folder 10-14, McMurray to Gerard, 27 August 1914. Los Angeles businessman Mr. P. Max Kuehnrich
agreed to courier documents back to America; Gerard Papers, Folder 13-9, Kuehnrich to Gerard, 3 March
1915.
74 The Reminiscences o f James W. Gerard. Columbia University Oral History Research Office Oral History
Project (New York: Columbia University, 1950), pp. 43-44; and Gerard Papers, Folder 16-25, Gerard to
Lansing, 18 January 1916.
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quantum leap forward for global communications and, eventually, Gerard’s implied “modem” diplomacy.
For the first time, information transmission speeds across oceans broke their previous confinement to the
pace o f a boat and revolutionized man’s capacity for rapid information. In contrast to the days required for
a steamship to reach its destination, messages now might be transmitted over global distances and vast
expanses o f water in only a few hours. Called “the grand Victorian technology,” telegraphy helped to
profoundly change the world’s conceptions o f time and space, and transform the conduct o f international
relations by diplomats like James Gerard. Due to technological limitations, land telegraphy had existed for
over two decades before submarine telegraphy. After the disappointing first try to America, in 1858,
engineers reviewed the potential points of failure and by 1860 had perfected the essential techniques of
electrical transmission and of manufacturing and laying submarine cable. In rapid fire, cables soon
connected the rising colonial powers with their possessions overseas. In 1866, the year after Britain finally
established a dependable telegraph link to India, the first working transatlantic cable to America came on
line.
Technological improvements helped to further increase efficiency, capacity, and utility in
subsequent years. In so doing, great strides were taken in speeding up transmission times and reducing
telegram costs, which in turn encouraged use. For example, in 1870 only a few dozen telegrams made
*

their way over Britain’s cable to India. But by 1895, the number had blossomed to over two million
annually and along the way had transformed the very nature of Anglo-Indian relations’ daily routine. In
the 1870s, the primary customers used the early cables mainly for commercial or private reasons. Within
ten years, the British Admiralty and Colonial, War, and Foreign offices had joined them and soon found
themselves accustomed to using telegraphic communication. Appreciating the great advantages conferred
by the technology, they desired in consequence to extend the web to all parts of the Empire, a project at last
completed with the “All-Red Route” in 1902, which girded the world with cables passing exclusively
through British territories. By century’s end, roughly 190,000 miles of underwater cable had spread a web
of nearly instantaneous communications around the globe, 72% o f the total British-owned,75

73 Headrick, Tools o f Em pire, pp. 157-163.
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Predictably, America entered the transoceanic cable business late. Distracted by the post-Civil
War reconstruction, the nation’s isolationism permitted numerous lapses, particularly with regard to
avenues o f international communication. Although iron-hulled, steam-driven ships had become feasible by
the 1840s and 1850s, a precipitous decline in the American merchant marine (sail- and steam-powered)
followed the conflict, with serious effect bn ocean-borne mails. On the eve o f the Civil War over 65% of
American trade and mail traffic crossed the seas on ships hoisting the American flag, but by 1898 the
figure had dropped to below 10%. As with the merchant marine, the United States neglected the
establishment o f transoceanic cables, too. Continental railroads and later attempts with American
steamship lines had set precedents in the way o f private ventures securing government subsidies to make
them happen. In 1874, however, a scandal broke out over discovered bribes to Congressmen in securing
governmental subsidies for the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. Thereafter, opponents touted the issue of
subsidies as symbolic o f corruption and privilege, effectively making it difficult for American lines to
maintain regular steamer connections for decades, and making it similarly problematic for American

.

companies to initiate expensive submarine cable projects.76 At most, the United States would only block
European monopolies’ efforts to gain cable landing privileges on the American continent. The
Government refused the French, for example, unless the French government reciprocated by similarly
guaranteeing landing privileges for future American companies. Likewise in the Pacific, the United States
tended towards the defensive and away from proaction. Numerous Presidents had encouraged Congress to
foster expansion of cable service to Hawaii and the Far East, the question finally entertaining hot debate by
the mid-1890s. But in the end, action was restricted to merely opposing establishment of a British cable
station on the island for a Canadian-Australian line.77
Gradually, demand made it profitable for companies like Western Union to open up transoceanic
cable service without government subsidy. And, like its British counterpart, the State Department soon
availed itself of the new telegraphic means o f communication, however belatedly. Sheer speed provided

76 David M. Pletcher, “ 1861-1898: Economic Growth and Diplomatic Adjustment,” in Economics and
World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789. William H. Becker and Samuel F.
Wells, Jr., ed. (New Yprk: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 140 and 159.
77 Ibid., p. 141.
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one important enticement. A ship might take upwards of ten to fourteen days’ transit time between New
York City and Rotterdam, and considerably more once the entanglements o f the British blockade fell into
place beginning in November, 1914. A telegram, in contrast, generally took anywhere from a few hours to
a more typical few days to reach its Berlin destination from Washington, D.C.

78

Actual transmission time

depended on the vagaries of the circuitous route a cable traveled once the war started. Leaving the United
States, it had to be telegraphed to the American legation at Copenhagen via London, or the embassy at
Rome via the Canary Islands, and then retelegraphed overland to Berlin.79 But due primarily to the United
States’ earlier isolationism, a handful o f cables proved adequate for the small volume o f traffic between the
continents in the years prior to the war.
Another important benefit came with better connectivity between the State Department and its
posts abroad. The experience of nineteenth-century European imperialism proved the telegraph’s utility in
connecting together all parts o f an empire for more efficient administration. In peace time, its cables
served as the “lifelines” for ever-increasing business communications between imperial home offices and
the colonies. Up-to-date information on prices, quantity, and availability of products around the world
crowded the cables between the financial centers of Europe. Newspaper correspondents likewise provided
the latest news, dispatching by telegraph their accounts o f events in faraway places and profoundly adding
to Europeans’ sense o f simultaneity with the rest o f the world. The telegraph became a valuable tool of
diplomacy in times o f crisis as well. In the 1898 confrontation at Fashoda, for example, Britain’s Kitchner
maintained communications with London through an underwater cable deployed on the bed. o f the Nile,
while his French counterpart, Marchand, operated in classic nineteenth-century autonomy, cut off from
Paris. And during times of conflict, as in the First World War, only through telegraphic technology could a
far-flung empire efficiently arrange and coordinate supply o f raw materials, food, and troops.80 The British

78 Grew, Turbulent Era. 1: 195-196, Grew diary, 15 May 1915; and Gerard, Four Years, p. 198. Gerard
Papers, Folder 11-16, Frederic William Wile to Gerard, undated, indicates prewar cables could reach their
destination in less than one-quarter of a day.
79 See Gerard, Four Years, p. 198. After initially being cut off from communication with Washington, the
embassy “soon established a chain of communication,” initially through Italy, then later through Denmark.
Gerard indicates, “At all times cables from Washington to Berlin, or vice versa, took, on the average, two
days in transmission.”
80 Eleadrick. Tools o f Empire, pp. 163-164.
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experience on all these counts impressed observers, including the Americans. The sharp increase in
American participation in world affairs after the war with Spain helped prompt the nation’s increased use
o f the speedier telegraph. The President and State Department officials could obtain ever more timely
information with which to make decisions and, increasingly, to formulate coordinated policy.
In 1906, the Secretary of State Elihu Root began breaking ground on a plan he hoped would
establish badly needed connectivity with the department’s diplomatic missions. Although gradually using
cable more and more, up until then, he observed, “There never has been the practice o f keeping the two
ends informed of what the other end was doing, except casually as time passed along by the slow process
of the mails.”81 The plan involved standardizing the dissemination o f information by routinely cabling a
digest to a regional distribution point for subsequent mailing to the missions. Once the cable arrived in
Europe, for instance, its information would be mailed to all the continent’s American legations. The
ambassador in Berlin, then, might be more systematically informed of the State Department’s actions in
Washington which bore upon his representations in the German capital. In 1908, Root finally enacted a
more limited scheme to test the plan’s feasibility. The department recently had established an experimental
Far Eastern division to better handle and coordinate American diplomacy in that part o f the world. United
States posts in Berlin, London, Paris, and Saint Petersburg were directed to send the department duplicates
of all important correspondence dealing with the Far East; the missions in Tokyo and Peking would
likewise forward all their correspondence except simple acknowledgments. Washington then digested and
copied the received dispatches before reissuing them as a confidential information series. In this way,
then, did modem diplomacy affect embassies like Gerard’s in yet another way. A rapid growth in the sheer
volume and detail o f information pertaining to their work inevitably raised the level of difficulty in their
diplomatic duties. Nevertheless, American diplomats in both Europe and the Far East hailed the procedure
enthusiastically,

82
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and the enhanced connectivity proved of such value, that the department eventually

expanded it to its other geographical divisions as they came on line.

81 Richard Hume Werking, The Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign Service. 1890-1913
(Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1977), p. 134.
82 Ibid., pp. 135-137.
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A variety o f restrictions imposed certain limitations, however. Although the average cost of a
telegram had plummeted over the half-century since the telegraph’s advent, expense still weighed heavy
enough on the State Department’s tight budget for it to constrain the use o f cabling to urgent matters or to
issues whose communication and resolution were given to brevity. By the summer o f 1914, ironically, all
cables had been sharply curtailed due to expense. But certainly the most severe limitation came that
August. That month both the Americans and the Germans discovered the value of possessing a secure
means of communication once their British-controlled direct cable access was cut upon declaration of
war.8’ The telegraph’s inaugural employment militarily occurred during the Crimean War (1854) when the
Allied Army resorted to its use and the American Civil War had made enormous use of the technology.
The Spanish-American War (1898) additionally geared landline and cable telegraphs for the first time to
meet the needs of newspaper war correspondents and the conflict also marked the first time in which cables
were cut at sea as an act of belligerency (by the U.S. at Cienfuegos, Cuba, and at Manila, The
Philippines).84 The immediate and lasting crush of work brought by the latest war made the telegraph a
mainstay for communications between the State Department and America’s missions abroad like Berlin,
with the department’s mere 28,031 words of telegraphed text in 1914 mushrooming by w ar’s end to
217,597 annually.85
For Gerard’s embassy, another restriction stemmed from the necessary routing o f all cable traffic
reaching the country through the German telegraph network. Sometime between late 1913 and January,
1914, the Western Union Telegraph and Cable Company successfully applied to the State Department for
approval o f a direct cable link to Germany. At the end of January, Ambassador Gerard expressed his

83 Headrick, Tools of Empire, pp. 164. Gerard inexplicably claims the existence o f a single direct
German-owned cable between Germany and America via the Azores before the war. The German company
successfully opposed his efforts to gain approval of Western Union’s application to land a cable in
Germany, which was quietly “pigeon-holed.” After the war began, in August Gerard told Ballin o f the
Hamburg-American Line and the head of the Deutsche Bank, von Gewinner, o f the circumstances.
Realizing the untold damage to Germany otherwise averted with an uncut American-owned cable, their
anger quickly prompted the Foreign Office’s approval o f Western Union’s application. O f course, the
company abstained from acting on the concession until the war’s hostilities were ended. Gerard, Four
Years, p. 74.
84 The precedent led to new provisions in international law to protect such installations, although the British
evidently paid scant attention in 1914. '
85 Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History of Its Organization. Procedure and Personnel
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949), p. 244.

103

willingness to facilitate the company’s plan by arranging discussions with the German Director General of
Posts and Telegraphs of their application for a cable landing on the country’s coast. The London-based
European representative for Western Union, S.J. Goddard, met with Gerard on 31 March 1914, but with
war hardly four months off, the plan never reached fruition.86 With cables direct to Germany cut in
August, the country and the embassy relied on indirect links through neutral neighbors, with traffic handled
internally by German lines and operators. All embassy cables inbound and outbound, consequently, passed
through a German intermediary whose preferential conduct should have held few surprises for the
American ambassador or his staff. Indeed, it soon became clear that cables to (and, presumably, from) the
embassy were being copied for the German Foreign Office first, before making their way to their intended
destination. In May, 1915, Grew was amused “to note that a copy o f every telegram addressed to the
embassy is furnished to the [German] Foreign Office by the telegraph office and sent to the appropriate
bureau.” After hurrying back from Vienna upon reading o f the Lusitania’s 7 May sinking, he heard of
Lithgow Osborne’s recent experience, in which Osbome had called on Dr. Schueler at the Foreign Office
and saw on the latter’s desk a copy o f a telegram from the State Department to the em bassy-which had
arrived only that m om ing-on the very subject which Osbome had come to discuss. Grew concluded, “A
good many communications which we make to the Foreign Office under instructions are quite superfluous,
for the Foreign Office knows about them quite as soon as we do...”87 Later in September, Grew found
among the embassy’s daily telegrams one stamped “Abschrift fu r A.A. Original befordert" (“Copy for
Foreign Office. Original forwarded.”) The telegraph office had mistakenly sent the embassy the
Auswartiges Am t copy instead o f the original! Grew commented, “We always knew that copies of our
telegrams were sent to the Foreign Office, but this confirms it...”88
To counter this threat to communications, the embassy and the State Department naturally
resorted to using ciphers or codes to encrypt the contents o f their cables. Prior to the war, the department
used several systems, all, however, so primitive and unimaginative as to make it likely every major power

86 Gerard Papers, Folder 11-24, Goddard to Gerard, 6 February 1914; and Gerard to Goddard, 28 March
1914.
87 Grew, Turbulent Era, 1: 190-191, Grew diary, 9 May 1915.
88 Ibid., 1: 215, Grew diary, 25 September 1915.
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quickly knew them. An early effort by the department to address the weakness occurred under the
Roosevelt administration, which replaced the antique “Old Gray Code” with the “Brown” code along with
several others, like the A, B, and C codes.89 An otherwise naively content State Department apparently
relied on a single such cipher in the period leading up to the war, with the cable’s composer indicating at
the top of the cable form “cipher” or “plain,” if transmission en clair was acceptable. This lasted until
September, 1914, when the initial use o f the “Green” cipher began. In February, 1915, and in late
November / early December, 1916, American diplomats switched to the “Blue” cipher for very brief
periods before again returning to the Green, whose use would continue at least through the end o f the war.
While periodic changes of the cipher seem an obvious precaution against its compromise, the State
Department evidently perceived no such threat, as it almost exclusively relied on the Green cipher.90
For their part, the Germans could rely only on American indulgence for telegraphic and wireless
communication between their Foreign Office in Berlin and Ambassador von Bem storff in Washington.
Unlike in their legation at Mexico City, no clandestine wireless transmitter was available.91 Gerard’s
embassy played point man in the negotiations concerning the extent o f license granted the Germans. While
allowing them use o f American means, Washington initially refused the right to communicate in cipher.
Von Bethmann-Hollweg and the Foreign Office naturally took issue on the grounds it hindered their ability
to satisfactorily arrange such sensitive diplomatic matters as the Lusitania case. In a late 1915 interview
with the Chancellor, Gerard directly indicated the restriction stemmed from well-founded concern the
Germans might encode communications destined for subversive agents in America.92 Nevertheless,
Secretary o f State Lansing finally granted permission for von Bemstorff and the Foreign Office to send and

89 Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1959), pp. 140, 144, and 150.
90 Based on author’s review of cipher use for cables in United States National Archives, Record Group 59,
Decimal File 1910-1929, File 123G31. Other evidence, however, indicates more frequent use of other
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receive enciphered cables “as a regular thing” via Gerard’s embassy,

9 3

which had .“ no idea what is in

them.”94
Despite the wartime difficulties for both the Germans and Americans, reliance on the telegraph
rested largely on its continued responsiveness over the much slower, more traditional forms of
communication. Written letters and reports were limited to the time required for an oceanliner to steam the
nearly four thousand miles between America and Germany, which went from several days before the war,
to several weeks during it.95 In contrast, transoceanic cables required only a few hours at most prior to
August, 1914, and thereafter still only several hours to a few days. Even with any “delays” due to
overloaded cable lines, overwhelmed operators, or overzealous censors, cables conferred nearly immediate
communications between the State Department and its diplomatic and consular officials abroad. The
Gerard embassy made extensive use of the link in prosecuting its wartime work.
Aside from the expected dislocations in regular communications, the British disruption also
immediately created a major difficulty for the embassy in providing desperate funds to stranded
Americans. Normally, funds might be deposited in America and notice cabled to the embassy authorizing
a disbursement to the individual. With no immediate means o f communication available, the embassy
obviously could issue no money.96 Two days after the war commenced, Gerard telegraphed Washington
via Copenhagen urgently asking for funds. At his request, the State Department cabled Gerard’s agent to
deposit some $32,000 of hjs own money with the U.S. Treasury and arrange its reimbursement from an
emergency load o f gold bullion imminently shipping to Europe aboard the U.S. S. Tennessee. Gerard’s
cable also had the department additionally cable Third Secretary Albert Ruddock’s wealthy grandfather,
C.K.G. Billings of New York City, to request he issue a telegraphic order for four thousand German marks
to the “Handels Gesellschaft [sic]” in Berlin. Finally, the embassy requested the department’s response

93 Johann H. von Bemstorff, My Three Years in America (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), p.
166 .

94 Gerard Papers, Folder 12-46, Gerard to House, 15 February 1916.
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“by telegraph.”97 Through such technological means was the embassy finally able to quickly provide at
least a temporary source o f emergency funds to stranded Americans in Germany.
The embassy’s work potentially played an important role in the timing o f American diplomatic
initiatives, which, in extreme situations, could depend directly on the speed o f the embassy’s reporting. In
early 1915, for example, Gerard came to believe the Germans had become ready for peace. A new phase
o f the war, however, ominously threatened to close the favorable opportunity at hand, and Gerard, earlier
directed to communicate and coordinate the matter with London-based Colonel House, now conducted all
his communications by cable, due to the situation’s urgency.

98

Another example cropped up late the same

year. In early winter, the United States secured indisputable evidence o f spying by German attaches von
Papen and Captain Boy-Ed. In consequence, Wilson declared them to be persona non grata. The state of
American public opinion, however, already had grown anti-German in the wake o f the Lusitania sinking in
May and, consequently, the German government desired to resolve the matter discretely to avoid further
inflaming the American public and raising a storm o f protest in Germany. The Foreign Office wished to
keep friendly relations with the United States, feeling a public demand for the m en’s recall would endanger
German-American relations, embitter the German public, and “enrage” their Emperor. Secretary of State
von Jagow approached Gerard to earnestly seek restraint in any publicity o f the sensitive issue and Gerard
promptly cabled Washington with his request. Wilson and Lansing nonetheless decided on publication of
their demand for recall, the intent of which the German ambassador in America, von Bemstorff, cabled to
von Jagow. The Secretary quickly sent for Gerard again to show him von B em storff s telegram and to
further emphasize the German government’s view o f the matter, explaining the Emperor and the German
people would resent the manner of the demand and again requesting a quiet arrangement. Gerard
“ immediately” sent a cable asking that publication be withheld pending State’s receipt of a longer, followon cable elaborating the details of the von Jagow interview, which he composed and issued very shortly
thereafter. In the end, his efforts proved for naught, as he received a Department telegram advising his

97 United States National Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1910-1929, File 123G31, Magruder
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98 The Reminiscences o f James W. Gerard. Columbia University Oral History Research Office Oral History
Project (New York: Columbia University, 1950), pp. 32-33 and 40-42.
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cables had “arrived too late” and then received reports that the Chancellor and Foreign Office were
“ furious” at the action and America’s neglect in helping “keep the peace.”

99

Despite the outcome,

however, trans-Atlantic telegraphy clearly facilitated Gerard’s time-critical attempt to resolve an important
public relations issue and a matter of potentially grave import to German-American relations.
The responsiveness of the telegraph also played an important role in Gerard’s public image back
home. While vacationing in Europe in the week after his Senate confirmation, the new ambassador
received in Hamburg an urgent telegram from his close supporter and Washington lobbyist, Thomas D.
McCarthy, who kept close tabs on Gerard’s affairs in America. McCarthy reported to Gerard accounts in
the recent Sunday papers, which purportedly carried details o f an interview with Gerard. He allegedly had
uttered such undemocratic indiscretions as asserting Americans in Europe should be taxed to support the
maintenance of the country’s embassies there; indicating he would wear court dress for his ambassadorial
duties; and criticizing the American government’s ill-treatment of its ambassadors abroad. “[TJhere has
been unpleasant impression createdf.] have told Washington you never could have said what was
reported[.] deny interview or say it was given in jest[.]...absolutely no trouble [advised.] interview
unfortunate to you personally as reported[.] cable immediately = mccarthy[.]” 100 In the still sensitive,
precarious atmosphere surrounding Wilson and Bryan’s patronage appointments, such bad press for Gerard
and for the Administration amounted to a potential disaster for Gerard’s prospects. Quick resolution and
coordination o f the issue were absolutely necessary for damage control and only by transoceanic cable
were possible.
In the early spring of 1915, another delicate, “very disagreeable matter” arose, requiring Gerard’s
advantageous use o f the rapid communications afforded by the telegraph. Sometime prior to March, 1915,
the French army had captured two German officers, Lieutenants Count von Strachwitz and von
Schierstaedt, along with two non-commissioned officers and two other soldiers. The cloudy circumstances
of their apprehension led that March to reports in a French publication, that the officers were enroute to
French Guiana in South America to where they had been condemned as criminals and that the other men

99 Gerard Papers, Folder 12-46, Gerard to House, 7 December 1915.
100 Gerard Papers, Folder 6-12, McCarthy to Gerard, cable dated 6 August 1913.
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had been imprisoned in France as convicts. The matter o f the Germans’ treatment already had caused
considerable excitement and ill-feeling back in their homeland, but the latest reports o f their fate threatened
to seriously aggravate German sensibilities. Realizing and hoping to avert the serious danger o f reprisals
against French POWs in Germany, Gerard “took the unusual, undiplomatic and extraordinary course of
telegraphing...direct” to U.S. Ambassador William G. Sharp in Paris to advise him o f the connection
between the condition o f the French prisoners and the treatment of Count von Strachwitz and the others.
Fortunately, the like-minded Sharp already had made what representations he could to help compose the
matter. 101
With Guglielmo Marconi’s 1894 invention of a device to transmit and receive electromagnetic
waves—in these early decades still limited to the crackle of Morse code—the age o f wireless began. Three
years later, Marconi had arrived in England and set up the first coastal station for communication with
ships at sea. The process of proliferation of wireless instruments soon witnessed the first transatlantic
transmission in 1901 and an exchange between King Edward VII and President Theodore Roosevelt in
1903, the same year that Berlin played host to the inaugural International Congress on Wireless Telegraphy
and its attempts to regulate the use of the new technology. The next year, 1904, the Marconi Company
launched the first transoceanic wireless news service, transmitting nightly between Cornwall and Cape
Cod. By 1912, a mere ten years after its invention, the wireless had become an integral component in
international communications as it tied together “land stations and ships at sea in an instantaneous,
worldwide network.” 102
' During the initial months of Gerard’s embassy, two new wireless stations in America went on line
to further extend the network. Erected by German enterprise and partly financed by American and French
capital, the stations were sited along the coast at Sayville, Long Island, New York, and at Tuckerton, New
Jersey,103 and on the night of 11 February 1914 a test was conducted of the planned Berlin-New York
wireless connection. Messages and news from German newspapers in Berlin passed to New York papers
and vice versa, and thus hailed the arrival of direct instantaneous radio contact between Germany and

101 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-57, Gerard to Sharp, 19 April 1915.
102 Kern, Culture o f Time, pp. 68-69.
103 Von Bemstorff, Three Years, p. 66.
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America.104 The test’s success helped lay the ground for an eventual German wireless news service that
developed-during the war, which directly allowed vital circumvention of the Allied-controlled and censored cable routes. American journalists in Berlin could now transmit their reports directly to the
United States and, escaping the British censor’s pen “unmutilated,” could provide sorely lacking balance to
the news picture in America.105 Taking legal advantage of ambiguous ownership among the parties, the
French attempted to close the stations through litigation once the war began,*but in the wake o f tedious
negotiations the United States took possession and kept them open. With German access insured, the
stations’ final disposition largely convinced Ambassador von Bemstorff of the benevolence of American
neutrality.106
In a time when the importance to foreign affairs o f public relations was reaching new heights,
Germany found wireless its only outlet to counter the Allied advantage in playing the critical public
opinion game in the United States. In December, 1916, the German ambassador credited “the recent
important development” of this “special news service” as an important factor in Germany’s generally
positive, post-presidential election press and in countering the entirely misleading reports seeping out of
London o f several recent German military successes.107 With its instantaneity and longer,, less restricted
reach, the wireless obliterated the barriers intrinsic to cable-borne communication, just as the airplane
leveled earth-based obstacles. Whereas the telegraph was limited to trained operators and restricted to
transmitting stations along definite lines, the ominidirectional wireless “proliferated source points of
electronic communication” on land and sea, and furthered the reality of simultaneous experience.108
In the meanwhile, yet another device doggedly worked to extend the “source points” to the
masses. Since its invention in 1876, the telephone only slowly penetrated diplomacy’s jealous reserve.
Hardly two decades had passed between Gerard’s embassy and the period when the apparatus initially
began to proliferate in the 1890s. In Germany, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had expressed notorious
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hostility toward modern devices, particularly the telephone, an attitude which his tradition-bound
successors zealously perpetuated in the venerable Foreign O ffice.109 In America, one of the first in New
York City belonged to Gerard’s law firm, Platt, Bowers, and Sands, where in 1892 a telephone was
“installed in a hallway wall between two offices.” 110 The advantages were obvious. The telephone made it
possible, in a sense, to be in two places at the same time as it allowed people to speak with one another
across great distances, for good or ill. It let them immediately respond to matters, but in doing so, it did not
allow time to deliberate as with written communications. In consequence, “[b]usiness and personal
exchanges suddenly became instantaneous instead o f protracted and sequential,”111 as did routine embassy
matters. Twenty years later in Berlin, anyone with business with Gerard’s embassy might telephone
“Zentrum 2070” to make arrangements,112 and likewise the legation’s outside work often was similarly
conducted.113
The advantages of instant communication could not be ignored, as Sir Edward Goschen, the .
'■British Ambassador in Berlin, realized at the outbreak o f the war. When Great Britain’s entry against
Germany became known, mob violence seriously threatened the British embassy, which Gerard would very
•/soon take over. Goschen’s phone call to the German Foreign Office brought an immediate force of
"mounted police and the Foreign Minister’s apology.114 The telephone revolutionized newspaper reporting,
business and other transactions, as it “leveled hierarchical social structures” and “made it possible for
callers to control the imrnediate future o f anyone they wished.” 115 Indeed, one German diplomat, Rudolf
Nodolny, recalled how at the turn of the century his chief, Counselor Rudolf Goebel von Harrant, feared
that if te lephones penetrated the Foreign Office, diplomats might soon dare to even call the Kaiser direct!
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Discovering one had been installed during his absence on vacation, von Harrant immediately dispatched
the device with a pair of desk scissors and exiled it to the peon Nodolny’s desk.116 Like the telegraph and
the cinema, the telephone significantly contributed to the general acceleration o f the pace o f life. It
“brought the voices o f millions o f people across regional and national boundaries..., worked to create the
vast extended present of simultaneity,” and thereby complicated diplomatic intercourse for men like James
Gerard and his staff.' 17
The invention o f the cinema between 1893 and 1896 introduced to the world yet another means
for. simultaneous experience. Using a variety o f techniques, like intercutting and double exposures, this
new art and communications form effectively compacted events in time “to suggest the multiplicity of '
occurrences in many distant places in a single moment.” The medium’s popularity quickly saw 10,000
•^nickelodeons spring up in the United States alone by 1910. By Gerard’s appointment in 1913, the cinema
’ 'already had established itself as a “democratic art.” Its eye penetrated all barriers, even vast, oceans, a no
’'m an’s land between two armies o f millions, and the martial veneer o f the German Empire; and “its cheap
admission prices and mixed seating arrangements brought the highbrow culture of the theater to the
working classes.” 118 Viewing “The Birth of a Nation” in 1916, Hugh Wilson felt the expansive, new film
had “revolutionize^] my conception of the cinema” as a new, powerful medium o f dramatic art (and,
indeed, propaganda) accessible by the masses everywhere.119 Little wonder, then, that Gerard and his
embassy should become a subject in demand. The American people wanted to see for themselves the man
who defended their interests and neutrality from such isolation in the blockaded capital o f a principal
belligerent.
Already in November, 1914, the master public relations man and new chairman o f the
International Committee for the Relief o f Belgium, fiiture-President Herbert Hoover, was advising U.S.
Minister to occupied Brussels, Brand Whitlock, to seek approval from the German authorities to have
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“moving pictures” taken of general conditions there.120 Likewise, Gerard did not wish to miss the
unprecedented public relations potential for his diplomatic work and for his political future. In March,
1915, Gerard initiated efforts to have himself and Mrs. Gerard filmed for show back in America. As his
close confidant in Berlin, American correspondent Franz Hugo Krebs, advised him, “Anything
shown...will reach millions of people in the United States who can not read English, and millions more
who can not be appealed to except through their eyes.” 121 With the film duly made, a friend o f Gerard’s
reported in August o f seeing him in the “movies” in New York City and how the ambassador had “received
quite an ovation and applause...The cheering for you was quite remarkable [by] a very high grade audience
o f 3000 people...” 122 The film, entitled “Our Ambassador to Germany Shown for the First Time,” another
friend described as “first class.” “Your name has certainly become a familiar one to the U.S. citizen,” he
•• informed a presumably pleased Gerard,123 who a few years later would make a bid for the Democratic
'• presidential nomination.
In September the president o f the Universal Film Company arrived in Berlin with a letter of
introduction from Gerard’s Washington point-man, Thomas McCarthy, desiring to make a moving picture
' 'for Universalis “Weekly.” Needlessly, McCarthy strongly encouraged Gerard in the project, noting “it
may prove valuable later.” 124 Late the next month, Mr. Oskar Einstein o f Erstklassige (“First Class”)
Films, Universal’s Berlin office manager, passed to Gerard copies of the films shot o f the ambassador in
his office and in front of the embassy, the embassy entrance on the Mauerstrasse, and American doctors
and nurses serving with the German Red Cross.125 While perhaps uninspired to the late-century mind, such
clips o f an animate Gerard and the bustle around America’s embassy in a faraway capital wowed his
contemporaries, and gave them exciting, telescopic insight into events a million miles away and helped
establish a cinematic dimension to public relations. In< 1913 a French movie critic had noted the enormous
impact on politics wielded by the cinema, particularly on the career o f French President Poincare. His
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frequent appearance on newsreels had greatly boosted his popularity and led the critic to consider the
cinematograph as “a kind o f popular annex to the Elysee Palace.” 126 In a similar sense, scenes o f
America’s ambassadors in Berlin and elsewhere gave a face to the nation’s representatives abroad and
helped cultivate popular response to the country’s policies of neutrality. The technology o f mass
communication thus asserted itself as a factor in political and diplomatic affairs by engaging the common
citizen and shaping public opinion.
As witness to the birth o f several o f the first commercial motor car manufacturers, including
Oldsmobile and Pope, the year 1897 generally marks the start of the era o f automobiles. Years later, Gerard
would proudly recall his participation in an event which grandly hailed the dawn o f a new age in ground
transportation, the first-ever “automobile flower parade” on the streets o f Newport, New York, in
.September, 1899. Gerard counted among his social acquaintances the Newport “cottagers,” who “played
an important role in introducing motoring in America,” by making it fashionable and lending publicity to
automobile touring.127 Although motorcars initially fell only to the wealthy, mass-production quickly
brought their cost down. Even before inexpense made it available to the masses, however, the automobile
possessed a recognized democratizing effect.128 Automobiles, like the 1908 Ford Model T allowed their
passengers, rich or poor, to travel unheard o f distances to nearly anywhere in amazingly short times—a
luxury available earlier only to those who might afford a horse or passage on the railroad. But not until
1911 would the invention of a self-starter for the gasoline engine eliminate steam and electricity as
competition, and, with assembly line production in 1913 and falling costs, precipitate wide popularity for
the motor car.129 Until then, automobiles largely remained with the rich, including those occupied with the
nation’s foreign affairs.
" Begotten o f wealth, Joseph Grew naturally possessed and used an automobile. Once arrived in
1906 at their new post in Mexico City, the Grews bought their first, a two-cylinder Cadillac, in order to
commute into the city from the suburb, Tacubaya. Eventually it gave way to a Pope Hartford, which
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remained in the family for many years, seeing faithful service in Russia (1907) and then in Germany during
Grew’s first tour in 1908.130 Gerard brought over from America at least two automobiles. A Mercedes he
had shipped to England some years before, evidently for motor excursions during vacations in Europe.
Due to the island’s very heavy taxation on auto registration, however, in August, 1911, he moved the
vehicle to France. There it remained in storage for nearly two->and-one-half years until late October, 1913,
when he had it shipped to Berlin by train,1'’1 Immediately upon his arrival in the city the same month, the
Koniglicher Automobil-Club extended, and Gerard accepted, an invitation to join.

132

Gerard also expressed

an interest in possibly purchasing an automobile for the embassy’s use. Already in mid-October, 1913, a
representative of Detroit’s Hudson Motor Car Company wrote to Gerard of the virtues o f the firm’s newest
model “54” six-cylinder Hudson, as an “ideal car for your purpose,” noting “Ambassador Page in London
thas recently favoured the Hudson company with an order and one of our new models is shortly to be put in
' use by the Embassy in Paris.” Gerard approved a demonstration for the next week, though it is unclear
whether he struck a deal in the end.lj3
Automobiles were de rigueur for the embassy’s cadre. A natural sign o f status in Berlin’s
'aristocratic and diplomatic milieu, motorcars conveyed America’s diplomats to social functions, holiday
retreats, and the ambassador’s game reserve forty-five minutes outside the city. Eminently suited to the
pre-war jo ie de vie, the machines quickly would establish their utility in the conduct of the embassy’s
wartime work. By 1916, representatives from the Berlin embassy were rushing hither and yon inspecting
at least 148 different camps throughout the German Empire.134 With rail transportation constrained by
schedules and subordinated to military exigencies, the automobile proved the quickest,, most reliable and
efficient means to visit the archipelago o f camp locations.135 Although by the fall of 1916 gasoline
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shortages were critically afflicting the embassy’s mobility,136 the automobile had found its place in
American diplomacy.
The variety of new technology made its mark on the embassy in numerous smaller ways as well.
As Grew and other embassy personnel could attest from their early experience, noted British statesman
Lord Vansittart’s encounter with the typewriter was not unique in diplomatic work. He remembered when
in 1900, as a fresh, young diplomat in the midst o f copying telegrams by hand, stuffing diplomatic
pouches, and deciphering incoming cables, he once paused to “explore” a nearby typewriter he found
under its tarpaulin. Just then, however, the head of his department burst in exclaiming, “ ‘Leave that thing
alone! Don’t you know w e’re in a hurry[?]’ “ 137 Such was the reception o f new-fangled gadgetry in even
the time-honored British Diplomatic Service.b8 Across the Atlantic, persistent efforts to rationalize the
.'State Department’s work and introduce more efficient, business-like procedures led by the eve of war to a
thorough adoption o f the typewriter, with virtually all official correspondence, memoranda, cables, even
intra-office notes rendered in its easy-to-read script.139 Mention was made earlier o f Grew’s amenability to
technology and innovation. By 1912, he had taken to often using the faster, more efficient typewriter for
'writing his correspondence. At one point, he lightheartedly explained to his mother, “Someday we shall all
come to it and shall carry around our pocket typewriters instead of our leaky fountain pens, but for the
present the pioneers must go forward apologetically.” Among the pioneers could be counted Grew’s
embassy the next year under his new boss, Gerard, where use o f typewritten correspondence was standard
for the same reasons of speed and efficiency in its diplomatic work.140 Meanwhile, other contemporaries
would continue to resist, like the Prince Regent of Bavaria, who insisted on having all typewritten
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documents first copied into longhand before he would consider them and kept a regular staff o f clerks to do
SO.

14!

As described earlier, the newly installed electrical fixtures of Gerard’s renovated embassy joined
its elevator as a modem convenience.142 Adding machines proved necessary enough for the routine office
work, that one was ordered in July, 1914.143 In the frenzy o f wartime activity arising the next month, the
embassy found itself hard-pressed to keep American citizens inside Germany informed o f the volatile
conditions. Initially relying on individual replies through the German post and, when urgent, telephones
and expensive telegrams, the embassy very shortly came upon a windfall in the form o f a duplicating
machine lent by an American expatriate. The embassy now could turn out one-thousand copies of an
original in only a quarter o f an hour, which they immediately used to issue general information bulletins
“which.,.obviate[d] m uch private correspondence” and streamlined the staffs heavy workload.144
Just as they did in their personal and professional backgrounds, Gerard and his staff reflected the
shifting diplomatic paradigm with their new embassy and with the technology outfitting it. With no
permanent housing in Berlin for his embassy and residence, and those o f his predecessor judged unsuitable,
Gerard found himself in classic nineteenth-century tradition searching for an adequate alternative, in a tight
housing market, and at his own expense. The tide had begun to turn three years before Gerard arrived in
Berlin, when the Lowden Act o f 1910 provided the initial move towards addressing the housing crisis in
the American foreign service. Persistent lack of political resolve kept meaningful results at bay, however,
until the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926 in the wake o f the Rogers Act two years earlier. While the
diplomatic paradigm shift slowly pushed the housing issue, an entirely different force helped propel the
shift itself.
Beginning around 1880, the technological revolution in communications and transportation
afflicting Gerard’s day radically compressed time and space, as it gave birth to what Marshall McLuhan
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would later call the “global village.” By Gerard’s tenure in Berlin, its infancy was marked by a web of
wireless stations and telegraph offices, and, along with countless other innovations like modem steamships,
electricity, and the cinema, enormously affected the conduct o f modem diplomatic relations. As forcemultipliers, such modem conveniences as typewriters and automobiles allowed diplomats like Gerard and
his staff to conduct their work more efficiently and effectively. Affairs transmitted through the virtual
instantaneity o f the telephone, telegraph, and wireless, demanded prompt resolution, introducing untold
pressures for accelerated decision-making. Further magnifying the hazards, technology had matured the
public eye’s powers o f scrutiny and helped introduce a pressing, and unprecedented, public relations
dimension to foreign affairs. Public opinion weighed in materially, as cinematic coverage helped prepare a
topic as an issue and telephoned, telegraphed, or radioed news reporting o f its further development might
be known worldwide within hours. For diplomats and statesmen, their work altogether grew considerably
; more difficult, volatile, and problematic—trademark trends for the new paradigm o f twentieth-century
diplomacy.
With technology its sine qua non, the First World War drove home the reality o f these changes
and helped mark decisively the coming o f age o f the new age o f simultaneity in all its imperfect and
complicating glory. In the driven dynamic o f the new diplomacy, information for decision-making and its
communication assumed paramount importance. After the February, 1917, break in relations, the German
response to Gerard’s embassy offered backhanded tribute to this reality: they reacted immediately with the
simple, but very effective, tactic o f a complete communications blackout. Embassy telephone service was
cut, mail service suspended, and telegraph privileges frozen, even to give final instructions to the American
consuls scattered across the Empire.145 But perhaps for Gerard, it meant great relief. For even as
technology had accelerated diplomacy’s pace, in the midst of war it had also helped painfully convolute
diplomatic work way beyond its previous bounds.

145 Gerard, Four Years, pp. 383-384.

CHAPTER V
THE EMBASSY AND ITS WORK
IN WAR AND THE NEW CENTURY
W hen the w ar hurricane burst over Europe, Am ericans abroad suddenly became
acutely conscious of the Am erican diplom atic service. The Am erican am bassador
or m inister loomed out o f the vague background, where, for most o f us, he usually
rem ains, the subject of hum orous contem pt. He ceased to be a mere concession to
international formalities and becam e a reality, a rock and a refuge.1
--The Chicago Tribune (O ctober, 1914)

For the countless thousands o f Americans traveling in Europe in early August, 1914, these w ords
in an editorial a few months later rang with certain truth and, for many, much understatement. For while
Americans everywhere encountered some inconvenience, it was those in Germany who most particularly
found themselves isolated, prostrate, and afraid. With declarations o f war coming rapid fire, rail travel
usurped by the military, cable connections to home cut, mails disrupted, borders closed, and war-hysteria
and suspicions rising to fever pitch, the war’s quick outbreak rapidly became an occasion for their arresting
concern. Untold numbers found themsel ves stuck in some small comer o f the German Empire, all cash
reserves inaccessible in closed banks, native landlords and others insisting on full payment o f debts
immediately, personal checks not accepted by anyone, stringent restrictions on all correspondence and
telephone calls inside the country, and all communication outside shut off.2 It was in these circumstances
that, for the first time ever, it fell to their country’s foreign service and diplomats to succor so many against
so anarchic an act o f God.
As might be gleaned above from Grew’s and Hugh Wilson’s early accounts o f its professional
stirrings, American diplomacy before the war exhibited very little o f the demands and complexities which
would become standard during the wartime and post-war years. Even at the larger embassies in Europe’s
great capitals, the work only very rarely proved at all strenuous. Despite America’s world power status,

1Gerard Papers, Folder 10-23, Patterson to Gerard, 27 October 1914, enclosing a 2 7 October 1914 Chicago
Tribune editorial, entitled “Ambassador Gerard.”
2 Gerard Papers, Folder 11-12, Anita de Vizen to Gerard, 5 August 1914.
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her continued policy o f non-entanglement stayed its course and effectively excused American diplomats
from the detailed, absorbing work that was the bread and butter of other diplomatic services. International
treaties and agreements provide a telling indicator o f America’s increasing global involvement after the
turn of the century. In the forty years before 1900, the United States entered into a total o f 255
international treaties and agreements, an average of roughly sixty-one per decade. In the first ten years of
the new century, however, the emerging world power became party to a further 188, a rise of slightly more
than 2.00% and a number that would set the pace for the early twentieth century. Especially in 1915, 1916,
and 1917, the consuming war years ironically saw the number o f international treaties temporarily dip to
help leave that decade’s total at a depressed, but still high, 139, before swelling again to 214 during the
1920s.3
The American, diplomatic service’s work not only was changing in quantity, but in quality as
well. The war imposed unprecedented challenges upon American and, indeed, world diplomacy, and
provided what has been called “a preview of the age of total warfare and total diplomacy.”4 The
assumption o f belligerent interests, submarine warfare, massive humanitarian relief assistance, human
rights issues-all were thoroughly complicated by the demands of more rapid, mass communications and
the immensely more influential role o f public relations. These and other novel, twentieth-century concerns
were highlighted by the conflict, which, as Joseph Grew observed from 1929, “so effectually put an end to
those old days of diplomatic serenity-a fool’s paradise.”5

ISSUES OF HUM AN RIGHTS: THE EM BASSY AS HUM ANITARIA N

It was in February, 1915, that Gerard perhaps first heard the phrase “human rights.” While his
correspondent referred to the Mexican anarchy, saying “Human rights are not respected; foreign life and

’ Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History o f Its Organization. Procedures, and Personnel.
New York: MacMillan Company, 1949), Appendix III.
4 Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1959), p. 165.
5 Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of 40 Years. 1904-1945. 2 vols., ed. Walter
Johnson (Boston: Houghton Miffiin Co., 1952), 1: 131.
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property' are gravely menaced and the diplomats are in danger,”6 Gerard surely cast Europe’s wartime
anarchy under the same rubric. Over most his three-and-one-half year tenure hung a humanitarian pall of
pending, widespread famine, of maltreatment o f prisoners o f war and civilian belligerent detainees, of
population deportations, of murderous, new killing machines in the air and under the sea. The war brought
basic human rights under the purview of diplomacy with dramatic force. Focused beneath the sun of
newfound public scrutiny in the age o f mass communications, humanitarian transgressions could ignite
public furor, just as humanitarian gestures could warm and inspire public and official moods.
Gerard’s humanitarian involvement during the war proved exceptional and certainly gained not a
little moral authority for America and her neutral standing. Gerard contributed to the success o f at least

•7

two medical expeditions made to Germany by the American Physicians Expeditions Committee, Inc. Fie
provided indispensable letters o f introduction for officials of the International Commission for Relief in
Poland traveling to Denmark and the Balkans.8 His contact extended to such organizations as the Relief
Committee for War Sufferers in Lodz, Poland9 and the New York-based Prisoners of War Relief Committee for the Relief of German and Austro-Hungarian Prisoners of W ar.'0 His hands worked for the
procurement and delivery of three motorized ambulances intended to operate in the rear o f the German
lines advertising American flags." With the Countess von Bemstorff, Gerard became a formal patron of
the American-organized American Red Cross Hospital, newly-established in Munich as a branch of the
German Red Cross.12 He and his embassy assisted in the unhindered shipment o f humanitarian supplies
and provisions destined for the German Red Cross and the American Hospitals in Munich and elsewhere.1'’

6 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-3 1. O ’Laughlin to Gerard, 8 February 1915.
7 Gerard Papers, Folder 14-3.5, Portack to Gerard, 16 February 1916. Portack asked for Gerard’s support in
an upcoming third, to which the ambassador surely agreed.
8 Gerard Papers, Folder 14-4, Trumbull to Gerard, 11 May 1915.
9 Gerard Papers, Folder 17-40, Dressier to Gerard, 3 November 1916.
10 Gerard Papers, Folder 17-30, F. zur Nedden to Gerard, 14 November 1916.
11 Gerard Papers, Folder 14-4, Taylor to Gerard, 24 February 1914 and 28 March 1915.
u Gerard Papers, Folder 1,3-9 , Kuehnrich to Gerard, 19 June 1915, enclosing a Kuehnrich article in an
undated Los Angeles Examiner (Sunday Edition) on the Red Cross Hospital.
|J Gerard Papers, Folder 13-26, Morris to Gerard, 9 April 1915, and Gerard to Morris, 26 April 1915. The
other two were in Gieiwitz and Cosel. hi the fall of 1914, for example, Minister van Dyke at the Hague
alerted Gerard that over five thousand tons o f prov isions along with further International Red Cross
supplies from America had left under American charge and control and that all would “probably pass
through your hands.” Gerard Papers, Folder 11-12, Van Dyke to Gerard, 12 November 1914.
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And, manned by members o f Berlin’s American colony and feeding over two hundred destitute Germans
every day, the American Relief Kitchen opened and endured hard times largely because o f Gerard’s
patronage.14

In such small, but largely symbolic, ways did Gerard’s diplomacy quickly develop a

humanitarian flavor to America’s difficult policy of neutrality. Describing the embassy’s specially nurtured
attitude of impartiality to his father-in-law, Grew wrote, “We have a hard road to follow here...In our
actions we are neutral and are heartily doing as much for Germans as we are for others, for human want,
sorrow, or suffering know [sic] no creeds.” 15 Neither, the First Secretary could well have added, might
they know any bounds to diplomatic effort. For soon, matters o f humane treatment for tens of thousands of
prisoners o f war and issues of massive food relief operations reaching millions o f Belgians, French, and
Poles rapidly escalated the Berlin embassy’s humanitarianism into a new dimension o f diplomacy
altogether.

BELLIGERENT HUM AN RIGHTS

America’s assumption o f belligerent interests immediately after the war’s outbreak, initially
introduced the embassy to the larger issue o f human rights. On 4 August 1914, Gerard assumed charge in
the German Empire o f ali British interests, and soon those of Japan, Serbia, Romania, and San Marino.
Aside from Roosevelt’s precedent in the Russo-Japanese War, this was an invitation into European affairs
without earlier parallel and, despite the wartime exigency, perhaps indicated the status America had
assumed in tire previous fifteen years. Almost immediately-and tliroughout the war until, the break--lhe
embassy’s most engrossing concern centered on the welfare o f belligerent prisoners o f war (POWs) and
interned ci vilian nationals, which Gerard and his staff took up with admirable energy . A lready by January,
1915, a bare half-year since the w ar’s start, Gerard’s embassy served as principal protector and

, ! Gerard Papers, Folder 14-35, Atwood to Gerard, 12 April 1916. A full statement o f the kitchen’s
operations indicated Gerard’s continued interest in the projects. Folder 14-35, Treasurer, American
Association o f Commerce and Trade Berlin to Gerard, 4 September 1916. Grew wrote he was “glad that an
official mark o f approval was thus placed cn [the kitchen], as everything is o f use that can serve to
counteract the unfortunate anti-German reputation which we all have here.” Grew, Turbulent Era. 1: 166,
Grew to Mrs. Grew, 7 December 1914.
' .Grew, Turbulent Era, 1: 166, Grew to Thomas Sargeant Perry, 6 December 1914.
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representative of a considerable portion of over 700,000 POWs of all nationalities (mostly Russian and
French), a total which would eventually exceed the two million mark.16 By August, 1915, the embassy
ministered to the needs o f almost 6,000 interned British civilians and 24,000 British POWs—which would
climb to nearly 40,000 by year’s end, making Gerard, according to one headline, “the busiest diplomat in
the world.” 17
Camp inspections proved the embassy staff s most time-consuming duty. The embassy was fust
obliged to negotiate the labyrinthine German bureaucracy to obtain, and periodically renew, special passes
from the War Ministries of each of the Empire’s constituent states, including Prussia, Bavaria, and
Saxony.18 Thus armed, embassy representatives regularly fanned out from Berlin to conduct inspections of
camps and detention centers, that by April, 1916, numbered at least 148 different locations scattered across
the Em pire.19 T he extensive list o f inspection items included general sanitation and treatment o f prisoners
by the German authorities; sleeping, bathing, washing, and cooking accommodations; nutrition quality and
quantity; arrangements for exercise and entertainments; provision of blankets, clothing, footwear, and other
necessities; hours and nature o f work required o f the prisoners; medical care provided; delivery, dispatch,
and censoring of packages and letters; and innumerable other details of the prisoners’ humane treatment.
Back in Berlin, the embassy meanwhile conducted on-going negotiations with the countless
German authorities, whose jealously-guarded, overlapping jurisdictions helped ensure constant trials, in
March, 1915, Gerard successfully arranged with the Prussian Ministry o f War, the Gentian Foreign Office,
and the Army General Staff, a so-called “treaty” to facilitate thorough, reliable inspections. Prior-notice
inspection of any camp could now'be demanded at. any time. Inspectors gained the privilege o f speaking
with prisoners out o f ear-shot and without the interference of camp authorities, and could insist on “the

10 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-23, Middlebrook to Gerard, 20 January 1915, p. 3.
17 United States National Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1910-1929, File 123G31, J.D.
Chenoweth to Lansing, undated but received by State Department on 19 August 1915, enclosing a clipping
dated 7 August 1915 from the Canadian newspaper Saturday Night. In December, 1915, Germany held
approximately 300,000 Frenchmen (whose interests the Spanish embassy handled) and a little less than
40,000 British prisoners, Gerard Papers, Folder 13-35, Gerard to Walter Hines Page, 6 December 1915, p.
6.

18 See Gerard Papers, Folder 15^36, for several such passes.
19 Graham H. Stuart, American D iplomatic and Consular Practice (New York: D. Appleton-Century
Company, Inc., 1936:). p. 66, Footnote 14. Some larger locations, like the civilian Ruhleben camp,
received weekly visits. Gerard Papers, Folder 13-35, Gerard to Walter Hines Page, 6 December 1915, p. 5.
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removal o f the causes of justifiable complaints.” The embassy also secured the right o f final appeal to the
Imperial War Ministry itself on any POW issue.20 Subsequently, in February, 1916, Gerard at last
succeeded in negotiating stringent, no-notice inspection visits.21 Another' matter requiring the embassy’s
diplomatic intervention centered on arrangements for prisoner exchanges or releases. Gerard parleyed for
the British to reduce the age under which interned civilians were considered potential combatants from 55
to 50, and in some cases to 45 years, thus qualifying for repatriation considerable numbers of men.
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also negotiated and facilitated a series of individual prisoner exchanges before finally representing the
British desire to abandon them for mass exchanges.23
Gerard meanwhile played a significant role in gaining access to the camps for neutral,
humanitarian, non-governmental organizations. His representations at the Foreign Office on behalf of the
Young M en’s Christian Association, for example, helped produce by April, 1915, a military proclamation,
that “ [tjhe German War Ministry establishes a new humanitarian precedent and welcomes the Y.M.C.A. in
prison camps.”2,1 The ambassador added point to his position by joining his Spanish counterpart late that
month in making a high-profile visit to the inaugural ceremony marking the new relationship. “You cannot
know how your visit is giving us standing throughout the country',” one beleaguered Y.M.C.A. official
wrote.25 The General Secretary of the New York-based International Committee of Young M en’s Christian
Associations, Mr. John R. Mott, wrote a week later of the organization’s “profound appreciation of the
invaluable service and influential cooperation which you have rendered.”26 .Mott’s remark could well have
applied to all Gerard’s work, on behalf of his British wards. Whether in facilitating other bodies’ aid, or
intervening itself diplomatically (through its representations) and pragmatically (through its camp
inspections), Gerard’s embassy performed critical, front-line humanitarian duty in its efforts for humane

“ 'Gerard Papers, Folder 13-35, Gerard to Walter Hines Page, 6 December 1915, pp. 7-9. “Constant
inspections of camps” immediately ensued beginning 29 March 1915.
21 Gerard Papers, Folder 15-1, Cecil to Gerard, 17 January.1916.
Usually elderly or sickly-for example, embassy Special Assistant John B. Jackson relayed to Gerard an
English note verbals regarding its acceptance in principle of a German proposal to release all British and
German civilians over age 45. Gerard Papers, Folder 16-16, Jackson to Gerard, 11 August 1916.
Gerard Papers, Folder 17-16, Baron Newton to Gerard., 23 May 1.916.
21 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-1, Harte to Gerard, 5 March 1915, and Harte to Mott, undated. The latter
advises, “Our Aaribassador informing State Dept.”
25 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-1, Harte to Gerard, 20 April 1915.
20 Gerard Papers, Folder 13 -26, Mott to Gerard, 27 April 1915.
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treatment o f British prisoners o f war and civilian interns. Within a few months o f assuming belligerent
interests within Germany, however, the Gerard embassy would extend its duty beyond the Empire’s
borders into German-occupied lands, as well.

BELGIAN FOOD R ELIEF

Meticulously choreographing Germany’s invasion o f France, the von Schlieffen Plan necessitated
by-passing the Maginot Line fortifications with an end-run through neutral Belgium. Despite a valiant
fight, roughly eight million Belgians and two million French still inhabited German-occupied Belgium and
northern'France when the offensive finally ground to a halt in early September, 1914. With military
expedience satisfied in the midst of wide expectations of a short war, the passing battlefront ravaged the
mature, August crops ready for harvest. With food reserves from the previous year low and. the industrial
and urban centers of this, Europe’s most highly industrialized state, dependent upon daily replenishment,
the conquerors were face to face by October with a looming food crisis of unprecedented proportions. As
the Commission for Relief in Belgium bluntly described it, “The complete occupation by a hostile army of
an area so exceptionally industrial and urban in its character.,.and so dependent on overseas imports for its
food-supplies...has created a situation of siege unparalleled in history and given, rise to problems not
'hitherto contemplated, whether from the standpoint of sociology, economics or international convention.”"'
As the crisis grew, representatives from several Belgian cities were allowed in. early October to
cross the Channel with hopes of temporarily alleviating mounting food shortages through grain purchases’
in England.. Desperate in their plight, they secured the services of a visiting American mining engineer and
millionaire named Herbert. Hoover. A man of abiding integrity and energy, Hoover quickly established the
American Relief Commission (ARC), scon recast, as the International Commission for Relief in Belgium
(CRB), with himself as chairman. The neutral body would provide an organized approach to raising the

Hoover Institution Archives. Joseph Coy Green Collection, Box 5, File “CRB - General Reports, Annual
Report (Second) 19)4-1916,” The Commission for Relief in Belgium Second Annual Report. November 1,
: 14 to October 3 1. 1916. Part I - Provisioning Department (London: Crowther & Goodman, Ltd., 191.6),
p. xiii.
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required vast sums o f money, purchasing foodstuffs sufficient for most o f ten million people, providing for
shipping through belligerent waters and borders, and, finally, supervising the fair distribution o f the
emergency provisions through local native committees to the needy, captive civilian populations.28 With
its operations caught between the always-posturing British, French, and Germans, the CRB’s existence, let
alone its success, remained tenuous, as it fought to establish and preserve its neutrality and to avoid
becoming a pawn in the belligerents’ war maneuvering.
To help legitimize the Committee and its neutral status and to secure invaluable diplomatic aid for
its activities, Hoover began recruiting a prominent list of diplomats as patrons. By late October, CRB
letterhead proclaimed as honorary chairmen Brand Whitlock and the Marquis de Villalobar, the American
• and Spanish Ministers in Brussels; Walter Hines Page and Senor Don Merry del Val, the American and
Spanish Ambassadors in London; and, in Berlin, the Spanish Ambassador and American Ambassador
James W. Gerard.29 The “protective diplomacy” of Page and Gerard would prove o f decisive importance
to the CRB.J° Together, the CRB and the neutral diplomats sought to lay a foundation o f effective and
efficient relief through a variety of agreements with the different belligerent governments, covering such
essential issues as transport of foodstuffs through belligerent lines, protection o f native food supplies,
government subsidies, and freedom o f staff movement and communications.31 In this inaugural appearance

28 With the help o f researchers in London, 'Paris, and Berlin, Hoover early conducted a thorough
investigation into past European famines, plagues, and organized relief efforts, in order to provide him self
with some guidance on his monumental undertaking. O f the greatest famine in European history, that
following the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), he noted the lack of any relief, “for it was recorded that onethird to one-half o f the population o f Europe died.” He concluded, “Except for the charities o f the religious
bodies, o f occasional municipalities and of a few princes, there had never [before] been such a thing as
relief.” Hoover felt “shortly convinced that gigantic famine would follow the present war.” Herbert
Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover. 3 vols. (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1951), I: 184.
29 Others included the Dutch Minister to Belgium’s govemment-in-exile at Le Havre, Jonkheer de Weede;
the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Johan Loudon; the American Minister to the Netherlands, Henry
van Dyke; and William Sharp, the American Ambassador to France. The corresponding officials of
Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Denmark declined. With American, Dutch, and Spanish
representatives, the American Commission changed its name on 22 October 1914 to the Commission for
Relief in Belgium, or CRB. Hoover, Memoirs. 1: 157-158.
30 Hoover’s term. Hoover Institution Archives, CRB Collection, Box number 6, “Hoover - July 1916,”
Hoover to Page, 11 July 1916.
31 Hoover Institution Archives, Joseph Coy Green Collection, Box 5, File “CRB - General Reports, Annual
Report (Second) 1914-1916.” The Commission for Relief in Belgium Second Annual Report. November 1,
1914 to October 31. 1916. Part I - Provisioning Department (London: Crowther & Goodman, Ltd., 1916),
p. xiv.
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o f what British diplomat Lord Percy later termed “moral reprobation as an instrument of foreign policy,” 32
Gerard’s work in Berlin on the CRB’s behalf, like Page’s in London, dramatically illustrated diplomacy’s
expanding field of operations. As with his embassy’s personnel, facilities, and technology, its
humanitarian diplomacy further reflected the new century’s novel forces, as their pressure produced for the
first time a real human-rights dimension to international relations.
On 7 October 1914, Hoover and his associates approached Ambassador Page with a plan to use
the new American Relief Committee to send emergency food to Belgium. Page cabled Washington to
outline British authorization and to underline the necessity of securing the German government’s approval.
The next day, Gerard made his initial foray into humanitarian relief issues when he took up with the
Foreign Office the matter of the ARC’s plan and cabled the Germans’ agreement to Page ten days later on
18 October.33 The quick agrement with Wilhelmstrasse, however, unfortunately occurred only because of
a still maturing appreciation o f the issue’s complexities. For the rest o f the war, the Commission, with help
from Ambassador Gerard and the other neutral chiefs o f mission, would maintain precarious relations with
the belligerent governments, which Hoover likened to “walking a tight rope.” ’4 The story also vividly
illustrates the ascendance o f a new political force in diplomacy, that of public relations.
Everyone wished to see the Belgians fed. Preferably, however, at the enemy’s expense and at no
cost to the friendly war effort. The Germans disavowed responsibility for feeding the populations, citing
the Allied blockade’s barring o f food imports as part o f an effort to starve the central Powers into
submission. They did effectively support the CRB’s relief, however, because they knew their resources
were already tight and they rightly perceived the public relations disaster that would accompany a Belgian
famine. On their side, the British and French feared relief food and supplies entering the occupied
territories would end up in German hands. But they also understood the bad press stemming from blocking

32 As quoted in George H. Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Humanitarian, 1914-1917 (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), p. 182.
Hoover Institution Archives, Herbert Hoover Collection, Box 329, File “Commission for Relief in
Belgium - Articles by its Members,” from the article “The Authentic Story o f Belgian R elief’ by Vernon
Kellogg, in The W orld’s Work. June, 1917.
34 Hoover, Memoirs. 1: 161.
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relief efforts destined for their ally’s populace, or for their own people in the case o f France. “The
introduction of a neutral organization...into such a situation,” the CRB considered a year later,

has proved to be an undertaking which, in its diplomatic phases, is fraught with the
utmost difficulty and is always face to face with failure. The question as to which of
the belligerents is legally and morally responsible for feeding civilian population in
such a position o f unparalleled human experience, the military aspects o f the economic
weapon o f food-control, the transfer of the food-supply through war zones and over
belligerent frontiers, its distribution and the financial transactions involved therein, are
obviously matters o f the greatest importance to the combatants. All o f the Commission’s
35
activities have, therefore, been subject to jealous supervision by both sides.

The diplomatic twists and turns that would buffet the CRB repeatedly, generally followed the pendulum’s
swing to and fro between political fears and ambitions. Cultivating popularity in the neutral countries
stood for both sides as a central goal in the relief issue, a theme which Hoover and Gerard did not fail to
emphasize with vigorous publicity demanding justice for the Belgians facing avoidable catastrophe.
The nations concerned quickly became keenly sensitive to every nuance of the CRB’s relief
operation arid regularly precipitated crises as they grappled with such an unusual matter. Almost from the
beginning, Hoover encountered strong and mounting opposition in Britain to the CRB’s fledgling relief
effort. Attempting to side -step the issue o f which side held the moral and material obligation, Hoover
sought English assistance on humanitarian grounds. Heads raised at his warnings of the untold, but
substantial, effect on American sympathy towards the British that public knowledge o f England’s explicit
refusal to help would have. As he privately warned one British notable, the “English people cannot afford
to have the question of responsibility in case o f failure on the part of this Commission through lack of
resources, put up to the judgment o f the neutral world.” To bolster his humanitarian appeals and overcome
the decisive objections of the British military, Hoover knew he had to secure more cooperation from the
Germans, and to do this, he needed Germ'd.36

3- Hoover Institution Archives, Joseph Coy Green Collection, Box 5, File “CRB - General Reports, Annual
Report (Second) 1914-1916.” The Commission for Relief in Belgium Second Annual Report. November 1,
1914 to October 31. 1916. Part I - Provisioning Department (London: Crowther & Goodman, Ltd., 1916),
p. xxii.
j6 Nash, Life of Hoover, p. 72, Hoover to Earl Grey, 15 December 1914, and p. 73.
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In his cables and letters Hoover typically tailored the line o f argument he wished the
correspondent to take in representing the matter at hand--essentially diplomatic instructions-and did so
with Gerard. On 27 November Hoover cabled Gerard a request to approach the German Government and
solicit on the CRB’s behalf a monthly subsidy o f five million Marks (approximately one-quarter of
Hoover’s estimated need for the Commission’s operations). Such funding, he told Gerard, would go far in
quelling the outspoken criticisms levied on Germany for her conqueror’s attitude in Belgium.
Additionally, it would compel France and Great Britain to provide the CRB with like sums, and thus
largely alleviate the organization’s financial problems. A second issue for Gerard centered on reports of
requisitions of locally-grown food by the German army. Hoover opined, that “ [a]ll of the destruction in
Belgium and the levying of food supplies for the support o f troops can be defended as a war measure, but
to allow these people to starve while under their material control will raise a storm in the neutral world fifty
■times the volume of that which has already been created by any local destruction.” Hoover condemned as
tantamount to murder any belligerent’s failure to assist in meeting the Belgians’ food requirements.
Alternatively, any aid extended by the Germans in this hour o f need would “wipe out nine-tenths of the
charges o f [German] mthlessness in war.” On 5 December, Hoover wrote Gerard urging again his
assistance in winning German cooperation and once again invoking the bogeyman o f American public
opinion. Given his “instructions,” Gerard commenced pressing the Foreign Office for its cooperation with
the Commission, Within three weeks, Wilhelmstrasse promised a halt to food requisitions in Belgium by
the German army of occupation, “and for a reasonable time after the last delivery,” so long as the CRB
continued sending supplies. On the day after Christmas he cabled Hoover, via the State Department, o f a
German acceptance/7
On 28 December, Minister Whitlock received in Brussels Governor-General von Bissing’s
confirmation of the agreement, but already the next imbroglio had ripened when two interrelated problems
threatened the CRB with imminent failure and required Gerard’s direct intercession again. Financially, the
CRB had to generate more secure financial resources and, diplomatically, it had to cultivate better relations

37 Ibid., pp. 73, 81, and 117.
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with the British and German governments.38 Just after the New Year, the Germans, determined to extract
some advantage from their occupation, announced the imposition of a forty million franc per month
indemnity on Belgium’s vanquished provinces. On 3 January 1915, Hoover cabled Gerard to start working
on Berlin to rescind its decision. Three days later, on 6 January Hoover wrote Gerard on the other pressing
issue o f cultivating better relations concerning Belgium and now northern France.
By the winter of 1914-15, the battle lines in northern France had settled into their maze of
trenches, trapping over 2 million hapless French civilians between the front and the Belgian / German
borders. Straining under the same conditions o f privation as the Belgians (though, as enemy citizens,
treated somewhat more roughly), they, too; grew perilously short of food. Mass starvation threatened by
late fall, 1914. The CRB originally had been organized in October exclusively for relief in Belgium, but
between November and January, 1915, it extended operations to two French border districts and thereby
•rescued roughly 130,000 French from famine. But the effort lacked the resources and authority for
sustained operations sufficient for the rest o f the millions, including 600,000 children, in occupied France,
and Hoover set to work on a remedy. He wrote Gerard on 6 January to explain the CRB’s willingness to
assume the extra burden. Short experience in Belgium, however, had shown the CRB had to expect
improved cooperation of the various governments, especially the G erm an/9 Much o f Gerard’s diplomacy
in Berlin at this time consequently centered on establishing a more comprehensive cooperation with the
Germans on Belgium and securing their assistance in extending full-scale relief operations into northern
France.
Back in London, throughout January, 1916, Hoover massaged the scene through a series of
discussions with Her Majesty’s government and finally overcame the major British opposition to the
CRB’s relief operations at a 21 January meeting with senior officials, including Chancellor o f the
Exchequer Lloyd George. In tentatively agreeing to allow the CRB’s operations to continue and even
voting to contribute to the Belgian relief, the British imposed two conditions, namely that Germany
abandon food levies and that she forsake her intentions to secure any indemnity from Belgium.40 The

38 Hoover, Memoirs. 1: 160.
39 Nash, Life of Hoover, pp. 104-105.
40 Ibid., pp. 83-84.
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overarching concern centered on “securing from the Germans more effective control o f food in
Belgium.”41
The pressure was back on in the German capital. Although Gerard continued working on the
Foreign Office, Hoover now felt personal intervention in Berlin would be necessary to once and for all
clear the air on both sides regarding suitable, stable arrangements for the CRB’s business. He assumed a
two-pronged approach. First, he set the stage by bringing initial pressure to bear through.a “storm of
public opinion” in the American press. On 27 January he cabled to Secretary Bryan to take up with von
Bem storff the CRB’s problefns, “believing the [German Ambassador] would be especially sensitive to
American public opinion.” Hoover then followed this up with a gloomy release to the Associated Press on
30 January, which began with a bleak prognosis for the Belgian situation, before explaining both sides’
refusal to assume responsibility for feeding the Belgians and emphasizing the imperative o f governmental
support to supplement limited, private philanthropy. Warning, finally, that millions o f Belgians .would die
should the belligerents fail to come to terms over the problem, Hoover concluded that “ [o]ur [the CRB’s]
only court of appeal is American public opinion.” 42 The next day he promptly left London for Berlin on
the second prong o f his approach, arriving on 1 February intent to “besiege the German Government at the
top directly and on all fronts.”43
In Berlin, Gerard and his embassy played central roles in arranging and preparing the ground for
Hoover’s planned conferences. Over the next ten days of talks, Hoover recalled, “Ambassador Gerard
arranged, and was often helpfully present at, interviews” with the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg,
Foreign Minister von Jagow, Finance Minister Helfferich, and other important German officials.44 Prior to
their first meeting in early 1915, Hoover had been led to expect o f Gerard “a typical Tammany lawyer,
whose appointment had been imposed upon an unwilling President by a crooked political machine.”
Instead, the future president discovered Gerard to be “a man o f polished attainments, o f fine intellectual
insight, helpful, courageous, who at once inspired confidence in his fine integrity. When I first called at his

41 Hoover. Memoirs. 1: 163.
42 Nash, Life of Hoover, p. 86, and Hoover, Memoirs. 1: 163-165.
43 Nash, Life of Hoover, p. 86.
44 Hoover. Memoirs. 1: 165-166.
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Embassy...he met me at the door and said at once: ‘We are all for you here. What can we do [to help].’ ”
During the subsequent negotiations with the Germans, “Gerard opened every official door in Berlin for me
and did not leave me on the doorstep. He brought skill and, where necessary, real punch to our
negotiations. At all times he stood ready to catch the ball and run with it. Whenever he smelled danger he
acted without our having to appeal to him. He sought no publicity out of our activities but did at every turn
single-mindedly seek the success o f our work.”45
Several major issues concerning the CRB’s operations and status were ultimately resolved in the
course o f the interviews. The Germans earnestly sought to find a financial arrangement for the CRB, as
they did not wish to see the Commission collapse for any reason. They additionally agreed to cease taking
food from the occupied areas; to allow complete freedom"of movement to CRB staff without search; to
order submarine commanders definitely to respect CRB ship markings; to provide directions through minefree sea routes to Rotterdam, the off-load point; to charter for CRB use German merchant ships sitting in
refuge in neutral ports; and to assign direct German officer liaisons to assist the CRB in treating with no
less than six different, independent German authorities with overlapping jurisdictions in the occupied areas.
Finally, the Germans allowed the extension o f CRB relief operations into France, but the obstinate
Germans categorically refused to lift the indemnity.46
Through deft diplomacy and vigorous action by Hoover with assistance from diplomatic patrons
like Gerard, temporary funding for the CRB’s near-term expenses was secured from Germany, Britain,
France, and Belgium. Germany’s acquiescence to the CRB’s other points and resolution of the financial
crisis relieved Hoover’s imbroglio by late February, 1915. The crisis, however, largely set the pattern for
future CRB-belligerent relations and Gerard’s supporting role. As Gerard subsequently obtained written
German confirmation o f the resolved points, he must have wondered at the chasm separating the simple,
comparatively trite work of his pre-war months, and the complex, unprecedented wartime issue o f

45 Hoover’s early-twenties recollection of Gerard was positive and appreciative, in direct contrast with his
remembrances o f Sharp (a “timid” man, who “unlike Gerard...would never take the initiative on our
b eh alf’), van Dyke (“one of my trials”), and Whitlock (“helpful,” but a sensitive man who “shrank from
the rough stuff o f dealing with the German officials”). Page Hoover called the CRB’s “most intimate
supporter,” a “great mind,” and “a man of sympathy and kindness...almost fanatically devoted to service of
his country.” Hoover. Memoirs. 1: 203-205.
46 Ibid., 1: 165-166.
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international food relief in conquered lands. Up to this point, Hoover recalled, “We were a great bother to
our patron Ambassadors and to their legation staffs in making appointments, attending conferences,
securing of visas, ship passes, and a hundred other details, to say nothing o f major negotiations with top,
officials.”47 For the remainder o f the war, the burden did not lessen either, as CRB issues mounted
staccato and occasioned Gerard’s repeated intervention in Berlin. To pressure the Germans to lift abruptlyimposed travel restrictions and recover essential freedom of movement for CRB personnel; to obtain
guarantees of the CRB’s right to a minimum number of staff in German-occupied territories; to secure safe
passage for CRB vessels crossing the Channel between England and Holland after Germany declared a new
submarine “war zone” around Britain; to persuade the Germans to cease exporting any foodstuffs or
livestock out o f Belgium; to win German guarantees to reserve the Belgian and French harvests for the
native populations: On these, and countless other points, the embassy’s representations firmly established
the new human rights dimension to America’s diplomatic work, even as they turned their attention to other
pressing humanitarian problems.

PO LISH FOOD RELIEF

In the summer and fall o f 1915, conditions on the eastern front unexpectedly deteriorated, as
German offensives shoved the Russians back and eventually captured Warsaw on 1 August. Adopting a
“scorched earth” policy, the retreating Russian troops burned over four thousand villages and surrounding
croplands, leaving two million refugees and a devastated harvest in their wake. By fall, occupied Poland
joined Belgium and northern France at the brink of calamity.

Hoover’s success in Belgium naturally drew

to him the responsible authorities. The German General Staff, Warsaw’s principal charity organization,
and others in America appealed to Hoover’s CRB for assistance, and in late October, Hoover dispatched to
Poland Stanford University professor, Dr. Vernon Kellogg, to assess conditions for similar relief services
as in Belgium and France.

48

Kellogg’s grim report in mid-November left little to doubt, as it told of

47 Ibid., 1: 199.
48 Kellogg, Hoover’s friend and the CRB “ambassador” at the Kaiser’s western front headquarters in
Charleville since spring, 1915, would become later American Secretary o f State in the 1930s.
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increasingly scarce food supplies, private charities’ emergency resources nearing exhaustion, and over
seven-and-one-half million Poles preparing to face the winter with nothing.49
Hoover immediately began making arrangements on both sides to extend operations into the
nation. The Poles were requesting only CRB relief along the lines o f that already being rendered in
Belgium and northern France, but the effort involved “a thousand difficulties” before it might even get off
the ground. An estimated five million dollars per m onth-far more than available from charity—would be
required. Shipping arrangements from the United States to Stockholm, thence to Danzig, would be fraught
with pitfalls, particularly as they would require creation of another gap in the Allied blockade. And for the
Allies ever to approve the scheme, the Germans would need to provide various guarantees. In the face of
disaster, on 2 December the Germans unofficially offered their full cooperation and promised all foodstuffs
in Poland to the civilian population. Nevertheless, on 22 December prospects remained dim for Allied
approval, as a depressed Hoover fonnally offered to British Foreign Secretary Grey a proposal to use the
CRB’s services for Polish relief.50
Not for six weeks, until 5 February 1916, did Grey finally respond to Hoover. Negative
undercurrents welled up in his reply, as he pointed to continued German and Austrian requisitions and even
exports of native Polish foodstuffs as grounds for rejection of the CRB proposal. But, he suggested relief
for Poland might be possible, if these practices stopped and the Central Powers made other concessions.
Thus slightly encouraged, Hoover wrote Gerard on 5 February and twice more on 7 February with the
details and a request to approach the German government to seek their agreement.51 “The matter has now
got beyond anything we can do as simple, unofficial persons and I feel that if you are able to develope [sic]
something with the German Government, Mr. Page at this end would be able to advance it another step on
this side.” Once again providing guideposts, Hoover observed to Gerard that'“the more humane section o f

49 Nash, Life of Hoover, p. 185.
50 The same month, Hoover also received the initial entreaties from the Serbian Minister to London, the
German General Staff, and the American Relief Clearing House in Paris to investigate the urgent needs for
humanitarian relief o f the war-tom Balkans. Gerard evidently had no role in the issue. Nash, Life of
Hoover, pp. 186-189; and George J. Lerski, Herbert Hoover and Poland: A Documentary History o f a
Friendship (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), pp. 4-5.
31 Hoover Institution Archives, CRB London Office Dossiers Collection, Dossier number 55, “Preliminary
Negotiations for the Relief of Poland,” Gerard to Hoover, 15 February 1916.
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the English Government wishes to see something done for Poland,” and that a substantial “counteroffer” by
the Imperial government would put Germany “right in public opinion” and lead to a breakthrough.52
Gerard took the matter up and his representations quickly bore fruit. On 11 February in Warsaw the
German government of occupied Poland issued a memorandum o f agreement on relief principles, in which
it promised not to export any native food supplies, and to reserve all to the civilian population, except
“surplus” potatoes and what food would be necessary for the roughly 100,000-strong German
constabulary.53 On 14 February, Gerard resurrected a preliminary “treaty” on Polish relief, which he had
worked out with German officials over one year earlier in April, 1915, when the contract had failed for
lack o f Allied ratification. An amended copy of this he presented to Undersecretary Zimmermann to
consider as a possible basis for negotiations in the current matter.54
Back in London, on 21 February Hoover and Frederic Walcott o f the humanitarian Rockefeller
Foundation submitted a limited relief proposal (the Floover-Walcott memorandum), which placed the
burden of Polish relief on the Germans. While the British again stonewalled, impatient hunger pangs
meanwhile awaited the trifles o f combatant diplomacy. On 25 February Floover wrote Gerard asking him
to assure the Polish [Relief] Committee in Warsaw that the CRB was “unceasing in. our efforts on their
behalf,”55 but not until 10 May did Grey finally respond with England’s acceptance o f the terms o f the
memo—as well as her imposition o f difficult, new conditions. The relief must cover all o f Poland, Grey
insisted, including Austria’s occupied portion. No native food could go to the German constabulary. And
the Central Powers themselves should provide sufficientsupplies and food tothe occupied Balkan areas of
Serbia, Albania, and Montenegro under neutral supervision. It fell once again, o f course, to Gerard to
negotiate the new demands with Wilhelmstrasse. Nearly three weeks passed before he cabled on 30 May
the German response. They stood willing to purchase and ship necessary food imports to Poland, and even
supplement the shipments from their own food supplies. They were not willing, however, to guarantee

52 Ibid., Hoover to Gerard, 7 February 1916, pp. 1-2.
5j Nash, Life o f Hoover, p. 189.
54 Hoover Institution Archives, CRB London Office Dossiers Collection, Dossier number.55, “Preliminary
Negotiations for the Relief of Poland,” Gerard telegram to Page / Hoover, received 1 June 1916; and
Gerard to Hoover, 15 February 1916. The exhausted Gerard declined at this time to become an official
chairman o f any resultant relief effort in Poland.
55 Ibid., Hoover to Gerard, 25 February 1916.
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extension o f the relief into Austrian Poland or to take responsibility for the Balkans. Gerard further
advised Hoover (through Page) of several points upon which a possible arrangement might rest, based on
his recent conferences with German Interior Ministry and Foreign Office officials, and Prince Lubecki of
the Polish Committee.56 But the British were in no mood to parlay.
With the British reply on 15 June 1916—that Germany could compel Austria if she so desired; that
Poland had to be treated as a whole, as a matter of principle—deadlock ensued.57 A State Department call
to resolve the issue “in the name and interests of humanity,” even a personal appeal from President Wilson
could do nothing to move the belligerents. A “final proposal” from the British only incensed, the Germans
to hold a conference in August to review the continuation of all relief operations. While the CRB survived
the crisis, Germany soon announced that with the coming harvest, no relief in Poland would be necessary
. .after 1 October. Any suffering there meanwhile would be England’s onus. Thus, the long campaign to
rextend the CRB into Poland collapsed and the break in German-American relations soon after the new year
precluded any resurrection.58 By the summer of 1916, however, Gerard’s embassy had other humanitarian
matters clamoring for its attention. For in early spring, its “protective diplomacy” assumed a different
charge; Forced German relocation of French burghers and deportations that fall o f able-bodied Belgian
males posed disturbing new breaches of human rights.

FRENCH AND BELGIAN DEPORTATIONS

In order to alleviate the overcrowded, idle workforce of the highly industrial areas of northern

56 Ibid., Gerard to Page, 30 May 1916.
57 Hoover Institution Archives, CRB Collection, Box number 6, File “Hoover - June, 1916,” Shoecraft to
Hoover, 15 June 1916, which transmits a copy of Sir Edward Grey’s reply.
58 Hoover Institution Archives, CRB London Office Dossiers Collection, Dossier number 55, “Preliminary
Negotiations for the Relief of Poland,” English translation of German Foreign Office note to the Embassy
o f the United States o f America (in Berlin), dated 25 August 1916, referencing Gerard’s “Note Verbale” of
29 July 1916. Nash, Life of Hoover, pp. 18-9-192. America’s entrance into the war in spring, 1917,
effectively squelched all chances for outside help to starving Poland. Only after the 11 November 1918
armistice would she receive any substantial aid from America, when Hoover organized mass food relief
based on careful preparations started in mid-October, 1918, when the Armistice was certain. His American
Relief Administration’s efforts continued for three more years, eventually feeding over 1.3 million Polish
children daily. Lerski, Herbert Hoover and Poland, pp. 5-6; and p. ii, Forward by U.S. Senator Mark O.
Hatfield.

France, in April, 1916, the German government o f occupation decided to offer the populace a chance to
work in the fields for wages and to more easily supplement their small CRB rations. Quite ignorant of
agrarian matters, few of these city folk took advantage of the dubious opportunity, which prompted the
autocratic Germans to decree that approximately 50,000 inhabitants were to go anyway. The forced
relocations began the week of 22 - 29 April 1916 in the cities o f Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, and
immediately outraged CRB officials. As it turned out, on 1 May 1916 the Germans abruptly summoned
CRB Director Poland and all the American representatives of French districts to the northern French town
o f Charleville, where Kaiser Wilhelm kept his Western Front Grosses Hauptquartier (Grand
Headquarters). No hint given as to the reason, the officials soon discovered that Ambassador Gerard and
First Secretary Grew had arrived from Berlin for a tense conference with the Emperor and his staff
concerning the crisis over the recent Sussex torpedoing. The Germans had arranged a rare meeting o f the
Americans, ostensibly to give a delighted Gerard an opportunity to talk over the Belgian relief with the
representatives. In reality, the Germans intended the arrangement to help them placate the American
diplomats, but quickly learned to regret their ploy. The CRB officials considered, “that the least the
American Commission [the CRB] could do would be to bring the tragedy of the Lille deportations to
[Gerard’s] attention...and, if possible, to obtain from General Headquarters some action for an amelioration
o f the situation.” Director Poland consequently took advantage of the occasion to discuss with the
ambassador the question of the outrageous deportations, including that o f young girls from the French city
of Lille and its vicinity. Gerard’s intervention with the highest authorities at this time put an end to the
barbarities.39 “The Germans never forgave the Commission for that incident,” recalled CRB Hauptquartier
liaison Dr. Kellogg, “but the happy result was an interruption in the brutal performance.”60

59 Hoover Institution Archives, Committee for the Relief of Belgium Collection, Box 6, File “Mr. Hoover,
April, 1916,” undated, anonymous memorandum entitled “Memorandum on the Deportation o f Inhabitants
from the Cities o f Lille, Roubaix & Tourcoing, April 22nd - 29th 1916;” and Joseph Coy Green Collection,
Box 20, File “Belgium - Short Articles, CA. 1917,” typewritten anecdote dated 5 February 1917, entitled,
“May 1st 1916.”
60 Hoover Institution Archives, Herbert Hoover Collection, Box 329, File “CRB - Articles by its member,”
in article “How North France Has Been Fed,” by Dr. Vernon Kellogg, in The World’s Work, January,
1918, p. 303.

137

A second German initiative, as brutal to Edwardian sensibilities as population deportations, called
further attention to the issue of human rights. On 10 October 1916, just two weeks after Gerard’s return to
America on leave, charge d'affaires Grew received word from the American Legation in Brussels that the
German military authorities in Belgium had begun deporting able-bodied men to work in Germany.
Besides the obvious inhumanity, the CRB feared the development might prompt the British to halt relief
supplies passing into Belgium and sought Grew’s representations in Berlin to stop the deportations.61
Appreciating the “far-reaching results of these new measures and their ultimate effect on the world’s
opinion,” Grew obtained the State Department’s authorization to make informal representations at the
Foreign Office on humanitarian grounds. On 15 November, exaggerated reports, that Grew would
formally (not informally) protest the issue, infuriated Wilson, who was then in process o f formulating his
planned post-election peace move. He desired nothing to interfere with its timing. While Lansing clarified
his actual, more limited instructions to Grew, he and Colonel House successfully argued the deportations
must temporarily delay any offer of mediation for fear of Allied rejection while Germany “persisted in
enslaving the civilian subjects of enemies who have fallen into her hands.”62
Back in Berlin, Wilhelmstrasse twice parried the energetic Grew’s efforts, which led him to
escalate the matter to an interview with Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg himself. For three weeks prior
to the 22 November demarche, Grew carefully prepared his case. He sought all available details and
solicited recommendations from Brussels, meanwhile consulting other neutral diplomats in Berlin to lay
the ground for a wider appeal if necessary. At the demarche, Grew detailed the deportations and their
likely negative impact on world opinion. After his presentation, however, a somber, worn von BethmannHollweg abruptly moved the discussion to the issue o f peace, asserting the deportations stemmed direc tly
from the failure abroad to follow up on Germany’s several, earlier-expressed desires to halt the hostilities.

61 Gerard had handled diplomatic matters himself throughout the war and this issue, arising as the United
States and Germany entered a twilight period before their break three months later, provided Grew’s first
real opportunity to exercise his wartime diplomatic skills.
62 House Diary entry of 15 November 1916, as quoted in Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador:
Joseph C. Grew and the Development o f the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1966; New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 28.
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Grew immediately cabled to Washington his report o f the meeting, concluding with his correct impression
o f the Chancellor’s unspoken, but particular, disappointment at American dallying.
,

Sensitive to rising public antipathy in America over the deportations, on 26 November Wilson

directed Lansing to issue instructions for a “very solemn protest,” which should emphasize the German
actions as posing a “very serious obstacle” to creating a favorable opportunity for any peace move by the
United States. This point, Wilson explained to the Secretary, would “from Mr. Grew’s recent
j

despatches...be the most persuasive part o f the protest.”63 Lansing issued instructions to Grew on 29
November to make the formal protest in hopes o f clearing the way for Wilson’s peace initiative, which
Grew issued on 5 December. While in the end the Germans’ two-installment reply amounted to a rejection
o f the protest, Under-Secretary Zimmermann informally promised amelioration, which later reports from
Brussels led Grew to believe his efforts might have resulted in an easing of the deportations.64 Gerard,
•upon his return, continued working the matter with “some hope that a [more permanent German] retreat
[from the policy o f deportations] may be arranged,”65 but had to leave it unsettled after the February break.
Gerard’s engagement o f humanitarian concerns directly illustrated the growing complexity of
modem American diplomacy. His embassy played a key role in sustaining the critical food relief work of
the CRB in Belgium and northern France. Though unsuccessful, Gerard had worked hard to promote
extending the Committee’s aid to millions in Poland. His direct intervention helped end forced relocations
of French civilians. As charge d'affaires, Gerard’s lieutenant, Grew, had escalated the Belgian
deportations to the highest level. Human rights issues had indeed moved forcefully onto the diplomatic
stage o f the new century. That they did so was not only a factor of the embassy’s energy and America’s
strong humanitarianism. Modem, mass communications technology also played a critical role, as
telegraphs, daily newspapers, and the cinema helped magnify transgressions against defenseless human
beings into serious factors of international public opinion. Particularly for the most important neutral of
the conflict, the United States, public relations became an important, new facet o f diplomacy.

63 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson. Life and Letters. 8 vols., 6: 343, as quoted in Heinrichs,
American Ambassador, pp. 28-29.
64 Ibid., pp. 27-30.
65 Gerard Papers, Folder 18-33, undated (but certainly late December, 1916) Gerard notes, probably for a
report to Wilson, Lansing, or House.
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ISSUES OF PUBLIC RELATIONS: D IPLO M A C Y ’S NEW DIM ENSION

The old diplomacy concerned itself little with propaganda and popular opinion. In America,
preoccupation with domestic issues, a limited political franchise, limited mass communications technology,
a large, rural, relatively uneducated population and other nineteenth-century conditions helped keep the
public’s awareness and involvement in international issues low. Towards the end o f the century, however,
these conditions began changing with the diplomatic paradigm. Factors such as mass circulation
newspapers, renewed emphasis on education in a complex, urban-industrial society, and the nation’s
emergence as a world power hankering for overseas markets, began encouraging the American populace to
■nave opinions on foreign matters.66 At the same time, the new diplomacy’s switch to “policy” involved a
heightened awareness on the part o f decision-makers, that public opinion could be useful, and occasionally
crucial, in accomplishing their national goals.67 In America, as throughout Europe, the creation and
shaping o f public opinion assumed increasing importance beginning in the 1890s, but the First World
War’s infinitely higher stakes abruptly, and once and for all, established popular sentiment as a nearly
indispensable component of any foreign policy calculus. “Especially during the First World War when
nations fought for their very survival, pressures mounted for governments to mobilize all possible
resources in support of their cause, including public opinion at home and abroad,” explains historian Paul
Gordon Lauren. “Vicious, unprecedented competition for the hearts and minds of the world’s citizens
convinced many of the necessity for immediate action. In response, [French, German, and other foreign
ministries] broke with past practices and created elaborate institutional mechanisms designed to assume
new and expanded responsibilities for international propaganda.”68 As the Gerard embassy’s experiences

66 While public foreign-policy opinion carried increasing weight in America’s affairs abroad after the Civil
War, it originated not from the masses, but rather from “tiny elites [of acknowledged opinion makers and
influential newspapers] in a few metropolitan centers.” Robert L. Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the
New. 1865-1900 (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1975), p. 5.
67 Ibid., p. 87.
68 Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to TwentiethCentury Diplomacy in France and Germany. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), pp. 178-179.
See his Chapter 6, “Civilisation and Kultur. New and Expanded Responsibilities for International
Propaganda,” pp. 178-207, for a thorough discussion of the general development of mass “public opinion”
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would reveal with British POW treatment in Germany, human rights abuses in France and Belgium, and
large-scale humanitarian relief operations in Belgium and Poland, the importance o f public relations to
twentieth-century diplomacy could not be underestimated.
In 1914, most American newspapers received their pre-war European news from London, with
hardly any maintaining European staffs.69 Upon the cutting of Germany’s transatlantic cable immediately
after w ar’s outbreak, Ambassador von Bemstorff perceived England “held the whole o f the Transatlantic
news apparatus in her hands,” with American public opinion inevitably receiving a lopsided, pro-Ally view
o f the w ar’s causes and course.70 Within the first week of the war, then, the Germans had begun worrying
about their public appearance in America. With England coloring reports against her and Germany’s
access to the American press severely curtailed, German domestic papers devoted much space to the
necessity of exhibiting the “greatest friendship” to Americans still in Germany.71 In this way, the Germans
hoped at least to balance somewhat the American leadership’s impressions o f them through the Berlin
embassy’s reporting of the country’s internal mood. While Americans generally failed to fully appreciate
the extent to which the belligerents viewed the United States as the determining power in the war, the
matter’s truth escaped neither the British nor the Germans. It, in fact, was clearly understood and served as
the fulcrum in the coming diplomatic wrangling surrounding the rest of Gerard’s embassy.
Once Germany realized in late 1914 the gravity o f the crisis brought on by a war o f stalemate,
peace became her ulterior diplomatic program. If an outright truce failed to solidify her gains, great good
still could be had, if Germany could successfully pose as the one belligerent desiring peace and meanwhile
maneuver the Entente to be viewed as responsible for the war’s prolongation. If Germany came to be
regarded “ in a tolerant spirit” at least, disputes with England over neutral shipping and blockades might
easily be fanned into outright anti-British sentiment and ideally into American intervention on Germany’s
side. As the war lasted unexpectedly and as it soon became clear America’s enormous economic and

and international propaganda around the turn o f the century, and of the concerted efforts of the French and
German foreign ministries to address these novel, twentieth-century factors o f diplomacy.
69 From narrative by editor Walter Johnson prefacing chapter IX, “Viewing the War from Berlin, 1914,” in
Grew. Turbulent Era, 1: 157.
70 Von Bemstorff, Johann H., My Three Years in America, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), p.
38.
71 Grew, Turbulent Era. 1: 142, Grew Diary, 7 August 1914.
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financial power would be the conflict’s virtual kingmaker, Germany’s peace program gained urgency.
“The consideration which was chiefly at stake in these tortuous proceedings,” one contemporary historian
concluded, “was public opinion in the United States.”72 Proclaimed ’’the land o f propaganda p a r
excellence1.’’ by von Bemstorff, neutral America and her sentiments became conspicuous marks for
influence and public relations manipulation.73
Across the Atlantic, both sides kept an eye on the public and official moods concerning the
CRB’s humanitarian relief operations in Belgium. Herbert Hoover likened the CRB’s precarious position
to “walking a tight rope, the ends o f which were [in January, 1915] anchored in the desire o f the British
and French on one side, and the Germans on the other, to cultivate popularity in neutral countries. Our
vigorous publicity in demanding justice for the Belgians who were between the millstones o f a blockade
and an army o f occupation met with a limited amount of enthusiasm from both the British and German
governments. Neither we nor the governments concerned were dumb in these matters [of public
relations].’’74 Whatever diplomatic maneuvering notwithstanding, neither wished, if at all possible, to risk
public condemnation over its perceived role in any debacle relating to feeding the Belgians. From the
CRB’s beginning, Hoover understood its success to hinge intimately on the mobilization o f public opinion
to such a degree that neither the Allies nor Germany could afford offending it. Gerard’s strenuous and
successful efforts to get correspondents and photographers into occupied Belgium indicated his •
appreciation o f the point, as well.75 By late 1915, when pressure for twentieth-century total war in England
grew to overwhelm her nineteenth-century humanitarian sentiments, the CRB and its relief mission were
firmly grounded. Its efforts were broadly and actively supported by American public opinion, and the
political costs in hindering its operations had grown too great to be dismissed—particularly by the Allied
governments, who remained especially dependent on American arms, money, and food.76 In all this,

72 Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters o f Walter H. Page. 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page
& Company, 1923), 1: 399-400.
73 Von Bemstorff, Mv Three Years, p. 33.
74 Herbert Hoover, Memoirs, p. 161.
75 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-40, E.M. Patterson to Gerard, 23 November 1914.
76 Nash. L ife o f Hoover, pp. 182 and 193-194.
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Ambassador Gerard and his embassy played an important role as a key diplomatic patron, just as they
found themselves mired in public relations considerations in their efforts on behalf o f British POWs.
A series o f correspondence between Gerard and Baron Newton o f the British Foreign Office
reveals the extent to which public relations had become an important factor in the new diplomacy. The
embassy’s reports of POW camp conditions in Germany played an important role in sustaining AngloAmerican relations. Their work helped reassure the apprehensive English people that their soldiers were
being well treated, even against frequent and exaggerated reports to the contrary.77 Embassy reports were
issued to the British Foreign Office and direct, personal correspondence kept up with its superior officials,
like Sir Horace Rumbold, Lord Robert Cecil (Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), and Baron
Newton. O f his representations on behalf o f British POWs, Gerard kept the Foreign Office and Newton
(privately) informed, making confidential suggestions as to an appropriate response on issues as they
arose.78 In mid-January, 1916, an issue flared up in which the Germans began punishing British POWs for
refusing to work in German munitions factories. Were the situation made public, Lord Grey’s personal
indignation would have paled next to inflamed popular wrath. With the potential hanging in the balance of
public opinion easily driving the government to reluctantly retaliate in consequence, Gerard gained
permission to use the possibility to bargain the German government into promptly ceasing the practice,
releasing any POWs imprisoned over the issue, and giving assurances against such work or “other labor
closely connected with the operations of war.”79 Thus, did prospects o f fiery public sentiment directly
motivate Gerard’s intercession and thwart a diplomatic stumble.
That summer, the embassy again became the focus of a public relations-sensitive matter, this time
concerning POW camp conditions. In May, leaks o f Gerard’s “very disquieting” reports to London of
unacceptably meager camp rations at the largest civilian intern camp,, Ruhleben, and elsewhere, had
worked up public opinion by June until “there is [now] a widespread belief that our people [POWs and
civilian detainees] are starving.” Additionally, complaints over the lack of mail from Ruhleben had further

77 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-16, Edward Lowe to.Gerard, 30 April 1915.
78 Gerard Papers, Folder 17-16, Baron Newton to Gerard, 16 August 1916, makes this clear.
79 Gerard Papers, Folder 15-1, Lord Cecil to Gerard, 16 January 1916.
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stirred up great suspicion that “s[omething] has gone wrong there.”80 While recent reports from Lithgow
Osborne o f nothing out of the ordinary had allayed some fears, British officials predicted an unavoidable
demand by the public for retaliation and great difficulty for the government in successfully opposing it. In
late June, reports from Gerard became “very ominous” and brought to fever-pitch official apprehensions of
a public outcry. A final Cabinet decision only delayed publication o f the most recent report on Ruhleben,
but the Foreign Office expected its eventual disclosure to “certainly arouse a storm when it does come out.”
To help forestall plummeting public opinion, the British quickly urged Gerard.to extract a German
agreement, at least o f the principle, to their recent proposal to exchange one-for-one all civilians detainees
over the age o f forty-five. A public announcement o f such an understanding, Baron Newton explained,
“would go some way towards easing the [public relations] situation.”81
The British greatly desired publication o f the contents o f embassy camp inspection reports, hoping
it would allow the English public to better judge the sensitive POW situation against the frequent wild
rumors. At the least, they wanted to publish Gerard’s despatches to air evidence o f his active skirmishing
on behalf of England’s POWs and thereby help assuage demands for recriminations. The State
Department, however, continued to withhold permission from the exasperated British out o f concern for
appearing unneutral, despite mounting pressure to suborn full discretion to Gerard over which reports
might be published.

82

Pending its approval (which never came), Gerard’s exertions made no immediate

gains, as the Germans continued to dawdle in responding to the British proposal and British public feeling

'

grew ever more severe. Finally, the government felt compelled to make official threats o f retaliation if the
Germans did not improve the food rations at Ruhleben and by early July, the Cabinet was considering
reprisals in earnest. Baron Newton reminded Gerard that England could easily reduce the rations o f the
26,000 German civilians interned in Great Britain to the Ruhleben-level and could also intern the 12,000
other German males still permitted to remain at large. Despite Gerard’s representations on this and other

80 Gerard Papers, Folder
81 Gerard Papers, Folder
82 Gerard Papers, Folder
33, McCarthy to Gerard,

17-16, Baron Newton
to Gerard, 6 June 1916.
17-16, Baron Newton to Gerard, 21 June 1916.
17-16, Baron Newton
to Gerard, 28
June1916 and 12 July 1916; and Folder 1613 October 1916.
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points, the Germans not only perplexingly dragged their feet on Ruhleben and the exchange proposition,83
but some officials actually began obstructing the embassy’s camp visitation rights. During the rest o f the
summer, as the British government held the public at bay, the ambassador persisted in working the issue in
Berlin. He continued pressuring the Germans for agreement to the British proposal.84 He moved to gain
the removal of two particular Ruhleben camp officials implicated in the obstructions and to insist on right
o f access to Ruhleben and other camps.8’ The British government waited anxiously, but then in late July
came the execution o f a British prisoner named Fryatt, which “appearefd] to be the limit” of English
tolerance. While the Cabinet would ultimately decide, public opinion would almost certainly insist on
some retaliatory measure.86 Only with difficulty did it managed to contain popular enmity on the issue
until near Christmas, when the Germans at last agreed to the exchange,87
This episode in the interminable dispute over POW camp conditions and prisoner exchanges
played out against a backdrop of public sentiment. A balance had to be struck between attempting to
compel improvements in the camps, but not overly inciting the English people into making
counterproductive demands. On the other hand, the threat o f public wrath forcing the government’s hand
could serve as effective leverage. Either way, the sway of public opinion had to be heeded in this fresh era
o f mass communication and popular suffrage. Gerard and his embassy confronted this latest spin to
American diplomacy in their international dealings on behalf o f British POWs and civilian interns. In the
midst of world conflict, public relations dawned as an essential consideration for effective diplomacy, a
point the ambassador meanwhile was learning on a much more personal note.
In early 1916, even as Bolsheviks, proto-Nazis, and fascists were awakening into ultimately the
most sophisticated, if not brutal, state propaganda regimes ever devised, the American ambassador to
Berlin fell prey to a propaganda smear campaign. Conducted by the small membership o f a shadowy front
organization called the “League o f Truth,” the campaign attacked the United States, Wilson, and Gerard, in
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*

They retained serious reservations over certain conditions attached to the British proposal. Gerard
Papers, Folder 17-16, Baron Newton to Gerard, 5 July 1916.
84 Gerard Papers, Folder 17-16, Baron Newton to Gerard, 19 July 1916.
85 Gerard Papers, Folder 17-16, Baron Newton to Gerard, 26 July 1916.
8" Gerard Papers, Folder 17-16, Baron Newton to Gerard, 2 August 1916.
8/ Gerard Papers, Folder 17-16, Baron Newton to Gerard, 27 September 1916; and Folder 18-33, undated
Gerard notes, probably for a report to Wilson, Lansing, or House.
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an all out effort to discredit America’s neutral policies. The League’s program opened innocuously enough
in January, 1916, when it displayed in the most conspicuous place in Berlin (a prominent statue of
Frederick the Great) a sizable wreath with the American flag bound in mourning. A large inscription read,
“Wilson and his press do not represent America,” but despite the embassy’s official protests, for three
months the wreath remained in place under winter skies.

88

The League followed this up with hoisting the

American flag draped in black crepe and distributing copies o f the U.S. Declaration o f Independence
ominously stamped with a Satanic black cross and blood-red hand.89 Its short-lived, German-language
newspaper, P er Bindestrich (“The Hyphen”), the English-language Continental Times, and various
pamphlets and circulars issued in both languages soon began spreading various fabricated propaganda
themes: Gerard had betrayed the German-supported, Irish rebel, Sir Roger Casement. Gerard’s blatant
anti-Germanism had so tainted America’s neutral credibility, that U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Henry
Morgenthau would soon replace him.90 Gerard even headed the “englischen Spionenneste’ allegedly
infesting the R eich.91 Meanwhile, League members were writing and cabling protests to prominent
American officials, like Senator O ’Gorman.92 By summer, the League’s smear campaign had helped
hasten America’s fall from being friendly neutrals to “the most hated people in Germany,”93 and a vigorous
response by Washington and the embassy grew imperative.
“Allowing them longer to poison the air without rebuke was taken as a sign o f weakness here,”
charged Gerard. “No one who abuses his own country, its government or its ch ief,” he resolved, “is
entitled to protection from that country.”94 With this, Gerard’s counteroffensive began. The embassy
started actively taking up the passports o f Americans who in any way slandered or defamed the
ambassador, the President, or the United States; in at least one case, it brought pressure to bear by routing

88 Gerard Papers, Folder 18-17, Gerard to Lansing, undated.
89 Gerard Papers, Folder 17-13, Neumann-Hofer to Gerard, 20 June 1916 and undated.
90 Gerard Papers, Folder 17-27, Polk to Gerard, 4 May 1916.
91 Gerard Papers, Folder 16-25, Gerard to Secretary o f State (Lansing), dated 1916; Folder 17-13, affidavit
by Frau Annie Neumann-Hofer,, dated 14 June 1916; Folder 18-13, affida vits o f George A. Taylor, dated 6
and 7 June 1916.
92 Gerard Papers, Folder 17-25, Phillips to Gerard, 10 May 1916.
93 Mounting animus in Germany over the submarine issue and America’s continued armaments sales to the
Allies played prominent parts also in this decline of American stature.
94 Gerard Papers, Folder 14-16, Gerard “Diary” (originally a letter intended for President Wilson), dated
July, 1915.

personal mail through the embassy and holding it.95 Gerard wrote editorials for German newspapers like
the National-Zeituns, to fight the League’s false accusations. He sent a statement o f denial, as well, to the
State Department for publication in America, thence Europe.96 But such direct tactics proved insufficient
to the task. The League’s multi-pronged offensive could happen only with German officialdom’s
toleration--or, as Gerard came to understand, its connivance. The editor o f the League’s main organ, the
daily Continental Times, at one point told Gerard he received considerable financial support from the
German Foreign Office, which agreed to buy many thousands of copies o f each issue. Gerard also knew
the German Government had allowed the League use o f their wireless, from which he concluded they had
“probably managed to get this story to America.” And at least one of the founders, Edwin Emerson, was in
the pay of the Foreign Office, having received from Ambassador von Bem storff at least one payment for
fifteen hundred dollars soon after the League’s establishment.97 The ambassador, therefore, complained
heatedly, but vainly, to von Jagow of Wilhelmstrasse-supported, League-inspired articles and editorials.98
But as he knew the League served hidden masters, so he concluded the situation obliged less conventional
countertactics.
Early on, Gerard successfully enlisted a spy inside the League to collect intelligence on not only
the League, but also the entire local American colony in Berlin.99 By early summer, his man produced a
series o f enlightening background and current-activity investigative reports on a variety o f German and
American individuals and organizations.100 Gerard, meanwhile, retained a German attorney to examine
pursuing legal action in the German court system against the League and its founders. Testimonial

95 Grew, Turbulent Era. 1: 206-207, Grew to Edward Bell, 6 July 1915.
96 Gerard Papers, Folder 17-25, Phillips to Gerard, 17 May 1916; and Gerard to Phillips, 7 June 1916.
97 Gerard Papers, Folder 18-17, Gerard to Lansing, undated..
98 Gerard Papers, Folder 16-17, Gerard to von Jagow, 9 May 1916. Gerard derided Edwin Emerson’s
recent Continental Times article condemning the ambassador and puts forth that von Bem storff paid
Emerson $1,500 in April, 1915, “for expenses.” Folder 17-23, Gerard to O ’Ryan, 31 July 1916.
99 Gerard Papers, Folder 18-13, Taylor to Winslow, 2 December 1916; and Folder 18-17, Winslow to
Gerard, 2 October 1916.
100 Including Herr Richards, the proprietor o f a restaurant at which an alleged embassy staff scandal
occurred; the German-American Trade League; the League o f Truth, of course, and its principal American
and German members; and a former League office secretary. Gerard Papers, Folder 18-13, series of
correspondence and reports from Taylor to Gerard, dated through summer, 1916.
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affidavits from former and current office secretaries,101 and important League associates ultimately
provided insufficient evidence for a case;102 but the effort had put the League under uncomfortable
scrutiny. Eventually, Gerard coopted several of the League, including hiring an ex-secretary to help begin
a counter “League o f Friendship” and a newspaper to help combat the League o f Truth’s propaganda.
And, finally, in a classic foreshadowing of later,“totalitarian method, the ambassador even sketched the plot
o f a propagandistic play, as he prepared to escalate the fight in this new age o f “total diplomacy.” 103 While
Gerard effectively neutralized the League by early fall, 1916, by then its job was done. Despite his efforts
to improve them, Gerard’s poor official and public reputations suffered until the break in relations that
winter.104 His experience with modem propaganda and public affairs reflected yet another encounter
between a nineteenth-century diplomat and twentieth-century diplomacy’s changed character. Even so,
Gerard had shown impressive resourcefulness in tackling the League’s assault, and, in doing so, he
. illustrated the renewed importance o f an old, though neglected, facet of modem American diplomacy. To
really know one’s enemy, timely, accurate knowledge was key.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

Gerard’s efforts to gather information on the League of Truth reflected yet another now-urgent
task for American diplomats: intelligence collection. Allowed to wither in the nation’s decades of
isolation, so ancient an undertaking abruptly assumed grave, modem relevance. To play the new public
relations game, to gauge domestic sentiments, to discern official in-fighting, to measure war efforts and

101 Gerard Papers, Folder 17-13, affidavit by Frau Annie Neumann-PIofer, dated 14 June 1916; Folder 1812, affidavits by Taylor and Miss Gaese, dated 8 June 1916.
102 The associate revealed deeper connections with German officialdom, in that one ringleader claimed he
had obtained his contact list of Americans from the President o f the German Police in Berlin; that he had
Under Secretary of State Zimmermann “in der Hand;” and that the Foreign Office facilitated the League’s
mail postings to America. Gerard Papers, Folder 17-40, two affidavits by Wilhelm Redl, dated 4 and 5
June 1916.
1<b Gerard Papers, Folder 17-13, Neumann-Hofer to Gerard, 20 June 1916 and undated. The latter also
offered further evidence of official German connivance in the League o f Truth.
104 In the meantime, his terrible sensitivity to appearing pro- or anti-German had grown so aggravated, that
in his search for a new personal secretary in America, he eventually nixed the top choice, Miss Lillian
Schoedler, on account of her surname. Gerard Papers, Folder 18-5, Sheridan to Gerard, 25 October 1916;
and Folder 18-12, Schoedler to Gerard, 31 October and 10 November 1916.
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war aims, to formulate diplomatic initiatives and help time them—these critical undertakings o f wartime
and twentieth-century diplomacy required regular, accurate, and timely information on which to base
decisions. America’s lazy, pre-war efforts had left the country’s decision-makers in the dark in the
summer o f 1914, with Wilson and the State Department clamoring for information as a dangerous, new
century dawned. Intelligence collection suddenly became an imperative component o f American
diplomatic work, as the experience o f the country’s Berlin legation showed.
The Gerard embassy seemingly exhausted every avenue in its attempts to keep its finger on
Germany’s pulse. In pursuing its difficult wartime policy o f neutrality, Washington could know o f internal
conditions only through four primary sources: infrequent presidential emissaries like Colonel House;
occasional travelers, such as businessmen, diplomats, and seamen; biased, Ally-censored news reportage
and, later, a trickle from equally biased, German-censored sources; and, finally, through front-line
'diplomatic listening posts, with London, Berne, and Berlin standing highest in importance—the last,
perhaps most. In theory, then, Gerard embassy reports o f internal politics, state matters, and popular mood
would figure prominently in American executive decision-making; at the least the State Department
desired to be kept informed.
The embassy availed itself o f the more obvious sources of information, o f course. Normal contacts
with the rest o f Berlin’s diplomatic corps and German officials in the Foreign Office and the military were
routinely consulted. Gherardi, the embassy’s naval attache, proved particularly valuable, according to
historian Waldo Heinrichs, as his “sources o f information at the Admiralty provided a surer gauge o f the
pressure there for unrestricted submarine war,” 105 the critical issue between America and Germany
throughout the neutrality period. Visits by embassy military attaches to the various fronts provided at least
some perspective regarding the German military situation, troop dispositions, and morale.106 Other staff
members regularly toured the empire on official business and soon began combing domestic news sources

105 Heinrichs, American Ambassador, p. 30.
106 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-8, Kuhn to Gerard, 2 May 1915 and 17 July 1915. In the summer o f 1915, for
instance, Military Attache Major Joseph E. Kuhn toured the Eastern Front headquarters and various
Western Front sectors during a major French-British offensive that began in early May. He assessed them
at one point as “so well in hand that it does not appear possible for them to be dislodged.” Routed to
Gerard, Kuhn’s observations certainly found their way into Gerard’s assessments and on to Washington,
possibly informing the timing of American diplomatic and peace initiatives.
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in their efforts to follow internal developments.107 American consular agents also frequently directed news
and potentially valuable contacts to the embassy.108 Gerard himself was “well in a position to keep the
Department intelligently informed as to the general situation, the character and influence of officials, etc.,”
according to Grew. “He often talks with the higher officials at the Foreign Office, meets and keeps in
touch with other influential persons, discusses affairs with bankers, politicians and officials and, in general,
keeps his hand on the pulse of governmental and public opinion. He continually has prominent persons at
his table and he spends the entire morning and part of the afternoon receiving visitors, which should keep
him well in touch with affairs which I presume he reports upon fully.” 109 The ambassador took routine
advantage of social contacts with German and American prominents and businessmen in Germany, as
when he attended a Thanksgiving dinner in his honor. Hosted by Consul-General Robert F. Skinner and

d* • Prior to the war, the State Department stuck to its traditional policy o f non-entanglement in Europe and
’•did not encourage comprehensive political reporting by its diplomats; consequently, reporting the press
iwas a chore which Grew felt he might neglect when pressed for time. Heinrichs, American Ambassador, p.
*21. Very early on, Gerard received an offer for the services o f Klose & Seidel Newspaper Extracts Bureau,
which specialized in providing abstracts and extracts from a large number o f German newspapers. Gerard
Papers, Folder 6-6, Klose & Seidel to Gerard, 6 October 1913. Gerard declined, but it is uncertain whether
he reconsidered a year later. '
.
108 For example, probably connected to the League of Truth’s defamation campaign in the spring, 1916,
Consular Agent J. Buck reported to Gerard a curious encounter onboard an Atlantic steamer with two
American men. They had insinuated that a press campaign would soon open up in America to effect
Gerard’s nonretention as ambassador. Buck reported the event to tire director o f the Consular Service,
Wilbur Carr, but finally reported to Gerard when he noted a recent “public press attack” against Gerard in
the German press. Gerard Papers, Folder 14-43, Buck to Gerard, undated but early 1916. In May, 1916,
American Consul in Basel Philip Holland sent Gerard a recent edition of the Basler Anzeizer. a
“Germanophile paper...recognized here as the official German organ for propaganda,” which recently ran
an attack on Gerard. Gerard Papers, Folder 16-14, Holland to Gerard, 1 May 1916. In late December, 1914,
for example, T. St. John Gaffney, American Consul General in Munich, sent a letter o f introduction to
Berlin with a Mr. Noeggerath, who “has recently made a trip through Belgium and I think you would be
very much interested in his report as to conditions there.”108 The next June, he sent another introduction
with Westpoint-graduate Mr. Henry J. Reilly, now o f The Chicago Tribune, who “has been at the front in
France and will undoubtedly have some interesting information to give you.” Gerard Papers, Folder 12-24,
St. John Gaffney to Gerard, 7 June 1915.
109 Grew’s professional mind detected a potentially difficult flaw, however. Gerard adopted the method of
“reporting what he gathers and what he himself thinks, in private and confidential personal letters written
weekly to Mr. Lansing and Colonel House, the latter for eventual perusal by the President. Copies o f these
letters are not kept on file in the Embassy and he does not show them to or discuss them with any of us, nor
does he invite advice or suggestions in preparing them...The only difficulty is that I and the other members
o f the staff do not know just what ground has been covered by the Ambassador... [and this practice...could
affect the Embassy unfavorably...in case he should at any time go away [or otherwise become
incapacitated] and leave a secretary in charge, in which event the secretary would not have had the benefit
o f the information which the Ambassador had acquired through the advantages o f his position and would
enter upon his chargeship under a handicap,” as happened that fall. Grew, Turbulent Era. 1: 218-219,
Grew to Phillips, 22 February 1916.
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the American Club in Hamburg, Gerard had a prime “opportunity to meet a considerable number of
[America’s] most active businessmen [in Germany].110 Visiting important persons, for whom the embassy
often arranged meetings with German officials, provided further insights. Herbert Hoover, Colonel House,
and others discussed with Gerard their conferences.
Gerard also exploited other sources of information to an unusual degree. From the start, he
maintained very close contact with the American corps of foreign correspondents in Berlin. During the
important months leading up to the war, Frederic William Wile, who represented the New York Times, the
Chicago Tribune, and the London Daily Mail, provided important intelligence to Gerard on a variety o f
matters. Gleaned through his contacts, Wile gave inside information of sentiments and incidents in the
German Foreign Office,111 and was careful to draw Gerard’s attention to developments and mood in the
German press.' 12 He often alerted Gerard to the transient presence in Berlin of prominent individuals
worthy of contact, about whom Wile would politely tip-off, “lest you may not already have gotten it
through your own Intelligence Department.” 113 Franz Hugo Krebs, the McClure Newspaper Syndicate’s
exclusive interviewer and special features writer in Berlin, was a wellspring o f information from audiences
with Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, the influential Count Talleyrand, and other important German
officials.114 United Press correspondent Carl W. Ackerman also retained close connections with Gerard,
with whom he apparently informally discussed the war and Germany and otherwise served as one more

110 Skinner went on to note, “The American Club in Hamburg is composed exclusively of American
citizens at the head o f large undertakings, and I am inclined to think that it would be useful to you,
hereafter, to come into touch with them, and also to meet the gentlemen prominent in [German] public and
business life...” Gerard Papers, Folder 7-5, Skinner to Gerard, 7 October 1913; Winslow to Skinner,
undated.
111 For example, the “Dewey incident,” in Gerard Papers, Folder 11-16, Wile to Gerard, 20 February 1914.
112 For example, in July, 1914, Wile wrote how “the German Press is at the moment devoting unusually
much space to roasting our diplomatic service,” with amateur Minister in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia,
Charles J. Vopicka, cited with others “as horrible examples.” Wile referred to specific papers’ editions
worthy o f Gerard’s review, humbly suggesting, “with your usual vigilance, to let the [State] Department
know about these things.” Gerard Papers, Folder 11-16, Wile to Gerard, 10 July 1914.
113 In June, 1914, for example, came the editor of The New York Times; and in the month before the war,
Wile alerted Gerard of the arrival o f the noted observer and writer on German naval affairs, von Lengerke
Meyer, whom Wile was “trying to coax” into talking on his “views about the necessity o f a definite naval
programme on [current] German lines”—ironically, a key contributing factor in the coming conflagration.
Wile left soon after the war’s outbreak. Gerard Papers, Folder 11-16, Wile to Gerard, 9 June and 6 July
1914.
114 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-7, Krebs to Gerard, series o f requests for audience with Gerard, variously
dated spring, 1915.
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knowledgeable sounding board for the ambassador.115 Very likely, Gerard did what he possibly could for
New York World correspondent, Herbert B. Swope, who sought the ambassador’s assistance in the matter
o f attending a German Foreign Office-arranged visit for foreign journalists to the Western Front.116
Certainly as mindful o f their public relations value as o f their information flow, Gerard’s careful
cultivation o f the American press soon established him as one of only two diplomats abroad, “who have
won the approval o f the newspaper fraternity.” 117
His esteem extended to the native press, as well. Influential German newspapermen, like Paul R.
Krause, o f the Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, helped Gerard with important connections and provided detailed,
native observations of current sentiments among both the populace and high-level government officials.
His expositions found Gerard’s ear on future peace and the roles of Gerard and Wilson in facilitating
friendly relations until the right “psychological time” came.118 In May, 1916, Max W. Karstensen, special
correspondent for the “highly influential” Munchener Zeitung. approached Gerard as an intermediary from
the highest political interests of the royal inner circle in independent-minded Bavaria. Assiduously
cultivating good ties with Gerard, Karstensen eventually introduced him to the wealthiest and most
politically influential men in South Germany, including possibly the King o f Bavaria. Karstensen even
actively countered “the circulation of reports which are detrimental both to your and our own intentions,”
and otherwise advised Gerard in his contacts in the southern kingdom.

119

Closer to home, more unusual avenues brought intelligence to Wilhelmsplatz 7. Gerard evidently
promoted contact with Herr Louis Adlon, owner o f Berlin’s grand Hotel Adlon, a nest of intrigue
frequented by prominent German officials, military men, diplomats, newspapermen, and expatriates.120

115 Gerard Papers, Folder 14-24, Ackerman to Gerard, 5 October 1916.
116 Gerard Papers, Folder 11-2, Swope to Gerard telegram, 3 October 1914.
117 In mid-June, 1914, close friend, prominent New York City attorney, and newspaper contributor, John C.
Flammond, also noted to Gerard with satisfaction of “how popular you hafve] become with the
newspapermen [in Germany].” Gerard Papers, Folder 9-8, Hammond to Gerard, 18 June 1914.
118 Gerard Papers, Folder 13-9, Krause to Gerard, 8 April and 20 June 1915.
119 Gerard Papers, Folder 16-23, Karstensen to Gerard, 14 May and 8 July 1916.
120 Gerard’s eyes and ears, Adlon politely advised the ambassador in October, 1914, o f recent information
concerning German staff personnel assignments. Adlon had spoken with Oberleutnant Trutzschler von
Falkenstein, “who informed me that he will keep his position as Adjutant to His Excellency General von
Boehn, the [n]ew Kommandant o f Berlin.” Gerard’s unlikely informant concluded his short note,
“Assuring Your Excellency that I shall always take great pleasure o f being o f service to you...” Gerard
Papers, Folder 7-36, Adlon to Gerard, 13 October 1914.
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The ambassador often received anonymous information, which he considered “usually quite correct in [its]
‘dope’,” although it is difficult to say what level of confidence he otherwise assigned to it.121 In mid
summer, 1915, another odd source o f intelligence emerged from the w ar’s chaos, when an “extraordinarily
interesting ‘find’ “ made its way through the embassy’s front doors. A sixteen-year-old sailor from Seattle,
Washington, sought assistance in returning home after a German submarine had sunk his ship and taken
him aboard. There he spent the next eleven days as she plied the waters until exhausting her ammunition,
and key among considerable and enlightening information was his confirmation that not once did the
commander sink a vessel without prior w am ing-a major point of dispute in America’s on-going tensions
over Germany’s submarine warfare.

122

A dubious episode late the same year illustrated the means to which

Gerard conceivably reached in his hunt for information. That month from Germany, New York National
Guard Captain Edwin Emerson dramatically resigned his commission in protest, charging “that
Ambassador Gerard committed the gross impropriety of asking me to violate my pledges o f honor toward
the German General Staff by furnishing secret information of my possible observations at the German front
to him in the form of apparently harmless field postal cards, which were to be written by me in a text
i containing a cypher of Mr. Gerard’s own devising.” 123 In so many ways did Gerard’s embassy attempt to
ferret out useful information to report back to Washington. But, in the midst o f shifting diplomatic and
technologic paradigms, different challenges faced both ends o f the line. A new State Department was
taking shape and, along with it, new work relations with its posts in the field.

121 Gerard Papers, Folder 12-46, Gerard to House, 3 August 1915.
122 Evidently believing him to be German, the crew released him once back in port. Commander Gherardi,
the embassy’s naval attache, “found him intelligent from a technical point o f view and we learned more
about the interior and working o f a German submarine than has probably ever before been learned by any
Naval Attache or other foreigner.” Grew, Turbulent Era. 1: 209-210, Grew diary, 30 July 1915.
,l2j Emerson’s regular occupation was a news syndicate representative on assignment to Berlin. In early
1915 he became a co-founder o f the League of Truth. Referring to an attached letter o f complaint to
Secretary o f State Lansing, Emerson, in his military capacity, evidently had somehow contrived to attend a
visit to the frontlines as an official observer. “O f course I refused indignantly...I was all the more
astounded at such a breach o f propriety from Ambassador Gerard considering Gerard was himself a past
National Guard officer.” The matter fell on deaf ears, while Emerson and the League o f Truth would soon
give Gerard major headaches. Gerard Papers, Folder 12-18, Emerson to O’Ryan, 22 December 1915.
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NEW RELATIO NS W ITH A NEW STATE D EPARTM ENT

As the telegraph and telephone removed generals from the front ranks to control and follow their
armies from distant headquarters, l24.so too did their technology, at least potentially, make possible an
unprecedented coherence of action and policy between the State Department and its distant corps o f
representatives. Especially in the face of a bare decade’s worth of grudging reform being buffeted in the
stormy seas of total diplomacy, two questions are begged. Caught together in a shift o f diplomatic and
technologic paradigms and meanwhile transitioning towards diplomatic professionalism, what was the
wartime status o f the essential relationship between Washington and her embassies abroad? And how well
did the State Department and the embassies weather the new century’s novel demands? As the Gerard
; embassy reflected the diplomatic paradigm shift in its personnel, the procurement o f its housing, and its
•work, so too did it reflect the concurrent technology-driven shift in frame o f reference with regard to policy
formulation.
Ironically, in the late nineteenth-century, American opponents o f permanent diplomacy argued the
. very advances in communication and technology provided adequate substitutes. The Atlantic Cable in
1866 allegedly “allowed a minister of foreign affairs, with the telegraphic wire under his hand, [to] treat
with the same functionary of another state almost as if the two sat on each side o f a table.” 125 Transoceanic
cables, improvements in steamship propulsion, “and other elements of progress,” according to another
observer, “have rendered ministers abroad trifling, expensive, and useless for every purpose o f national
comity, interest, and glory.” 126 While certainly exaggerated, the statements still contained considerable
truth.
As early as 1861, diplomats were appreciating the impact o f rapid.telegraphic communication
with their Foreign Office-based superiors. Most disturbing seemed the decrease in the heretofore isolated

124 Stephen Kern, The Culture o f Time and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1983), p. 317.
125 Albert Rhodes, “Our Diplomats and Consuls,” Scribners, XIII (December, 1876), p. 175, quoted in
Warren Frederick Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States. 1779-1939: A Study in
Administrative History (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1961), p. 20.
126 Samual S. Cox, The Folly and Cost o f Diplomacy (Washington, 1874), p. 6, quoted in Ilchman,
Professional Diplomacy, pp. 20-21.
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diplomat’s traditional autonomy and powers o f discretion. That year, British envoy Sir Arthur Buchanan
observed, that “it reduces, to a great degree, the responsibility of the minister, for he can now ask for
instructions instead o f doing a thing on his own responsibility.”

127

The point’s truth had become only more

manifest by the time o f Horace Rumbold’s assertion at the turn of the century. But also as evident, it
obtained only if the superiors were fluent in foreign affairs and adroit in coordinating them from afar—
conditions largely absent at the other end of Gerard’s telegraph line. As a politically appointed amateur,
James Watson Gerard has been condemned by some as an ineffective diplomat, failing to report
developments accurately or fully.128 While deserving without question some o f the criticism, Gerard’s
hurdles were unusually high. Preeminent among them were the communications restrictions inside
Germany and the overwhelmed State Department and policy-makers inside Washington. The embassy’s
performance must be considered in perspective under the light of a department and White House
themselves adapting to the changing diplomatic paradigm and then frantically adjusting to the pace-setting
"demands of world conflict. Despite the advances in the embassy’s communications and the expected
improvement in overall foreign policy formulation, execution, and coordination, improvements in the
relationship between the field and Washington did not so easily follow the shifting paradigm.
While the State Department posed its own encumberments to the country’s foreign policy process,
a critical obstacle to its effectiveness was the policy formulation “team.” Through Gerard’s time, it must be
remembered, American foreign policy was formulated exclusively in Washington, not in the field. Wilson
was the first president to exercise fully the power of executive leadership and control over American
diplomacy. Ideally, the President and Secretary o f State together determined the country’s course after
thorough counsel by other Cabinet members and experts in the State Department. In reality Wilson
remained the primary architect with inputs by Bryan, and more frequently by his replacement, Lansing.

127 From “Report from the Select Committee on the Diplomatic Service,” 1861, cited in D.P. Heatley,
Diplomacy and the Study of International Relations (Oxford, 1919), p. 252, quoted in Kern, Culture of
Time, p. 274.
128 For comprehensive reviews and assessments of Gerard’s performance, see John Lawrence Herberich’s
“James Watson Gerard: The Forgotten Ambassador” (Master’s thesis, Department o f History, San Jose
State University, 1976); Theodore R. Berthold’s “Assignment to Berlin: The Embassy o f James Watson
Gerard, 1913-1917” (Doctoral dissertation, Department of History, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA,
1981); and Martin V. M elosi’s “American Amateur Diplomats during the Administrations o f Woodrow
Wilson: An Evaluation” (Master’s thesis, Department of History, University o f Montana, 1971).

Wilson held small regard for State Department bureaucrats and diplomats, even those he appointed. His
many amateur appointees received essentially no instruction prior to leaving for their posts and their
reports received nearly as little attention from Wilson. Rare exceptions were made when they amused him,
as with Walter Hines Page’s witty correspondence, or they supported his position. He considered the
diplomats and almost all members o f the State Department as unimportant in the formulation o f American
foreign policy, viewing in true nineteenth-century fashion the department and the diplomatic service as
peopled with mediocrity at best. Until the war, when he began to appreciate the diplomatic service’s
import (at least as an information source), Wilson persisted in his earlier voiced opinion o f 1905, that for
diplomats, “There is little o f serious importance to do; the activities are those o f society rather than those of
business; the unimportant things are always at the front; there is no provocation to study; impulses are
cooled and principles are exposed to rust.” 129
■

Matters received scant help from the other half of the policy-formulation mechanism, Wilson’s

Secretary of State Bryan. On the job, the typically disorganized Bryan’s ignorance proved uninspiring, if
not downright frightening. The Secretary received frequent briefings on foreign affairs o f state from.
several high-level consular and diplomatic officials. Wilbur Carr related the predominant perception that
Bryan “seemed hardly to follow a definite line o f thought,” in strong contrast with his predecessors Kriox
and Root. State Counselor John Bassett Moore lamented Bryan’s “apparent inability when present to give
consecutive thought or really intelligent consideration to anything brought before him. He never seemed to
have a reasoned judgment on anything or any real appreciation of what he was doing.” 130 In early 1914, a
close friend complained to Gerard of the President’s decision-making in a vacuum, calling it one of
“Wilson’s great defects,” and condemned Bryan’s non-contribution:
[Wilson’s] confidence is absolute, but he gets practically no advice. So far as I can learn
the only man in the Cabinet who speaks up at all is Garrison. Poor old Doc [Secretary o f
State] Biyan has been eating out of Wilson’s hand so long that he can’t feed himself. I
appreciate [Bryan’s previous service to Wilson on domestic issues], but now o f what
possible use can he be—a man who hasn’t thought a thought probably for 25 years? He is
a feeler, not a thinker, with a moral formula to apply to every situation...131
129 Arthur S. Link,’ Wilson. 6 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947-65. Vol. 1: The Road
to the White House, p. 214.
ij0 Rachel West, The Department o f State on the Eve of the First World War (Athens, GA: The University
o f Georgia Press, 1978), p. 33.
131 Gerard Papers, Folder 8-5, Burlingham to Gerard, 28 April 1914.
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With Bryan’s unfeeling return to spoilsmanship, he already had shown his higher regard for
politics than for the practical organizational health o f his new department. Along with the major shake-up
in the field, back in Washington he also turned out large numbers o f personnel running the State
Department itself and replaced them with men with little knowledge or experience, but much in the way of
partisan support to the Democratic Party. Morale among the remaining employees and diplomats
languished near the bottom as a result. Bryan also displayed little to no facility in wielding the
organization as a unified whole in accomplishing the nation’s objectives abroad, especially after August,
1914. The State Department’s mechanism for.policy formulation (or, at least, advisement) and execution
had begun falling into place over the past ten years, but Bryan remained oblivious to its potential.
The diplomats in the field became soon aware o f the disorganization reigning in Washington.
Within the State Department the order of dissemination ofdispatches and information from representatives
abroad changed frequently depending upon the personnel. Consequently, it was not unusual for cables and
correspondence to fall anonymously into a file cabinet or hide indefinitely at the bottom of an in-basket.

132

Often, no reply came back to routine queries, and sometimes weeks passed before any answer returned on
important matters o f policy. American diplomats naturally followed the department’s lead and soon shied
of communicating with Washington on matters of not much more import than visas and commercial
listings. They refrained from anything more ambitious for fear o f reports getting pigeon-holed, as Grew
experienced in Vienna just prior to his reassignment to Berlin. In a series o f despatches from Vienna
throughout the summer o f 1911, Grew kept the Department informed on Austria’s food riots and tough
economic conditions. Later, Grew returned to Washington on leave and decided to call on the Chief o f the
new Near Eastern Division (under which Austria-Hungary fell) to receive his expected accolades for his
fine reportage. To his dismay, however, he found the Chief with feet on a clean desk and the baseball news
in hand. He had not read or even'seen Grew’s reports—suggesting they probably were in the files. Grew
recalled later, “That was another shattered dream for me!” Eventually, the President himself came to
understand Bryan and the State Department as a collective weak link, leading to his circumvention o f the

132 W est, State on the Eve, p. 107.
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secretary through use o f executive agents, like Colonel House. This in tum adversely affected relations
between the State Department and other foreign offices, exacerbated the field’s estrangement from the
Department, and contributed to the further demoralization of department staff relegated to bystander
status.

133

As a result, in the hands of an antipathetic Wilson and an unenlightened Bryan, the formulation of
policy and its transmission and execution in the field once war began tended to leave diplomats like Gerard
in the dark. This persisted even after Lansing replaced Bryan as Secretary of State in June, 1915, when the
latter resigned over moral objections to Wilson’s tone with the Germans during the Lusitania crisis. “The
underlying problem [for the Wilson Administration after war’s outbreak],” as one student accurately
observed, “ was the difficulty of formulating 20th century policies with 19th century guidelines.”
Patronized, often ignored, typically not privy to high-level decision-making, and usually lacking
.^instructions from State, Gerard often “could only react to each new crisis on the basis of previous official
-responses.” lj4 For the duration of his embassy, Gerard labored under a State Department still ignorant of
keeping the field adequately informed.
■ :

Such poor relations posed little trouble for most the lesser embassies and legations, whose

'.■nineteenth-century diplomatic ways and means-only belatedly entered the crucible o f twentieth-century
pressures. But serious conflicts with the Administration arose for those primary embassies on the front
line, exposed directly to the tumultuous birth of the new century and its new diplomacy. Ambassador to
revolutionary Mexico Henry Lane Wilson, and Walter Hines Page, ambassador to a principal ally (Great
Britain), clashed hardest with the Administration, as did the American ambassadors to two other key
belligerents, Ambassador to Russia, Paul Reinsch, and Gerard. In each o f their cases, the Wilson
Administration reacted differently, though never deviating from an ultimate disregard for the envoy.
Wilson was outright dismissed, Page ignored, Reinsch pacified, and Gerard, finally, neglected, particularly
as regarded keeping him informed on policy and diplomatic developments elsewhere.135 In April, 1916,
Gerard made opportunity to “respectfully point out to the Department that my work here is greatly

U3 Ibid., pp. 3; 95, n. 5; and 34-35.
134 Herberich, “Forgotten Ambassador,” pp. 51 and 74.
I3:> Melosi, “American Amateur Diplomats,” p. 187.

158

handicapped by my lack of information and knowledge of the Administration’s views and intentions.
Ambassadors are expected to be thoroughly au courant o f the situation at home. My information depends
entirely on the censored despatches in the press and I am thus frequently placed in embarrassing situations
in conversation with officials and influential persons in Germany,” he wired. “Respectfully suggest that
this could be obviated by the Department’s cabling me and other Ambassadors a daily resume o f the trend
o f official and public opinion at home regarding important pending questions such as Mexico and the
Submarine [sic] issue marking as strictly confidential such communications as are for our personal
information only.” 136 But, unsurprisingly, Gerard’s entreaties were disregarded.
Even in the midst of crisis, Gerard and his embassy were “insufficiently informed o f [Wilson’s]
intentions and plans during decisive periods.” 137 For example, in the midst o f the Sussex crisis in May,
*1916. Gerard complained to Colonel House, “I wish the State Department would keep me better informed.”
'’He had received information that Washington had made demands for the release by England o f Americans
hi'rested from a ship called the China. Gerard strongly felt knowledge o f the matter would have “been o f
great'assistance” to him as leverage during his climactic late-April demarche at the Kaiser’s Western Front
•headquarters. “When I am getting ‘Sussex’ admissions and changes in submarine war and keeping the
•peace, and cannot get even a pat on the head...I might at least be kept up to date on information vitally
affecting my work. This is a very small kick [back].” Adding further salt to the wound, Wilson’s answer
to-the German note on the Sussex sinking had just arrived at the embassy-simultaneous with its
publication in German newspapers that morning.

138

Evidence elsewhere o f the State Department’s ill-coordinatiori revealed the problem’s systemic
nature. Across the Channel at America’s other principal outpost, Walter Hines Page experienced similar
neglect. At an early 1915 luncheon held by British Field Marshal Sir John French, the host brought up the
matter o f a recent, fourth peace proposal transmitted from the Kaiser to Great Britain via President Wilson,
about which Page had no clue. “Alas!” he complained afterward, “the fact that I know nothing about the

136 United States National Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1910-1929, File 123G31, Gerard cable
to Lansing, No. 3774, 19 April 1916.
lj7 Karl E. Bimbaum, Peace Moves and U-boat Warfare: A Study of Germany’s Policy Towards the
United States. April 18. 1916-Januarv 9. 1917 fStockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1958), pp. 338-339
138 Gerard Papers, Folder 12-46, Gerard to House, 10 May 1916.
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offer has no meaning; for the State Department never informs me o f anything it takes up with the British
Ambassador in Washington.” 139 Likewise, Gerard was unduly hampered in his diplomatic efforts by the
department’s failure to properly harmonize American policies regarding Germany. “The pity o f it,” said
Second Secretary Wilson later, “was he was not always properly supported by the State Department so that
the full results of his vigorous activity could not make themselves felt. Again and again the force of his
presentation o f America’s case was mitigated by soothing words from the Department, duly reported to
Berlin by Ambassador Bemstorff.”140
While greater coordination was now possible with the modem communications technology at its
disposal, the State Department failed to fully exploit the potential. Much o f the reason rested with Old
Diplomacy residues, which portrayed the foreign service as “a subject for humorous contempt” and
•retarded State Department initiative. While the technology was there, the institution had not yet caught up
r'with the shift in diplomatic paradigm. The new diplomacy increasingly demanded efficient formulation and
execution of effective foreign policy. The State Department had only just begun to recognize the
importance of two prerequisites: Timely, reliable intelligence reporting to inform the policy-makers, and
sound coordination, o f the details o f established policy with the field diplomats levied with its
representation. The continued absorption of telegraphic and other technology since 1900; the attempt to
keep the field better and more comprehensively informed through use of regular, circular briefs beginning
around 1908; and the initiation and expansion of the geographical division concept from 1909 onward, all
-served to improve communications between Washington and its representatives abroad. Such reforms
were largely experimental, however, and still in their infancy by 1914. They had insufficient time to
mature before the war, in overtaxing them like everything else, revealed their importance to a concerted
diplomatic strategy. Furthermore, the great pressures and huge volume o f work during the war distracted
the overworked department from its crucial coordination role and forced American diplomacy into a game
of institutional catch-up. Wilson’s personalized approach to international affairs and his preference to keep

139 Burton J. Hendrick. The Life and Letters o f Walter H. Page. 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
Page & Company, 1923), 1: 425 and 429. A few days later on 18 January 1915, Colonel House wrote
Page, explaining he and Wilson had no safe way to inform Page of the proposal.
140 Hugh R. Wilson, The Education o f a Diplomat (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938), p. 171.
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the reins fully in his own hands, if through use of presidential emissaries, posed one possible, though
ultimately inadequate, solution in by-passing what amounted to an anachronistic logjam.
The wartime face o f neutrality during the Gerard embassy in Berlin provided a dramatic presage
o f the new diplomacy. The new century’s complex diplomatic problems, accelerated tempo, and increased
work volume challenged the Gerard embassy and American diplomacy beyond anything previously
encountered. Massive food relief operations became necessary as total war afflicted entire civilian
populations. Neutral protection of belligerent nationals and prisoners o f war, and deportations in occupied
northern France and Belgium injected further urgency to a diplomatic role in international issues o f basic
human rights. Maturing political democracies in Western and Central Europe and, especially, the United
States, combined with new, mass communications technology to once and for all unleash the formidable
political force of Gerard’s bete noir, public relations. The embassy’s work in these novel dimensions of
modem diplomacy paralleled the shift from the old diplomacy to the new and, simultaneously, underscored
the practical advantages and, indeed, essentiality of maintaining a professional diplomatic service.
Irreversibly established by the war in its international involvement, America discovered that the vagaries o f
total diplomacy required expert ability.

THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN SERVICE

Negotiation o f peace treaties, war debt, the rise of Fascism, Bolshevism, Japanese nationalism, the
League o f N ations-all these issues and more on the horizon stood in dire need of professional diplomatic
treatment in the post-war era. With the exorbitant diplomatic demands of the early modem century-a trend
the war made emphatic-embassies like Gerard’s could no longer meet their responsibilities competently
without improved housing, manning, training, experience, and professionalism. The years 1914-1918 had
“a lasting effect on the organization of the diplomatic service and the outlook o f its members,” due in part
to the heavy diplomatic activity during the period of American neutrality.141 Aside from the Stone-Flood

141 Kenneth W. Thompson, American Diplomacy and Emergent Patterns (New York University Press,
1962), pp. 81-82.
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Act of 1915, further moves towards professionalism were delayed by preoccupation with the war. But with
the conflict’s conclusion, efficiency in the American diplomatic (and consular) service--in coordination,
unity o f purpose, organizational cohesion, elimination o f waste—reassumed top priority. The heightened
level o f work levied on the department during the war had set par for the new century bom out o f the
conflict and lessened in no appreciable degree after the armistice in 1918. From the conflict, the United
States emerged as unquestionably the greatest power of all with her strength enhanced enormously, or at
least its long-existing reality made ostensible. America had become inextricably mired in world affairs
and, as Wilbur Carr observed the year after the war’s conclusion, “It does not remain for the United States
to choose whether it shall enter into world affairs. It already has an important part assigned to it, and the
only question that now remains is how efficiently or inefficiently that part shall be performed.” 142
Representative John Jacob Rogers’ legislation largely answered that question.
.i-.-

In drafting what would become the Rogers Act of 1924, the Congressman understood what Carr
and most other observers saw as well. The diplomatic and consular services required thorough reform i f

they were to adequately serve as America’s first line of defense in a considerably more unpredictable and
perilous world:
The machinery of government now provided for dealing with our foreign relations is in
need o f complete repair and reorganization. As adequate as it may have been when the
old order prevailed and the affairs of the world were free from the present perplexities, it
has ceased to be responsive to present needs...Necessity is forcing new nations and even
older ones to incur obligations and form political affiliations having a decisive if not a
supreme bearing on the course of future events. International movements o f such import
can only be correctly judged through an accurate knowledge o f causes and influences and
a complete understanding of the methods and motives involved. American agents in the
foreign field must broaden the scope and intensify the nature o f their work in order that the
Department o f State may have at its disposal knowledge of the actual facts o f every devel
opment or turn o f events. Any degree o f conjecture is fraught with the gravest danger,..143

As the most ambitious reform legislation ever in the history o f the American diplomatic and
consular services, the Rogers Act of 1924 drove major organizational changes. The act unified the two

142 Quote from a Carr report supporting the principle of “consolidation” o f the services, 4 December 1919,
Carr Papers, quoted in Jerry Israel, “ A Diplomatic Machine: Scientific Management in the Department of
State, 1906-1924,” in Building the Organizational Society: Essays on Associational Activities in Modem
America, ed. Jerry Israel (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 190.
143 Stuart, American Practice, p. 185.
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previously separate services into one Foreign Service on an interchangeable basis. An officer now might
transfer between the two service tracks, allowing much greater flexibility and suitability in assignments.
All Foreign Service officers were placed into one o f nine merit-based grades, with all new officers entering
the lowest class after passing the formal examination. The Executive Committee o f the Foreign Service
Personnel Board appeared to screen and examine applicants for the service and to recommend promotions
within the service through a more formalized process. A new Foreign Service School provided more
elaborate and sufficient instruction to new appointees. Whereas formerly the salary scale for diplomatic
secretaries ranged between $2,500 and $4,000, now Foreign Service officers earned from $3,000 (Class
IX) to $9,000 (Class I)-sufficient, for the first time, for a diplomatic secretary to live respectably without
private, supplemental income. Provision also was made for the promotion to the rank o f minister any
Foreign Service officer recommended to the President as exhibiting special ability. The new law offered
.officers so promoted all the benefits o f retirement and disability, which it otherwise now provided for the
lesser, classified ranks with a new Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund. And, among numerous
lesser reforms, the act established for the first time in the diplomatic service a formal inspection system for
examining posts abroad for efficiency, like the consular service had enjoyed since the early years o f the
century.144 At last, the American foreign service stood definitely and permanently outside politics, as the
Rogers Act provided a professional, classified service firmly grounded on a merit basis. Another sign the
next year indicated, too, that a new era had indeed dawned in American diplomacy. Under the new
President Warren G. Harding, for the first time ever, every career diplomat retained his earlier commission
and the traditional submission o f resignations with a change in administration lapsed forever. '45
While the Rogers Act stood as a hallmark in the professional development o f the consular and
diplomatic services, full unification and professionalization o f the United States Foreign Service would

144 In authorizing the Foreign Service School, the Act permitted the assignment o f candidates to the
Department for however long was deemed necessary to provide sufficient instruction. In early 1925, the
first class began a five month-long work period in the Department, which later was extended to seven to
eight months. They heard regular lectures by experts on American foreign policies, economic policies,
political reporting, and electrical communications. They worked from one to three weeks in each o f the
Department’s divisions. Additionally, their period o f instruction included French conversation, quizzes
and study tim e-altogether of vastly greater quality than the earlier thirty-day period’s haphazard
preparation. Ibid., pp. 70, 153-154, and 184-188.
145 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 214.
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require still some refinement. In 1926, Congress passed the Foreign Service Buildings Act, under which
the new Foreign Service Buildings Office assumed central responsibility for the administration o f real
property acquisitions abroad, marking a major move towards solving the permanent diplomatic housing
problem. In 1930, allowances were made at last to chiefs of mission for building rent, light, heat, and fuel,
previously paid for out of pocket. A 1927 scandal over administrative favoritism towards diplomatic
personnel in promotions led directly to the Moses-Linthicum Act of 1931. Further executive
reorganizations and Congressional legislation, like the Reorganization Act o f 1939 and the Foreign Service
Act o f 1946, sought thereafter to remove the Service’s shortfalls and continue its professionalization.
Practices of formal examination, merit promotion, and evaluation o f efficiency were diligently and
successfully refined to best suit the Foreign Service’s dedication to impartially offering a professional
. career to all suitable candidates and convincing the public the Foreign Service was a genuine profession.
, The spirit o f professional careerism, finally, took deep root, as ambassadorial assignments testified. While
in Gerard’s time the number of career appointments to ambassadorships counted an exceptional few,, by
1928 the ratio between career and non-career appointments stood at fifty-fifty. And by 1939, the
. proportion rose further yet to 60% professionals, including such critical posts as Mussolini’s Rome and
: Imperial Tokyo, where Gerard’s former First Secretary, now Ambassador, Joseph C. Grew reigned. Even
Berlin itself warranted a professional, as Gerard’s former Second Secretary, Hugh R. Wilson, followed in
the footsteps of his erstwhile boss to become United States Ambassador to Germany.146

146 Ilchm an. Professional Diplomacy, pp. 212-213 and 229.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: PARADIGM SHIFT, THE GERARD
EMBASSY, AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
W e all suffer much from am ateur diplom ats.1
-- Am bassador James W. Gerard (1916)

[The United States Foreign Service represents] a new order...estab!ished, a new
machine...which is steadily being developed and im proved with a view to serving
Am erican interests...with the greatest possible efficiency and to the greatest possible
effect.2
—U ndersecretary o f State Joseph C. G rew (1925)

By the end o f the First World War, the truth of Gerard’s ironic remark resounded loudly down the
, halls o f the State Department, through the political chambers o f Washington, and across a nation now
indisputably a great political, economic, and military power in a turbulent, Machine Age world. Gerard’s
■Berlin, embassy directly reflected the remarkable paradigm shift that occurred in American diplomacy
around the turn of the century. Beginning in the early 1890s, developments in domestic and international
conditions, and changes in Americans’ perception of those developments, prompted a transformation o f .
paradigm that would continue into the early 1920s. His embassy also reflected the on-going reform of
America’s diplomatic service from nineteenth-century amateurism to modem professionalism in response
to the paradigm shift. Marking the actual beginning o f the twentieth-century, the world war drove home
the essence of the changed paradigm; that, no matter how reluctant, America’s future lay amidst the stormy
landscape of world politics and a global economy in which she played an unconditional role. It established

1 In late 1915, Gerard’s ironic expression of irritation to Secretary of State Lansing related to “some
messages” (contents o f which eluded the ambassador) conveyed from the German Foreign Office back to
President Wilson via newspaper correspondents. Gerard Papers, Folder 13-10, Gerard to Lansing, 28
December 1915.
2 Jerry Israel, “A Diplomatic Machine: Scientific Management in the Department o f State, 1906-1924,” in
Building the Organizational Society: Essays on Associational Activities in M odem America, ed. Jerry
Israel (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 194. From a Grew speech to the American Manufacturers’
Export Association on 9 November 1925.
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the complex and knotty character her relations with fellow sovereigns would assume per force in the new
century. Its extreme demands, meanwhile, laid stark the grave disadvantages and inadequacies o f a non
professional diplomatic service under the new paradigm. New-fashioned international affairs had come to
roost in America and only Daedalian diplomacy might negotiate the shoals. The American foreign service
would largely complete its reform towards professionalization by 1924. A year later, with United States
career diplomacy finally coming into its own, Joseph Grew could issue his declaration. A new paradigm
had replaced the old; and a bygone diplomacy had fallen to the new.
Gerard’s embassy came at the inflection point of the shift between the old and the new paradigms.
During its heyday between 1865 and roughly 1890, the old paradigm was based on Americans’ continued
trust that their isolated nation was free from foreign attack. They remained non-interventionist, as the
country focused on such domestic priorities as post-Civil War reconstruction, settling the West, and
building an immensely successful industrial society. Considering foreign relations unessential to those
priorities, the nation’s leaders largely disregarded international affairs and neglected the country’s
diplomatic and consular services. Republican simplicity stigmatized the diplomats particularly as elitist
and unnecessary, and left the ill-equipped, underfunded services open to spoilsmanship in consequence.
With few exceptions, posts went to party-hacks and misfits, and wealth became a principle criterion for
selection, since meager salaries obliged the amateur diplomat to pay most his considerable expenses out of
pocket. Meanwhile, back in Washington the nation’s “foreign relations” remained relatively simple and of
peripheral concern. Left largely to themselves with no direction or policies issuing from the center, the
field-m issionaries, military officers, ignorant diplomats and consular officers abroad-took the initiative,
.often creating situations to which Washington merely reacted willy-nilly. Actual, formulated foreign
policies remained a thing of the future, as “spasm” predominated over any “system.”
But starting around 1890, several developments conspired to begin shifting the paradigm and,
eventually, the foreign service. The secure conditions and inward focus o f most the nineteenth-century
received three sudden blows, on top o f other more gradual developments. The first blow began in the late
1880s and lasted well into the 1890s, as Americans generally entered into a dark period o f gloom, anxiety,
and loss o f national confidence in their purpose and the country’s future. Their fears and uncertainty soon
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developed with the second and third blows into what historian Richard Hofstedter has termed the “psychic
crisis o f the 1890s.” The country’s decades o f industrialization reaped dramatic dividends by the last
decade o f the century, as production o f manufactured goods skyrocketed and helped fuel an explosive
expansion of the nation’s economy and its foreign trade. In 1893, however, a sudden panic and severe
economic depression befell the country, which would not subside for four, long years until 1897. By then,
a second crisis rose up over perceived threats to America’s current and potential markets abroad-a matter
soon taking on obsessive proportions, as Americans vested foreign trade with great hopes as a vent for the
nation’s superheated economy.
Other, less abrupt developments also further altered conditions and America’s perspective.
Beginning in the last decades o f the century, a revolution in transportation and communications technology
simultaneously expanded America’s national interests, tended new importance to developments abroad,
. and moved potential threats—and markets—closer to the nation’s shores. Meanwhile, Americans
increasingly appreciated the nation’s growing might and influence on its way to imminent world power
status. Together, these several new pressures, changed conditions, and revised perceptions ever more
. forcefully urged a more deliberate, security-minded, trade-protective foreign policy to develop. By
.century’s end, a “policy” approach to international affairs began slowly replacing Washington’s earlier
passivity—the hallmark of the new paradigm.
In response to the shifting paradigm, United States involvement in world affairs quickly gained
steam through the 1890sf with the Spanish-American War finally signaling the country’s earnestness in.
1898. Further evidence testified to the rising importance o f international relations to America, as far-flung
territorial acquisitions from the. war conferred imperial status on her, and threats to Chinese sovereignty
(and potential trade markets there) produced the Open Door notes; as a war in the Philippines sent back
thousands o f American war dead, and the assertive Theodore Roosevelt took the nation into the twentiethcentury. It was only natural that the country’s new, increasingly purposeful, external involvement required
a competent, reliable corps of foreign representatives to serve its widening interests. Thus, a heretofore
amateurish diplomatic service and State Department came under scrutiny and under pressure to reform and
adapt to the new environment.
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Lagging in response to the shifting paradigm and in the wake o f earlier, aborted attempts (as under
Cleveland), the department and the diplomatic service finally began belated efforts to professionalize after
the turn of the century. The fortunately successive Republican administrations o f Roosevelt (1901-1908)
and William Howard Taft (1908-1912) laid a solid foundation, as important executive orders in 1905,
1906, and 1909 effectively removed the consular service from the patronage system, established the
diplomatic service on a merit basis for the first time, and instituted a variety o f other lesser reforms such as
entrance into diplomatic service only after formal examination. At the same time, Roosevelt’s Secretary of
State Elihu Root initiated a major overhaul of the State Department and began reorganizing it for
maximum efficiency in the execution of its duties. A much improved filing system allowed better storage
and retrie val o f correspondence and documents. New diplomatic secretaries endured a thirty-day period of
instruction in the department’s various branches. Perhaps o f greatest significance, Root introduced the first
division of the department along geographical lines. The Division of Far East Affairs successfully
-separated administrative from policy matters and provided regionally-focused expertise against'the
increasingly voluminous and delicate diplomatic issues arising; iterations for other regions soon followed.
Meanwhile, communications technology continued making inroads, as expanded use of telephones and,
.especially, the transoceanic telegraph offered promise for enhanced formulation, coordination, execution,
and control of policy decisions. And the 1911 Lowden Act sought to begin correcting another serious
deficiency in America’s foreign service, the almost complete lack o f permanent diplomatic housing abroad.
Thus, thorough-going reorganization, specialization, and reform efforts under Roosevelt and Taft
undertook the first serious steps towards eventual professionalization of the foreign service.
In 1913, however, the new Democratic administration of Woodrow Wilson made a significant
return to spoilsmanship and patronage under Secretary o f State William Jennings Bryan. By that year,
most diplomatic secretaries, like Grew, Wilson, Spencer, Harvey, and Ruddock, had entered the service
under Republican administrations and recommendations from Republican congressmen. Indeed, many
were of that party, and soon their fears of losing their positions, if not their “careers,” materialized.3 Large

3 Rachel West, The Department o f State on the Eve o f the First World War (Athens, GA: The University
of Georgia Press, 1978), p. 121.
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numbers of diplomats with extensive experience were turned out wholesale along with droves o f veteran
department staffers. Replacing them, a la old diplomacy, were amateurs like James Watson Gerard—
“deserving Democrats” o f little to no experience, but replete with wealth, distinction, and endebting party
service. Now, at last, came the harvest, with political spoils rustled up from the ranks o f diplomatic plum
positions. Much o f the corporate knowledge and experience o f the diplomatic service dissolved away next
to the plummeting morale of the few surviving pre-Wilson officials. Wilson eventually began to rein in
Bryan’s ravages in response to these and other failings, as well as mounting opposition from influential
quarters. The disrupted diplomatic service already had incurred much damage by mid-1914, however, just
on the eve of the ultimate trial that would lay bare the relative merits and demerits o f amateurism versus
professionalism. Appointed ambassador to the German Empire in September, 1913, Gerard spent most of
his tenure (viz. August, 1914 to February, 1917) upholding difficult American neutrality in the capital of a
^princ ipal belligerent in the midst o f the First World War. Emerging from the Roosevelt-Taft advances,
. feeling the. sting of the Wilson retreat, and anticipating the final push to professionalism, his embassy
uniquely reflected both the old and the new paradigms. In its professional staff, housing arrangements,
..gmbassy technology, the quantity and character of diplomatic work it engaged in, and in the status o f its
,relationship with Washington, Gerard’s embassy revealed a shifting paradigm and shifting diplomacy in
every important aspect.
The ambassador and his professional staff themselves reflected the transition, particularly in their
backgrounds, methods o f entry into service, and in their tenures. The politically-appointed Gerard,
selected in large part based on his great wealth and long, loyal service to the Democratic party, represented
the patronage of the old diplomacy. His nearly complete lack of diplomatic experience did not discount
him in the view o f a presidential administration that harkened back to an earlier paradigm by installing a
“useless lieutenant” as its Secretary o f State, who then promptly broke with the previous two
administrations in returning the diplomatic service to spoilsmanship. With the break in relations with
Germany in 1917, Gerard returned to private life, his ambition of securing a prestigious ambassadorship
realized. The large majority of his secretaries, on the other hand, were products of an increasingly
professional, reforming diplomatic service that marked the new diplomacy. Gaining entry into the

•
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diplomatic service after the 1909 institution o f formal oral and written entrance examinations, they spent a
1

newly-required 30-day period in training at the department prior to their first assignment. Increasingly,
they perceived the service in terms o f a career, in contrast to the older secretaries, like Grew, who initially
looked upon diplomacy as an exciting, temporary waypoint to “real” work in business or law. Rushed
through to passage on account of the great wartime difficulties embassies like Gerard’s were encountering,
the Stone-Flood Act o f 1915 only furthered such feelings o f careerism, as it introduced graded, indirectlyinerit-based promotions and allowed more responsive administrative transfers between assignments.
Gerard’s older staff, like First Secretary Grew, displayed in their lengthy, early service, traits o f
both paradigms. His career began as a political appointee at a time when long diplomatic service was a
thing to be marveled at. Over forty years later, he retired with pension after unbroken service had
; successively promoted him finally to ambassador-level rank and undersecretary of state. Initially
(^considering his entry into service as tentative given the volatile climate o f patr onage, he quickly developed
j.a.deep sense, o f loyalty to his diplomatic calling, which proved a vital glue in the professionalization of the
.U.S. foreign service. Along with all o f his subordinate secretaries, however, the passing paradigm still
-showed in their common, elitist backgrounds. All hailed from privileged upbringing and education, most
..attended Ivy League schools and traveled abroad, all enjoyed private income—together they showed how
far the service had yet to go towards opening up its ranks to merit-based access, towards eventually
democratizing its recruitment in the name of professionalization. Wealth directly and indirectly stood in
1917 as an important criterion still for selection, advancement, and success in the service. Only provisions
under the Rogers Act of 1924 and subsequent legislation would eventually replace wealth with merit as the
deciding factor. The mark of success towards professionalization, otherwise, stood with four o f eleven
secretaries in the embassy eventually rising through the ranks to become ambassadors themselves—a very
remote prospect at best when they first entered American diplomatic service.
On a more pragmatic level, until well into the twentieth-century, the United States made almost no
provisions, for suitable, pennanent housing for its diplomatic representatives abroad. AH the Europeans and most other nations considered adequate housing as indispensable to their professional diplomats.
Gerard’s experience vividly demonstrated the severe problems facing a new American envoy in this regard.
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Already considering his inadequate embassy and official residence before leaving America, Gerard was
consumed with the issue from immediately upon his arrival in Berlin the first week o f October, 1913, until
January, 1914. Almost the whole o f the first four months of his tenure had passed, when a brand-new
embassy opened finally for official business and the start of the German capital’s important social season.
During that time, he and his staff endured the major inconvenience and embarrassment o f searching for a
decent option in crowded Berlin, belabored the final decisions regarding the leasing, complete renovation,
and occupation of Wilhelmsplatz 7, and tried to minimize, meanwhile, the complete disruption of the
embassy, its work, and its reputation. Gerard, o f course, had to pay several tens of thousands of dollars of
his own money for the unnecessary distraction (no small sum in those days). In addition to the
considerable entertainment and living expenses to diplomats, expectations that they (especially the
ambassador or minister) paid for their own housing costs helped preserve private wealth as a key selection
^criterion, even as the new paradigm exhorted change. Only three years prior to Gerard’s appointment to
a-Berlin, the Lowden Act o f 1911 passed Congress to become the first important, though ultimately
, ineffectual, step towards redressing the housing crisis. The first, meager appropriations under the act came
‘.only later just before the war, the exigencies of which cast the issue on the far, back burner and ensured
sGerard’s Berlin would not be a beneficiary. After a few fruitless, post-war attempts, the 1926 Foreign
Service Buildings Act finally began to mount a serious effort to correct this critical fault in America’s
foreign service.
Caught in the middle of the housing issue, Gerard and his staff also found themselves in the midst
o f a phenomenal, technological revolution. A very important facet in the changing paradigm,
technological advances in only a few decades had introduced such innovations as the steamship,
automobile, airplane, telephone, typewriter, cinema, and, perhaps of most importance, a worldwide
communications web o f telegraph lines and wireless stations. Overnight, the speed o f transportation joined
new, virtually instantaneous, mass communications to effectively shrink physical distance and drastically
compress people’s notion o f time. The pace o f industrial life abruptly began accelerating, sweeping along
the world and its occupants almost helplessly. Between roughly 1880 and 1918 a novel “age of
nervousness” emerged to define the angst experienced by Gerard’s generation. The bewildering speed of
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change hastened by technology provoked lamentations and warnings o f man’s progressive degeneration.
Contemporaries assigned increased incidences of suicide, disease mortalities, crime, and other pathologies
to the “barrage of new speeds” in transportation and communication and the “tension, excitement, and
incessant mobility o f modem life.”4 The Gerard embassy ’s unusual double-insanity o f Second Secretary
Harvey and Assistant Naval Attache, Lieutenant Angel, gave dramatic point to the alleged connection.
On the occasion o f his first telephone exchange with his grandmother, the French poet Marcel
Proust had a vision o f death.5 Along with the demise o f an expiring world he saw, came also the extinction
o f old modes o f diplomacy. For a shrunken globe and immediate, transoceanic communications posed
direct implications for America’s old diplomatic paradigm and her diplomatic service. Events abroad took
on wholly new significance, as the nation had now to consider its interests and security on changed terms..
Faster warships and effective, coordinating contact between them and political decision-makers made
A merica seem considerably more vulnerable to foreign attack and urged a more security-minded foreign
/•^policy,. At the same time, diplomats no longer enjoyed an ample leasli, as under the old paradigm.
\

. Washington might exercise now micromanaging control dver its field representatives, like Gerard. Policies
•tiri ight now be informed, formulated, and coordinated with unprecedented efficiency. Along with the pace
.-.pf life generally, the rate of diplomatic dialogue and decision-making now accelerated quickly, as well.
.. Demands intensified in international relations for speedier decisions and replies, thus introducing higher
probabilities for mistakes and missteps under pressure, as the July crisis illustrated in 1914. Media like the
cinema and mass circulation newspapers made enormous contributions to raising popular awareness over
issues and.thereby to raising public relations and propaganda to new heights as weighty factors to be
considered in the conduct of diplomacy. Add to this situation the unparalleled diplomatic factors and
issues that accompanied the world war, and the milieu and conditions in which the Gerard embassy
conducted its work take on unusual severity—particularly when the actors were awash in residual elements
of the old diplomacy.

4 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time arid Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press,
1983), pp. 124-126.
5 Ibid., p. 268.
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The First World War erupted in the eleventh month of Gerard’s embassy and marked a hard
turning point for American diplomacy in every measure. With the war’s fury coming down all around, one
admirer called Gerard a “Pharos amid the storms of war.”6 Indeed, he did prove a “beacon,” as his
embassy helped illuminate the way to twentieth-century American diplomacy. Certainly the spotlight fell
most brightly upon the embassy’s work experience, from the extreme upturn in workload to their exposure
to work issues and factors with scant precedent in American diplomatic experience. The demands on the
undermanned, untested State Department beginning in August, 1914, nearly broke it, while similar
overwork exhausted the understaffed embassy in Berlin and elsewhere in the field. American travelers had
not required passports previously; now Gerard’s staff had suddenly to issue untold thousands throughout
Germany. Only through their official intercession could desperate access to emergency funds and escape
.fr om the empire be arranged for trapped Americans. The same held true for other nationals as well, once

.^Ihe embassy assumed the interests o f belligerent Great Britain, Japan, Serbia, Romania, and San Marino.
*These, early rushes on the embassy, however, soon gave way to the real work ahead.
, t

.

The substance of diplomatic work changed drastically overnight. Gerard quickly became

gmbroiled in other matters highly unusual for American diplomacy. Such novel issues as intelligence
collection, public relations, propaganda, and, most, indicative, human rights, chastened the Gerard embassy
and American diplomacy, as they would come to define and characterize the complexity o f modem,
twentieth-century international discourse. Assuming belligerent interests for Great. Britain, his embassy
soon became heavily engaged in British POW and civilian intern camp inspections at locations across the
empire. Ensuring basic needs were met and standards and rights upheld by their German captors, Gerard
proved key in gaining the introduction of and maintaining access for neutral, non-govemmental aid
organizations as the Y.M.C. A. The embassy also worked hard as intermediary to negotiate prisoner
exchanges between the German and British governments, ultimately gaining repatriation for hundreds o f
men.

Largely because of Gerard’s diplomacy in Berlin on the organization’s behalf, Herbert Hoover’s

Committee for Relief in Belgium averted catastrophic famine in German-occupied Belgium and northern
France, saving several millions o f lives. Although a similar food relief effort in war-torn Poland proved

6 Gerard Papers, Folder 12-20, Edwin J, Farber to Gerard, 18 February 1915.
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stillborn, the ambassador’s forceful representations at the highest level won elsewhere a stop to German
forced relocations of French civilians and deportations o f Belgian males as forced labor in Germany. The
deep and constant involvement of Gerard’s embassy in human rights and humanitarian issues thus
introduced American diplomacy to the much more complicated, untraditional demands it would face in the
new century.
Other extraordinary work demanded the embassy’s attention as well. In contrast to the services of
other nations, Washington had kept with the country’s prewar isolationist orientation in not encouraging
information gathering and reporting on conditions abroad right up to the eve o f conflict. The war,
however, immediately required the establishment o f major national policies and, subsequently, the
negotiation o f a difficult neutrality through a wholly new landscape fraught with pitfalls, many exacerbated
.ifov.the modern technologies o f war and diplomacy. Public sentiments, domestic conditions, war effort,
official mood, and countless other indicators became important factors in the calculus o f diplomatic
^initiatives and the maintenance o f America’s neutrality. Information, therefore, proved vital and timely
intelligence collection for decision-making became a top priority for key outposts like Gerard’s. The
.embassy consequently exploited every available avenue as it sought, ultimately for Washington, an
accurate picture of Germany’s volatile internal scene. Gerard and his staff assiduously nurtured official
and-unofficial contact with Berlin’s diplomatic corps, German officialdom (especially the Foreign Office
and the Admiralty), German and American newspapermen, travelers, businessmen, politicians, and others
of influence. They constantly monitored domestic news sources for broader trends, while spies and private
detectives sought more specific intelligence. The staff brought back information from theif frequent
travels, whether inspecting POW camps or acting as couriers to Paris or London. U.S. consuls irt-country
knew to advise Gerard o f any sensitive news and to direct potentially valuable contacts to the embassy. In
so many ways, then, did Gerard attempt to establish an accurate sense o f developments from inside Berlin
and, meanwhile, establish a place for intelligence gathering in twentieth-century American diplomacy.
. Perhaps to no more important facet of diplomacy was information so critical, than to the newlyemerging factors o f public relations and propaganda. Sensitive public opinion, made keen in these early
days o f mass communication, arose as a potent consideration in domestic politics and international
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diplomacy. This was especially so in democratic, industrial America—the most important neutral in the
war and “land o f propaganda par excellence," in the opinion o f the German ambassador, von Bemstorff.
Both sides in the conflict determined early on that their public standing in America was crucial to their war
success, an emphasis which inevitably,spilled over into American diplomacy, as Gerard’s experience
amply demonstrated. The embassy’s humanitarian work, for example, was steeped in public relations
concerns. The threat o f being condemned to the world over an avoidable food disaster in Germanoccupied Belgium gained leverage for Gerard’s diplomacy in Berlin, just as prospects o f negative press
certainly played well in his successful representations for redress of other humanitarian issues like the
Belgian deportations and French relocations.
At the same time, British public opinion was an important concern for Gerard, responsible as his
^embassy-was for the welfare of several tens of thousands of English POWs and interned civilians. He
tj;St;ood very much aware of the potential ripple effect that publication of the embassy’s camp inspection
■imports might have in inciting popular domestic pressure. Pressing the British government for hasty,
counterproductive action could inadvertently invite German retaliation; alternatively, the threat o f pressure
disadvantageous, to German designs could prove a powerful ally in Gerard’s negotiations. Gerard’s run-in
..with the League o f Truth, meanwhile, established the dangers o f propaganda. Evincing a credible veil of
neutrality was as important to his diplomatic effectiveness with the Foreign Office as it was to his
reputation back in Washington. The mauling his ambassadorial prestige suffered at the hands o f the
German government-backed League o f Truth struck a serious blow on both counts. Fully Comprehending
the threat,- he went to exorbitant lengths combating the League’s muiti-pronged smear campaign through
. newspaper editorials, counterespionage, legal action, and his own counter-League o f Friendship, reaching
even so far as to draft a proposed propaganda play.
The experience o f Gerard and his staff with public relations, propaganda, intelligence gathering,
humanitarian diplomacy, and other novel, diplomatic demands presaged the complexities and concerns of
modem American diplomacy. Exposed to the leading edge o f the shifting paradigm and the new
diplomacy, veteran diplomats became a post-war premium. The negotiation of peace provided immediate
evidence of their great value, as the U.S. government tapped numerous Gerard staffers for important roles.
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Appointed Secretary of the United States Commission to the Paris Peace Conference in November, 1918,
Joseph Grew rushed to prepare proper facilities in anticipation o f President Wilson’s arrival. The
diplomatic service’s wartime experience was not lost as Grew whipped the logistics into shape, including a
complete communications system with 24-hour code and cable facilities, considerable numbers of couriers
and messengers, and a complete American telephone exchange. Reproduction o f the Commission’s vast
paperwork fell to a large staff o f stenographers, mimeograph operators, and a special printing facility.7
Grew meanwhile arranged positions for a proven, able group o f diplomatic secretaries, o f whose
professional qualities he was well aware. Former embassy Special Assistant Ellis Loring Dresel he placed
in charge o f the Division o f Current, Diplomatic, and Political Correspondence,8 with Gerard Third
Secretary Lithgow Osborne among Dresel’s principal assistants in an organization designed to keep the
■State Department apprised of Paris developments. Former Second Secretary Hugh Wilson acted briefly as
..secretary to the Commission as a whole and former Third Secretary Alexander Kirk performed as personal
secretary to Secretary o f State Lansing.9
The Paris conference altogether “showed how far removed from the requirements o f the twentieth
century [the] Old State. [Department] with its pigeonholes and sealing wax had been,” as Grew and his
colleagues displayed their growing expertise against the “full force o f the ‘heyday o f irregular
diplomacy.’” 10 Their pivotal, wartime experience in Ambassador Gerard’s Berlin embassy left little doubt
that America’s maturing world power status and inevitable global involvement in the new century
promised much rougher going than in the last. No longer would or could non-professional diplomats
suffice for the rigors certain to come; Gerard’s mere “sufferance” o f amateurs stood soon to invite
potentially ruinous consequences for the nation. Only six years later, the Rogers Act recognized this truth
with its 1924 establishment o f a professional United States Foreign Service. With the diplomatic paradigm

7 Waldo FI. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development o f the United
States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966; paperback edition published New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 37.
8 Dresel would undertake afterwards an important investigatory mission to Berlin before finally becoming
American High Commissioner in Germany and negotiating a final treaty o f peace with Berlin in 1921,
preliminary to the reestablishment o f diplomatic contact the next year.
9 Heinrichs, American Ambassador, p. 42.
10 Ibid.
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shift nearing its fmal form, it seemed clear to men like Congressman Rogers and Undersecretary of State
Grew that a perilous “new order” required an efficient “new machine,” and that for mighty America
diplomatic amateurism could have small place in it.
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